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THE CROZER QUARTERLY

October, 1943

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THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

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THERE is nothing in experience that is better established than the fact of human moral responsibility. Every man is constantly pronouncing moral judgments upon his own actions and those of other persons. He thinks of something that he has done, and says to himself: "I did right in that matter," or "I am sorry that I lost my temper and made such a fool of myself yesterday. I knew better than to act in that way." He makes similar judgments upon the deeds of other persons: "Henry Smith was a brave man to risk his life in order to rescue the woman and baby from the burning building." "Thomas Jones did a dirty trick when he took away that poor widow's cow with the lie that her husband owed him money that he had not paid before he died."

Moral responsibility is a principle which governs all human social relationships; without this principle it is hard to see how we could live with one another at all. Customs, moral obligations, laws would be impossible. Some gregarious animals, to be sure, live in societies of a sort; but human behavior is not ruled by instincts in the manner of animals. We have reasoning power, self-initiative, spontaneity, and capacity for independent action which animals do not possess; and unless we were restrained in our conduct by principles of moral obligation and responsibility, every man would be in actual or threatened conflict with other men, and human life today would be what Hobbes thought that it had been in primitive times—"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."

Moral responsibility implies what I shall call *pyschological freedom: i. e.,* that a person is free to do or not to do a particular deed, or to choose between alternative actions. The pressure of physical forces in his environment and organic conditions in his own body cannot be regarded as the complete determinants of the decisions of a person who is psychologically free and morally responsible, although no doubt they influence them. It is hard to draw the line between psychological freedom and moral responsibility for conduct, and mental and psychical abnormalities that make an individual psychologically unfree and morally irresponsible; the old tests in the common law need no doubt to be considerably revised in the light of recent psychiatry. However, even the partially insane are not wholly irresponsible so far as their relations with their custodians are concerned.

A psychiatrist, a former colleague, although he professed to be a materialist, once told me that it absolutely would not do to allow a mentally deranged person to think that people would never hold him to blame for anything that he ever did; a patient who thought that would not only be a menace to his keepers, he would also be medically incurable.

We often look with charity upon a criminal who grew up in vicious surroundings and we are disposed to exclaim: "There, but for the grace of God, go I!" We wonder if society is not more responsible for such a man's misdeeds than is the man himself. Yet who of us would not feel shocked if we were to hear a killer or a confidence man coolly declare: "I never had a chance. Society is to blame for everything wrong that I have ever done. I am the victim of circumstances. I have nothing of which to repent. Nobody should blame me at all." We do not like to hear such a man unblushingly pity himself, and disavow all moral responsibility whatever.

Nor do we like to hear the claim made that no great leader or benefactor of mankind deserves any credit for his services—that circumstances merely conditioned him that way: *e.g.,* that George Washington was born and bred in a society favorable for the rise of great men, and that Abraham Lincoln came from an excellent family stock, sure to produce occasional men of his type. None of us belongs on a level with Washington and Lincoln. Yet each of us has been more successful in life than a considerable number of our fellow citizens. In part our modest successes have been due to favorable circumstances in one way or another. Yet who of us would be willing to admit that he himself deserves no credit whatever, personally, for anything that he has accomplished? And, on the other hand, who of us does not occasionally confess to himself that in some ways he has failed to make the best use of his opportunities, and is painfully aware of his "sins, negligences, and ignorances"?

I have come across a few men who profess to be *mechanical determinists.* They affirm that since our bodies are composed of the same material elements as those of inorganic nature, and are subject to the same physical and chemical laws, it follows that moral responsibility is an illusion. A man's actions are determined by the same laws that cause a stone to roll down hill, and it is as absurd to blame a man for killing another man as it would be to blame a rock upon a hillside for falling upon and crushing a passer-by. Mechanists who talk in this fashion seem to me to be crude materialists who know little science and less philosophy. They rashly generalize from the physics of a generation ago and make sweeping generalizations in social fields in which mechanical principles do not wholly apply. For instance, there is no laboratory experiment that shows that the law of the conservation of energy completely accounts for the responses

of human beings to organic stimuli; to suppose that the law of the conservation of energy does thus apply is a sheer assumption based upon a dubious analogy. For there are too many differences between the behavior of stones and the actions of men to bring them under a common principle. Men are self-conscious, they reason, they remember the remote past and anticipate the distant future, they appreciate values, and their actions are often directed toward consciously conceived purposes. Moral responsibility is as obvious in human experience as any facts upon which doctrines regarding energy are based.

Some well-meaning criminologists have at times denied that criminals have moral responsibility. Such criminologists seem to be under the mistaken impression that recognition of moral responsibility necessarily implies vindictive punishments for offenders and excludes humane modes of treatment. That, of course, is not the case: any one who believes that criminals are morally responsible may also favor humane methods for the treatment of offenders. Criminologists sometimes talk about "rehabilitating" a criminal, as if he were a piece of mechanism like the machinery of a motor car that needs to be repaired. However, I am under the impression that prison wardens and others who have been most successful in inducing criminals to reform have not regarded their charges as mechanisms or robots to be "reconditioned," but as men to whose sentiments of self-respect, loyalty, gratitude, and devotion they have learned how to appeal. Kant and Hegel were right in claiming that men cannot be reformed against their own wills. It is only by treating men with respect, as human beings with personalities of their own, that they can be induced to desire to lead better lives, and assisted to do so.

If you agree with me up to this point, you will be ready to affirm that normal men under ordinary circumstances are morally responsible for their conscious decisions, and deserve their own and other persons' approval or disapproval of the manner in which they make them. You will further agree with me in rejecting every theory of mechanical determinism which assumes that human conduct should be regarded as conditioned in the same manner as events in the purely inorganic field. You and I will agree with the mechanists that a knife is not morally responsible for slipping in a man's hand and cutting him, and that it would be absurd to punish the knife; but in opposition to the mechanists we think that if a man snatches a knife, slips behind another person and stabs him in the back, the man is morally responsible.

With psychological freedom and moral responsibility accepted and mechanical determinism rejected, there lies before us the problem of working out an acceptable philosophy of the psychological freedom of the will and moral responsibility. There are two current hypotheses on the subject,

indeterminism and *self-* or *teleological determinism.* The simpler of these is *indeterminism.* Adherents to this view frankly admit that a person's decisions are considerably influenced by his heredity, habits, sentiments, and his physical and social environments. The indeterminist, however, insists that over and above all such influences a person has a locus of alternatives between which he can make a choice. Once he has made a choice, however, between two alternatives that keep recurring, a habit begins to form, and the time will come when the individual will largely be conditioned by that habit. This is the view implied in William James' famous chapter on habit. By forming the right habits when we are young, and adhering to them, we become masters of our fates, architects of our fortunes.

As an illustration of indeterminism, let us suppose the instance of two boys, Johnny and Tommy. On a certain day, each of the two boys has the same locus of choices. He may go to school or he may play hooky. Nothing in the heredity, environment, or past habits of either boy entirely determines his choice. Johnny decides to go to school, Tommy to play hooky. This locus of choices frequently recurs, and on each new occasion, partly by reason of his previous decisions, Johnny forms the habit of always going to school, until the time comes when it never occurs to him to play hooky. Tommy, on the other hand, forms the habit of playing hooky whenever he can, and his attendance at school becomes a rare event. After a few years the two boys come to have different loci of choices. As a result of his past habits, the training he has received, and the character he has acquired, Johnny's locus of choices now permits him to decide whether to go to college or to accept a position in the office of a business firm. Tommy's locus of choices is different; he is unprepared for college, and no business firm would want him in their office. So Tommy's choices are whether to take a job as an unskilled laborer or to begin a career as a pickpocket. If we wish to be melodramatic, we can imagine that when Johnny has reached the age of fifty, he may have as his locus of choices either to become President of the United States or Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Tommy's locus of choices at the same age is, whether to submit to arrest and probably go to the electric chair, or to commit suicide. Each boy has, by the choices he has made, determined the direction of his subsequent development, and he is therefore morally responsible for the kind of man that he has become.

Looked at technically, James believed that free choice was limited to the fiat exercised in the few seconds in which voluntary attention is possible. Attention ordinarily goes on nonvoluntarily or spontaneously: when this is the case, what interests us holds our attention, and such interest is determined by stimuli and habits. Voluntary attention, however,

is different. Suppose you are sitting in your study trying to read a book on some technical subject. A radio is turned on in an adjoining apartment. By a definite effort, or fiat, called voluntary attention, you concentrate upon your book. If your effort at concentration is successful, you soon become absorbed in the book and forget the radio entirely; your brief moment of voluntary attention has been succeeded by spontaneous effortless attention. On the contrary, if the radio grips your attention, the opposite occurs; your voluntary effort lapses, you forget your book, listen to the music, and your attention again becomes spontaneous.

Our conduct is in the end determined by the ideas that persistently hold our attention; all ideas attended to ultimately lead to appropriate actions, unless blocked or inhibited by external circumstances. The boy in college who is uncertain whether to become a physician or a lawyer, but who directs his attention more and more often toward one of these professions and less and less toward the other, will in due course find his mind "made up" in favor of the one to which he has given most thought. As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he. We make our life decisions in our moments of voluntary attention. Such is James' version of indeterminism.

Few if any social scientists like indeterminism. It is easy to see why. Psychologists wish to give a complete explanation in scientific terms for every phase of the conduct of individuals; economists wish fully to account for the behavior of men in their field of investigation, and the political scientists in theirs. Historians wish to state accurately the causes of events in history. So far as free choice is conceded to individuals in an indeterministic sense, precisely to the same extent actions are unaccountable and unpredictable, and scientific explanation is impossible.

Now an indeterministic philosopher like Bergson, for instance, might claim that this is exactly the case. In the domain of inorganic matter "nothing new ever happens": the future is a repetition of the same elements and operations as the past: that is why predictions in physics, chemistry, and astronomy are possible. An astronomer can tell you with absolute accuracy the dates of every total eclipse of the sun for centuries, not only in the past but also in the future. On the other hand, no social scientist can make any predictions, even for the very near future, with any high degree of accuracy. I recently heard one of my colleagues in the social sciences confess that ever since 1939 he had been attempting to predict to his classes what the next event in the war probably would be, and in nearly every case he had been mistaken! A historian or biographer, looking backward, can persuade himself and others into believing that he has stated accurately the causes of the events that have occurred in a field under investigation; but he is mistaken if he thinks that any social scientist, even if he

had been omniscient, could have predicted the outcome before it took place. I have just been reading a treatise in natural theology, in which the writer affirms that while God may be omniscient to the extent that he knows all that has happened in the past and all that is occurring today, even God cannot completely predict the future, because he cannot anticipate the undetermined decisions of the free agents in the universe who have wills of their own.

However, such considerations are unlikely to overcome the dislike of the social scientists for the indeterminist interpretation of the freedom of the will. I hasten to add that many moral philosophers agree with them in this dislike. On ethical grounds it is sometimes argued: What credit does a man deserve for actions if they are not determined by himself—by his own character? What *is* a man except his personality—his impulses, sentiments, ideals, aspirations? Yet all of these latter can in some measure be described and understood causally, and either empirically or rationally explained. If in addition to these elements of character, there exists in a man some weird, unexplainable, unaccountable factor of will that intervenes and decides his conduct, is the man himself really responsible? Does indeterminism successfully account for moral responsibility, much as it endeavors to do so?

Let us therefore turn to the other hypothesis for explaining moral responsibility and psychological freedom—that of *self-* or *teleological determinism.* According to this view, a man's conduct, when he is morally responsible, is determined by his *self* and his purposes—*i.e.,* by his character, his personality, by what sort of man he is. To be sure, his personality or character is the product of his physical and social environments, his habits, sentiments, ideas, and ideals—by, if you like Freudian terminology, his *id, ego,* and *superego*; but even so, the man is responsible for every action that is the outcome of his own mental processes, conscious and subconscious—except of course, to some extent, in pathological cases.

Self-determinism ought to be an acceptable view to social scientists. It welcomes the psychologist's causal explanations of the factors that go to make up the personality of an individual man, and also the explanations that other social scientists may offer for economic, sociological, and historical processes. All that the self- or teleological determinist insists upon, is that a sharp distinction must be made between the *kind* of causation that goes on, mostly if not wholly mechanically in astronomical, geological, physical, and chemical events, and the very different kind of causation that goes on in the self-conscious and purposeful acts of a rational human being. This distinction must be insisted upon in order to account for the fact that the normal human being is morally responsible for his actions, whereas the stone or other inanimate object is not responsible.

A human being, when he makes decisions, does so with some conscious purpose in mind, and this purpose grows out of his memories of the past and his anticipations of the future, his ideals and aspirations, his relations to other persons, and his powers of abstract reasoning. When a man makes his last will and testament, he may take into consideration his memories of the distant past and plans for the remote future. He may make provision for descendants as yet unborn. The founder of a world religion may bring within the scope of his plans the welfare of millions of people in all parts of the world for ages to come. Think of the scope of the will of Jesus when he decided to die upon the cross, if you accept the significance attached to that decision by the author of the Fourth Gospel, or the formulators of the orthodox creeds! Or think of the vision of Gautama Siddartha, the Buddha, when after years of effort he at last attained Nirvana under the Bo tree, and decided to renounce bliss for the time, and to devote the forty-five remaining years of his long life to the humble wanderings of a mendicant, teaching the four noble truths and the noble eightfold path to the common people of India.

In the case of a purely mechanical event, the only cause to be taken into account is another event immediately preceding it in time and contiguous to it in space. In the case of a human being, when he makes a moral decision, the remote past and distant future, plans, purposes, ideals, values, abstract concepts and reasoning, all often enter in and help to determine what is done. If the social scientist will remember this—he does not always do so—the self- or teleological determinist will have no quarrel with his causal explanations.

There is, however, an objection to self- or teleological determinism, in the opinion of some moral philosophers. If, as the self-determinists say, a man's conscious decisions are all causally determined by his own self or personality, so that, being the kind of person he is, he cannot decide otherwise, is he really psychologically free and morally responsible? In answer to this objection, the self-determinist can repeat only what has already been said. A man's decisions, when he is morally responsible, are determined by his self—that is what makes them different from events in inorganic nature in which there are no selves. This distinction is sufficient to establish human moral responsibility.

I confess that personally I am not wholly satisfied with either indeterminism or self-determinism. Moral responsibility seems to be an indisputable fact. Indeterminism and self-determinism are both earnest endeavors to account for this fact, although their methods of explanation are quite different. Neither seems entirely successful. Yet there has arisen no other hypothesis that seems any better.

Let me try by an illustration to show the differences between mechan-

ical determinism, self-determinism, and indeterminism. News, let us imagine, comes in the course of the same day to Mr. Integrity, an officer in the First National Bank, to Mr. Careful of the Second National Bank, and to Mr. Risingman of the Third National Bank, that Mr. Landpoor would like to sell a piece of property that he owns in the business district of the city, for $800,000 cash, and that Mr. Acquisitive is ready to buy this property for $1,000,000.

On receiving this information, Mr. Integrity resolves that at the first opportunity he will inform each of these two gentlemen that he can make a successful deal with the other. The notion that he might himself take advantage of the knowledge does not occur to Mr. Integrity for a moment. Had any one suggested it to him, he would have felt insulted.

Mr. Careful reacts differently to the information, when it comes to him. Mr. Careful would like very much to buy the property from Mr. Landpoor for $800,000 and sell it next day to Mr. Acquisitive for $1,000,000. The trouble is, that Mr. Careful would have to dip into the funds of his bank to get the necessary cash. To be sure, the money would not be likely to be missed. The bank examiners have made a visit quite recently, and they are not likely to come again for some time. He will be able to restore the money to the bank in two or three days. There would really be little risk. But he is a careful man: if he were caught, he would be disgraced, his whole career would be ruined, he might even have to go to prison. And, too, it would not really be the right thing to do, and he has hitherto been an honest banker and would like to remain so. Therefore, after a severe internal struggle, partly as a matter of caution and partly from moral scruples, Mr. Careful overcomes the temptation and continues to be an honest banker.

Mr. Risingman on receiving the information is strongly attracted by the opportunity of making a large personal profit. He is not a timid soul. The risk of making a temporary appropriation from the funds of his bank is slight. Without hesitation, he jumps at the opportunity and snatches the profit. He gets away with it. In the course of time Mr. Risingman carries off a number of equally successful coups, and becomes one of the city's wealthiest men.

Years afterward, at the beginning of a serious financial depression, Mr. Risingman dies suddenly, under mysterious circumstances suggesting suicide. His accounts are found not to be in order. Mr. Integrity and Mr. Careful acquire only the amount of wealth that honest bankers without independent means can accumulate. They live and die respected and respectable men.

Now which of these three bankers made his decision freely—one, none, or all of them?

According to the mechanical determinist view, none of them. The actions of each man were the result of mechanical causes inherent in his bodily organism and environment.

According to the view of indeterminism, Mr. Careful's decision, and it alone, was a genuinely free act. Mr. Integrity and Mr. Risingman were each so completely conditioned by his own character, habits, and principles, that only one of the two alternatives held his attention at all. Only Mr. Careful was able to look at both alternatives impartially, and by an act of free will make his decision.

The school of self-determinism would say that all three men were psychologically free and morally responsible. In each case the decision was made by the man himself, determined by his own character. However, Mr. Integrity should receive most praise. His personality was firmly integrated, consistent, in harmony with his own personal interests and with his duties to society. The very fact that he felt no temptation, had no internal conflict, shows how completely free and self-determined he really was. That is why he deserves the highest praise. Mr. Careful's character was less firmly integrated; but he, too, deserves commendation. He decided right in the end, and thereby gained more integration of character than he had had before. Subsequent temptations were in consequence easier for him to overcome. Perhaps in the course of time he attained integration of character equal to that already possessed by Mr. Integrity. Mr. Risingman of course was morally reprehensible. He acted against his highest ideals and the moral standards of his vocation. Yet he, too, was free in the sense of moral responsibility, and his conduct was the expression of his own bad character.

Now ask yourself whether none, one, or all of these three bankers exercised freedom of the will. Your reply will reveal whether you are a mechanical determinist, an indeterminist, or a self-determinist.

The illustration just discussed leads us to another conception of free will, which for convenience let us denominate *ethical freedom.* From this standpoint, which perhaps blends more readily with self-determinism than with indeterminism, a man is *ethically* free when, and only when, he does what is good and right, although he is *psychologically* free and morally responsible for all of his decisions provided only that they are the outcome of his own mental processes functioning in a normal way. As a moral being, you are ethically free when, and only when, you do what is consistent with your whole personality, and since you are a social being, this means that you are ethically free only when your conduct is in harmony with that of other persons and the common good.

The word integrity indicates ethical freedom. The irresolute person is not wholly ethically free because his character is not firmly integrated.

The dissolute person lacks ethical freedom almost altogether; his impulses and sentiments lack coherence, he has no stability. Yet all three, the person of integrity, the irresolute, and the dissolute men, are psychologically free and morally responsible.

All of us are imperfect persons and we live in an imperfect society. Complete ethical freedom, therefore, is an ideal, not yet fully realized by any mortal being. However, each individual increases his own amount of ethical freedom as his character becomes more nearly internally consistent and harmonious with society. As societies become more integrated and work more consistently for a common good, conditions become more favorable for the rise of a larger number of individuals of integrity. The better a society is, the better will be the individuals of which it is composed. The better individuals are, the better will be the society which they constitute. An absolutely perfect society would be composed of perfectly integrated individuals; a community of perfectly integrated individuals would be sure to maintain a perfect society. Advances toward complete ethical freedom imply correlative progress on the part of social groups and of individual citizens.

What theological considerations follow from the fact of human psychological freedom and moral responsibility?

In the first place, it follows that no doctrine about God can be acceptable, if it fails to acknowledge our psychological freedom and moral responsibility. For this reason it is impossible to accept without qualification the old doctrines of the absolute omnipotence and omniscience of God. Almost every theologian has conceded that God's power is limited in at least a few respects: *e.g.*, God cannot make round squares and vicious saints and cause the past not to have been. Furthermore, it seems to follow that God cannot have foreordained from all eternity all the decisions that every individual man makes today; otherwise men would lack psychological freedom and moral responsibility. Nor can we suppose that, although God has left us free to make our own decisions, yet he knew in advance exactly what decisions we should make, and created the world with this foreknowledge; such a supposition would make human freedom and responsibility a sorry sham, and regard us as mere puppets for divine amusement.

In the second place, therefore, it seems to follow that God for his own purposes has effected upon the earth the emergence of rational beings who possess a sense of values and who have sufficient freedom of choice—whether in the sense of self-determinism or of indeterminism—to decide for themselves whether and in what ways they will endeavor to realize these values in their lives. If men seek the help of God, he will indeed give them grace to pursue these values more consistently and effectively. But

men are free of their own initiative to pursue or to neglect the higher values, and to seek or not to seek divine assistance. God respects our personalities. Calvin was wrong: God does not overwhelm anyone with irresistible grace, and he does not foreordain any one to eternal perdition. Karl Barth is wrong: God is not a terrible Being, wholly other than ourselves, who vertically descends upon us from out of time and confronts us in crises. On the contrary, God is not far distant from any of us at any time. He is, as Tennyson said, "closer than breathing, nearer than hands and feet"; or, as the *Koran* expresses it, nearer to a man than the artery in his neck. God, though ever ready to help us, does not force himself upon us. He stands at the door and knocks. It is for us to decide whether we wish his society.

Since we have free wills in some sense, whether of self-determinism or of indeterminism, God cannot be wholly omnipotent in every respect. Nor can God be wholly omniscient, since he does not know how in the future we shall exercise our wills. Yet God is immeasurably wiser and more powerful than we. It is possible that God knows every event that has occurred in the tiniest electron or proton in the farthest galaxy of stars, as well as every thought that has passed through the mind of every conscious organism in the universe. God loves goodness and beauty, and he has been mighty enough to effect all the goodness and beauty that exist anywhere, with the exception of the comparatively small contributions of lesser beings like ourselves.

Thirdly, we may conclude that God is our best friend and counselor. Though neither wholly omnipotent nor omniscient, he can judge far more wisely than we regarding what we ought to do. His power is mighty to assist us in our efforts. And he loves us. We should therefore commit our wills to him, and be his fellow workers. Our wills are ours in order that we may make them his. As Dante says, "In his will is our peace." We should pray with Jesus, "Thy will be done."

"THE BEST THINGS IN THE WORST TIMES"

JULIUS SEELYE BIXLER
Colby College

MEMBERS of the graduating class: A few weeks ago I remarked to one of the boys at Colby that I thought the future belonged to his generation. "After the war great decisions will be made," I said, "and you and your companions will make them." "How can you say that?" he asked, "with the example of the last war before you? Why won't this war be succeeded by the same slump into apathy?"

I think there is one possible answer to his question, and it is what I should like to offer to you this morning. There is one important difference between what our generation found when we came out of college twenty-five years ago and what you see as you come from seminary today. If I talk of it in terms of my own experience, I hope it will not seem egotistical. By speaking in this way I can be more direct.

To begin with, we watched the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 without the slightest conception of the effect it was about to have on our own lives. War seemed of course a terrible thing, and we heard of it that first week in August with a great sense of shock, but it was a shock of sympathy for our friends in Europe. No one dreamed that it would strike nearer home. This in itself sums up a profound difference between our way of thinking and yours. We have learned today that what happens in one part of the world is bound to have its repercussions in other parts. Further, we have learned not merely how closely bound together are the various parts of the earth's surface but how closely connected are the various strands of social and economic life. When we hear of race riots in Detroit, for example, we think at once not merely of emotions at fever heat and of passion and prejudice rising high, but of economic and political causes. What is back of all this? we ask. When the strikers leave the mines, likewise, we think not merely of capital and labor and their disputes but of inflation and changes in the economic structure as lying in the background of labor troubles and causing strikes to flare up.

Thus where our generation was complacent, ignorant, and provincial, yours is easily stimulated, better educated, and more aware of the truth that no man, no country, no economic or political condition lives to itself alone. A lot of educating on this subject remains to be done, you may say, and you will be right. But the difference in knowledge seems very great as one looks back at the change. You and your generation know a considerable amount about social strains and tensions and about the

darker forces that are ever ready to break out to overwhelm a society that is not on the watch for them. Your chance of controlling these forces is to that extent better than ours.

After college I spent a year teaching in southern India. It is interesting to recall today how much the Indian boys of that time talked about Japan. "If we can only follow Japan's example," they kept saying, "all will be well." What they meant was that Japan in beating Russia had shown the Orient how it might throw off the yoke of Europe. The problem was thought of by the Indians solely as a private quarrel between themselves and Britain. Because they knew they had no way of arming themselves as Japan had done, they felt they were licked from the start and took out their feelings in expressing admiration for the Japanese.

Now it is far from my purpose to suggest that the Indian problem today is not a serious one or that anyone has an easy solution for it. But I submit that one can watch the growth of a state of mind, both in England and in India, where the problem itself is seen to belong to the world as a whole rather than merely to the two squabbling parties. What was the real issue on which the Cripps mission failed? Is it not true that Cripps offered the Indians just about all they wanted, the trouble being that he set the wrong date? For practical purposes England promised to meet their demands after the war. The negotiations really broke down on the question who should control India's defense in wartime. That, after all, is a problem which will not appear when the war is over. The lengths to which the British have gone in their postwar proposals for India and the growth I have mentioned of a feeling on everyone's part that the Indian problem is a world problem lead me to believe that the problem itself is nearer solution today than it was twenty-five years ago.

Some years later I lived in Syria. The Syrians of that day were very bitter. Palestine, you may recall, was after the last war called the "Much-Promised Land" because it had been openly or secretly promised to so many parties. The Balfour Declaration promised it to the Jews, the McMahon agreement to the Arabs, the Sykes-Picot treaty to the British. There was every reason why the Arabs should have felt abused, and they expressed their feeling in no uncertain terms. One day a student said to me: "You think that we come to this American College of yours to learn about American culture, religion, and idealism. If you think so, you're fooling yourself. We've come to learn the secret of America's materialistic civilization, and when we learn it, we're going to turn it against you!" Making allowance for the bravado of his remark and his eagerness to see what kind of an effect he could produce, it is still true that the boy was a spokesman for the bitterness of the Arabs against the use of their country as a football for European politics. To change the

figure, Syria was a pawn in the international chess match, just as it had been for centuries, with the difference that crude oil had taken the place of olive oil as the stake of the game.

Once more it would be idle to claim that the Near East no longer presents problems of a most intricate sort. But there is no sense in shutting our eyes to the change in public opinion in the last quarter of a century. Every one recognizes today the importance of the Near Eastern cog in the world machine. Our knowledge of the importance of certain raw materials and of the areas across which they must be transported has brought with it, almost in spite of ourselves, a similar knowledge of their importance to everyone else. Not necessarily because we view the matter altruistically but from the standpoint of hardheadedness we see that the problems of the Near East are world problems and will not be solved until we have achieved at least a degree of world mindedness.

One more illustration, this time from a year in Germany which followed soon after. A brilliant German university student, whom I had congratulated on his prospects for a distinguished career, said to me in surprise: "You seem not to realize that there are no careers ahead for my generation in Germany. The inflation, the loss of capital, and the unemployment have left no future for the intellectual classes. I will return," he said, "to my native village to have an honorable life, I hope, but nothing that can be called a distinguished career." Anyone who knew the Germany of the twenties could duplicate the remark many times over. We used to hear the crack that in Germany matters were serious but not hopeless, while in Austria they were hopeless but not serious. We forget how actually hopeless they were for a large proportion of German youth and how desperate the Germans were when they turned finally to the Nazi movement.

Why had conditions in Germany reached such a pass? Am I not right in saying it was because Germany and the German problem were treated as an isolated phenomenon? After the last war there was no realization of Germany's place as an inescapable element in the total world picture. The general assumption was that the Allies could treat her about as they pleased so long as the ordinary demands of decency were met. Today I think matters are very different. We know now that what Germany does and thinks and feels affects profoundly the thinking and feeling of millions of men and women all over the globe. I don't claim that we have agreed upon any solution for the problem this presents. I do think it is important to see, however, that the problem itself is recognized and that this marks an advance from our earlier ignorance.

I should sum up the difference in the two generations this way. In the first place, there has been an intellectual improvement. Your

education is better than ours. You know more of the facts of the social struggle, of the interdependence of various parts of the world, and of the interweaving of the threads of psychology, economics, and politics. You know more facts than we did and you see better how to appraise the facts you know.

Secondly, the moral situation is different. In our time the teachers of ethics had to say: Choose the unselfish, disinterested point of view in place of selfishness and greed. Today we know that the alternative is not so clear-cut. The question is not whether to live for others or for ourselves but whether we can understand the total situation well enough to save others and ourselves at the same time. Our own destiny is bound up with that of others. This seems to me to be an insight new to this generation, or at least new in the broad implications it brings. Take just one illustration. In his book *One World* Wendell Willkie says: "To raise the standard of living of any man anywhere in the world is to raise the standard of living by some slight degree of every man everywhere in the world." That, I submit, is a new idea with profound and far-reaching ramifications. If your generation can take this insight seriously and follow it through, you will find yourselves with a new moral situation on your hands. You will find that your moral problems can be solved with education and applied intelligence since the real question for you will be: Can we help people to see that their own welfare is bound up with that of others? In other words, the chances of success with your problem and your methods appear to be much greater than were our chances twenty-five years ago.

Finally, there is a religious difference. After all, you cannot consistently send a boy out on an idealistic crusade for democracy if you yourself feel that pleasure is the end of life. You cannot ask him to kill and be killed for a cause if your own philosophy is materialistic and cynical. It must be a very blind person today who does not see that men are grappling with this issue and does not sense their yearning for a religiously satisfactory creed. Out of this common ache of humanity for an idea which will justify the world's suffering a new approach to religion is bound to come. Kierkegaard says: "One must have suffered very much before there can be any talk of loving one's neighbor." Unamuno adds: "Men love one another with a spiritual love only when they have suffered the same sorrow together." Why should we not believe that from this world-wide experience of suffering there will emerge a world-wide desire for a creed that shall express our common human brotherhood, and that from this will come a feeling of our need for God? Suffering is giving us a new sense of neighborliness—there can be no doubt about it. As William James once wrote on the subject of bereavement: "It brings one closer

to all mankind,—this world old experience." Out of the yearning and groping that is so characteristic of our own day there must come—if religious leaders show real leadership—a new insight into the meaning of our common lot as members of one family.

Is it far-fetched to believe that this will lead to a new understanding of God? The first commandment is to love our God and the second to love our neighbor. In the practical experience of daily life doesn't the second come first? Why should we love the Lord whom we have not seen if we fail to love the neighbor whom we have seen? However it may be with the specially gifted mystics, it seems to me that for most of us love for neighbor is natural and even instinctive, while love for God is a more difficult and less understood experience that comes as we reflect on the amazing fact of a world where love for neighbor is possible. What kind of a world must this be? we ask. What qualities does it possess to produce this driving passion of neighborliness? We ask the meaning, as the philosopher says, and answer with the name of God. This seems to me again to be what the philosophers would call the truly empirical procedure. We take the common, irreducible, and striking features of our daily life, and when we ask what they imply we are led to religious belief.

Because this view of religion has such a natural basis in our emotional life and promises so much for the future, I am extremely suspicious of the attempt of so many of our theologians to call us back to an authoritarian creed which does not fit our present climate of opinion. There is time to comment on only one feature of this attempt. It seems to me that our neo-Calvinists have no right to exploit for their own theological purposes the present feeling of agony and disillusionment. Suffering is the experience of each one, be he orthodox Christian, liberal, Jew, or Buddhist. As Hosea knew long ago, it is what we all share as men and what should therefore bind us together in our common lot instead of dividing us into warring sects. Suffering is a part of the universal human situation and it should not be used for partisan purposes. Our friends of the neoörthodox camp emphasize it to impress on us the need for a special type of belief. By contrast I think the liberal uses it not to defend a particular creed but to assert the universal attitude that in its expression of a common aspiration underlies all creeds. Further, I think that the liberal who stresses the persuasions of the God of reason and love struggling against obstacles that were not of his making has much less explaining to do than the conservative who has to fit the horrors of the present day into the pattern of God's sovereign and transcendent will.

Let us cultivate for ourselves, then, the type of humanism which would stress the solidarity of the human family and would at the same time remember that the finest ideals in human life were discovered and

not invented by man. I find great encouragement in the fact that this is a natural emphasis for youth and particularly for your generation of youth with the evidences it shows of a growing world-mindedness. One can see the lines forming today for the conflict between youth and age that is coming after the war. Age in this sense does not refer necessarily to physical age but rather to the hardening of mental and emotional arteries that shows itself in attitudes of prejudice. Wherever you hear men speak of keeping the lines of empire intact, or keeping the Negro in his place, or maintaining the trade barriers of isolationism, or raising the standard of living in one country at the expense of others, or where you hear the theologian crying: "My creed, may it ever be right, but right or wrong, reasonable or unreasonable—my creed," there you hear the voice of men whose feelings and ideas are unable to keep pace with the times and whose minds have ceased to grow. But wherever you hear the magnificent slogans of democracy, calling for liberty, equality, *and* fraternity, and where you find those slogans backed up with the knowledge of fact necessary to make them effective in this modern world, there you hear the voice of a generation that is bound to keep the flexible resiliency of youth even when in terms of bodily structure it is no longer young.

I would not minimize the evils of the present time, or indulge in any complacently optimistic hopes. The terror and the horror are here, and we must deal with them as we can. I would simply indicate that for our own mental health and for our own religious effectiveness we cannot dwell on them too much but must fix our attention on such grounds for hope as are evident. I have tried to show that at one crucial point, the awareness of our problem as a world problem and the knowledge of the facts that make the problem what it is, this generation is ahead of the generation that graduated from college and seminary during the last war. I make bold to believe that the point will not be lost on you. For you are fortunate in having had your professional training in an institution that takes advantage of its opportunities in an industrial community, that proclaims an interdenominational ideal, and that freely admits qualified members of all races to its privileges.

Last summer in a sermon at Colby Dean Charles W. Gilkey quoted the following memorable sentence from a tablet in the chapel of Staunton Harold, Leicestershire, England: "In the yeare 1653, when all thinges sacred were throughout ye nation either demollisht or profaned, Sir Robert Shirley, Barronet, founded this church; whose singular praise it is to have done the best things in ye worst times, and hoped them in the most calamitous." May it be said of us that we did the best things in the worst times and hoped for them in the most calamitous because we knew what we were doing and on what our hope was based.

CHRISTIANITY AND A NEW WORLD

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THERE are two rays of hope which shine, intermittently but I think with increasing steadiness, in the midst of the storms of these tragic days. One is that men are turning back anew to the sources of life and power in the Christian religion; and the other is that there is forming a common will toward a new world order.

In many and diverse quarters it is being recognized that the democracy for which men are willing to sacrifice and die has deep rootage in the Hebrew-Christian tradition. This is borne witness to, negatively, by the fact that the Nazis, in their war against democracy, seek to displace Christianity among the German people by a new religion of blood and soil and want to deny to the people the reading of the Bible. *Per contra,* Thomas Mann, writing in the *Atlantic Monthly* (February, 1942), finds the solution of our most fundamental social problem in "the Christian conception of the world." Let me also quote from the *Christian News-Letter,* which comes twice a month from London. The editor, Dr. J. H. Oldham, prints a letter from a correspondent who is turning from a vigorously active secular career to seek ordination. This correspondent writes:

> I have been increasingly conscious during the past decade, and, in particular, during the past year of crisis, of an impulsion of spirit, like the undertow of a tide, back to the Church. . . . If I am candid with myself I know that this impulsion is something beyond reason. It is something stronger than my will and indifferent to the judgments of my mind. In this I do not really decide; I am decided.

The writer has been searchingly critical of the church, and he remains so, but he is responding, as he says, to "that resurrection of Christianity which I know, none the less, to be at the birth."[1]

Perhaps there is no better indication of this new return to the Christian sources of life and power than that which is to be seen in the church itself. For the church is manifesting a deepening repentance for its own sins and a longing for an effective recovery of its original inspirations. In support of this I wish to cite a report of a committee of the Federal Council of Churches, published a few years ago. I quote only a few scattered sentences:

"Once again in history the Church of Christ has to struggle to be in the world but not of it." "Our immediate task is to summon our churches to repentance for personal and corporate sin. We need to repent of our

[1] *Op. cit.,* October 29, 1941.

concessions to the world." "From repentance we need to go on to a common faith." "Not only must we seek a common faith, we must seek a common conscience." And "we need an increasing consciousness of the Church as a world Christian community." We ought "to concern ourselves more than we have with the solid spiritual core of our membership. . . . These groups of people who have heard the call of Christ to a complete commitment of their whole lives need to find one another." "Above all we should seek to recover the original genius of the Christian movement in the Apostolic Age."[2]

Although the storm of war is now raging over the greater part of the earth, I believe that this ray of hope, which consists in a new turning to the Christian sources of life and power, is clearly to be discerned. But let each one consult his own heart.

The other ray of hope—the forming of a common will toward a new world order—is evidenced by the whole movement toward "winning the Peace"—lest in this war more millions than in the First World War shall prove to have died in vain. This movement is already taking on impressive dimensions. It is exemplified by the National Peace Council in London, composed of fifty national organizations in Great Britain; by the National Peace Conference in New York, representing thirty-eight religious and secular organizations; by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, led by James T. Shotwell and William Allan Neilson; by the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace, established by the Federal Council of Churches, of which John Foster Dulles is chairman. The movement appears in the demand to know the peace aims of the Allied Powers; in the increasing volume of literature on the subject in the form of books and magazine articles and materials for study groups; in gatherings of students to discuss the subject, such as the Southern post-war planning conference which met at the University of North Carolina on January 30, 1942, and in the great assembly of church leaders at Delaware, Ohio, March, 1942. The task of arousing the public mind in this and other lands on so great a question, and of coping with the moral and material exhaustion which follows a world war, is an enormous one. But at least this will to win the peace is more widespread and impressive than was evident in the last war; and the torso of the League of Nations is still before our eyes as a guide to new creative effort.

These two movements which are sources of hope, while distinct from each other, are interrelated in significant ways. Says Mr. John Foster Dulles:

> A few years ago, as a result of my thirty years of experience with international problems, I came to the conclusion that there was no hope of substantial progress

[2] *Christian Century*, December 30, 1936.

toward peace unless there were in the world more people who would bring to bear upon international problems the . . . Christian spirit.[3]

Similarly the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace writes:

No system of laws and organization can be of value without the living faith and spirit behind it. No world organization can succeed without mutual confidence on the part of its members. Our problem is largely an ethical one; it involves recognition on the part of all peoples, large and small, strong and weak, of the rights of others; a willingness on the part of all to make sacrifices for the general good; a belief in the existence of a power in the world that makes for righteousness. We set forth our conclusions in the knowledge and belief that unless a people have vision they perish.[4]

On the other hand, I do not believe that any return to the original sources of life and power in Christianity will be deep and lasting unless it brings to the masses of mankind a gospel of social as well as personal redemption, and unless that gospel impels men to the construction of an international order of justice and good will.

Let us, then, proceed directly to the consideration of our subject, CHRISTIANITY AND A NEW WORLD, in the conviction that its study is vital for the salvation of spiritual life in our time. It will be convenient to divide the subject, making the theme of this chapter, *Christianity and a New Social Order*—meaning thereby the domestic order—and leaving for the following chapter the theme of *Christianity and a New International Order*. At the same time I hope we shall not lose sight of the fact that these two themes are very closely interrelated.

PART I

CHRISTIANITY AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER

First of all we should direct our thought to certain aspects of the nature of Christianity. For Christianity contains an interpretation of ultimate reality which is basic for the establishment of any true order among men. What are the foundations, we must ask, already laid in Christianity, on which any order of society and of the world should be built?

The most comprehensive answer to this question is that any true order among men must be built upon God's eternal purpose. Prior to the foundation of the world is the purpose of God for which he founded it. "By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that what is seen hath not been made out of things which appear."[5] The Christian faith is that God is the only eternal being, and that all

[3] Quoted in the *Federal Council Bulletin*, January, 1941, p. 6.
[4] *Preliminary Report*, p. 8.
[5] Hebr. 11: 3.

other beings owe their existence ultimately to the will of God. And this faith is entirely relevant to our thought of the social and the world order. It denies the materialistic interpretation of history. It denies the doctrine that society can be dominated by the will to power on the part of man or superman. It cannot consent to the evolutionary naturalism which holds that the biological energies of man, or of this or that race, are bound to control the course of human events. Nor can it consent to the dualism which declares that self-interest must necessarily be man's dominant motive in economic and political affairs, leaving art, pure science, and religion as possible spheres of disinterested effort. All these determinisms—physical, biological, psychological, social—are false foundations for man's thought and action in the social order. They are perhaps half- or quarter-truths, which become grievous errors when conceived to be the ultimate bases of social life. Not *matter,* nor the *will to power,* nor *life-force,* nor the egoistic "war of all against all," is the determiner of destiny for the life of man. The ultimate determiner of destiny is the purposive will of God.

The new emphasis upon the sovereignty of God which recent theology has been placing has been a needed corrective of those doctrines of the immanence of God which have hardly distinguished him from the natural order, or the world process, or the spiritual life of man. At the same time the conception of God's sovereignty must be kept in harmony with the Christian understanding of his eternal purpose. For a supernaturalism of the Calvinistic type may in turn be little different from naturalism in practical effect, when it interprets the sovereignty of God to mean that all that is and happens is equally determined by his predestinating will. Such a conception of the divine sovereignty does not give us the true basis for the ordering of human life, for it may make us acquiescent in matters which we should know to be contrary to God's will.

What we need to do is to keep constantly in mind the content of God's will as made known to us in the Christian revelation. We need to interpret the sovereignty of God "according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord."[6] That eternal purpose, the apostle tells us, is "to sum up all things in Christ"; or as Professor Ernest Scott expresses it in his comment on this passage, "to reunite in Christ all things in heaven and earth." All the divisive forces in the world are to be overcome by the reconciling work of Christ. This purpose to sum up or reunite all things in Christ, which has now been made known by Christ's death on the cross, is the revelation of the mystery of God's sovereign will.

Here again we must give heed to keeping the doctrine of the sovereignty of God true to Christian teaching. Often that doctrine has made the will of God something so mysterious as to be utterly inscrutable

[6] Eph. 3: 11.

to the mind of man. But such is not the apostle's teaching. The mystery of God's will is a revealed mystery, an "open secret," to use Moffatt's translation. The self-forgetting love of Christ manifested on the cross is the power by which all things are to be reunited and brought into harmony. This is indeed a mysterious wisdom, which it requires the illumination of the Spirit to apprehend; but it is an open secret, manifest to all who will put their faith in Christ.

Once more, let us avoid the notion that the eternal purpose of God to sum up all things in Christ has its application only to what lies beyond the realm of time. Rather, it is the purpose according to which God is working throughout the time process. The apostle's expression, translated by "eternal purpose," means more literally "a purpose of the ages," and of this Professor Scott says in comment: "Not so much an eternal purpose as one that has run like a guiding motive through all the successive phases of the world's life." It is a teleological view of human history which the apostle gives us when he says that God has purposed to sum up all things in Christ. The Christian faith does indeed look for the complete fulfilment of God's purpose beyond the confines of human history, and the apostle, with the early church in general, expected that fulfilment to be ushered in very soon in apocalyptic fashion. But this complete fulfilment nevertheless was profoundly conditioned on the course of human events, and upon God's purposive working in those events. We cannot in our day rightly substitute an eschatological view of history for a teleological view, as though the former were an alternative for the latter. The biblical eschatology was itself teleological, and though our Christian eschatology has had to be modified, it must still be kept in the framework of God's enduring purpose.

In the Christian conception, then, that it is God's eternal purpose to reunite and sum up all things in Christ, we have the ultimate principle for any true order among men. By this principle our present social order and our present international conflict must be judged, and by this principle any attempt to recreate order, in our own country and in the world, should be guided. "Except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain that build it."

Bound up with this Christian interpretation of ultimate reality, which is relevant to every issue in the ordering of human life, is another principle which is fundamental for any order that shall be better than the one which is passing away. This principle is the reality of eternal values. It is actually inseparable from the principle of God's eternal purpose; but it is an aspect of the latter which our time has well-nigh lost sight of and sorely needs to recover.

It is too common in our day to hold that there are no eternal values. All values, it is said, are relative to the desires of men or to particular

times and social situations, and when these change, values change, and may do so completely. It has been claimed, for example, that human slavery was not always an evil. The argument is that it was better for the victors in war to enslave their captives than to kill them. Slavery, then, was a relative good. By the same reasoning polygamy, too, was once a good, namely, when the men of a tribe were continually being killed off in war. The intrinsic worth of human personality, the right of a person to freedom, the equality of men and women, and the sacredness of the monogamous family—these, it has been contended, are not eternal values. They belong to a certain period in history and to certain social conditions. Before that period and those conditions they were not values, and they may be superseded as time goes on.

But if we hold such a view, we should be ready to accept its consequences. For one thing we should acknowledge that on this basis we have no answer to give to totalitarian rulers who insist upon the drastic subordination of the individual to the state. The time, they say, for any such recognition of rights of individuals as democracies have given has gone by. Nor can we insist that the state must not dominate religion and ethics. And indeed on the basis of the complete relativity of values why may not totalitarian states settle questions of truth, including scientific truth, in accordance with the political policies they adopt—biological questions as to race, for example? And may not the obligation to good faith between nations be discarded as belonging to other times than ours? What, when we think candidly, are the ultimate reasons why we seek to defend democracy? Is it only because it is the way of life in which we happen to have grown up? But the attackers of democracy have either grown up, or are being trained up, in a radically different and opposing way. Is the last word concerning human values that of a struggle for existence between cultures, with war as the inevitable means of arbitrament? Or, in domestic relations, may great financial and industrial interests claim to be above the law, and deal with employees or the general public according to their sovereign will? May they hold the obligation to obey the law to be relative to the magnitude of the interests involved?

When we ask ourselves questions like these we become aware that our thought is without chart or compass, unless we recognize the reality of eternal values, and that a society which deliberately ignores those values is bringing about its own downfall. Truth, justice, honor, freedom, mutuality, love—these are values for the ages. Mankind discovered them slowly; but the discovery did not create them, for they are principles of God's nature. Indeed they were not so much discovered by man as revealed to him by God; though the revelation must needs wait upon man's seeking and upon his capacity to receive. But once apprehended,

they are seen to be eternal in their significance. They always have been valid, though their validity has not always been recognized. They are valid now, however far short of them we may fall. They always will be valid, whatever changes in human customs and culture the passing centuries may bring. Similarly personality, and a society in which personalities respect and further each other are infinite values; and any development of the state or of economic systems which overrides them is sowing seeds of disorder and preparing for its own downfall.

It is true that eternal values always require fresh application as new situations arise; hence practical procedures will alter with changing conditions. But it is also true that the direction of the changes and the resultant outcome will be good or bad, according to whether the changes are guided by eternal values or not. Take, for example, the determination of a just wage in a given industry. The idea of justice will not automatically settle the question. The financial condition of the industry and other economic factors must be taken into account. At the same time if the idea of justice does not play a significant part in dealing with the question, the outcome will be merely the result of the struggle of force against force. No doubt force or pressure will always play a part in such questions; but if the idea of justice does not enter into their settlement, the whole process tends to be destructive of democracy. As a matter of fact the recognition of eternal values, instead of keeping society static, tends to make it dynamic. Eternal values stand as a basis of criticism of any society, and impel its members toward changes for the better.

The recognition of the reality of eternal values, then, saves us from sheer naturalism. But it also saves us from extreme supernaturalism. The extreme form of supernaturalism regards God's will as so sovereign and inscrutable that no values apprehensible by man can be held to characterize it. But this doctrine, by placing God's will above all knowable values, tends to make the believer acquiescent in the course of human events as having been determined, however unintelligibly, by God's will. From this standpoint events tell us more of God's will than ideals. But such is not the truly Christian teaching. The prophet Amos envisions God's justice as a plumbline which shows that the tottering institutions of Israel must fall. The prophet Hosea shows God to be also unfailingly merciful and compassionate, yearning over his wayward people. Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the prophet of the Exile proclaim the union of justice and redeeming love in God—he is "a just God and a Saviour." The prophets thus tell us of eternal values as belonging to the very nature of God. So in the New Testament God is eternally both King and Father. With him from the beginning was creative reason. His nature is love. The

fulness of the divine nature dwelt in Jesus Christ and is revealed in his reconciling love.

Fundamental, then, for any social order—for judging our present one and for efforts toward creating a new and better one—are the eternal values which belong to the very nature of God, and which he purposes to realize in his universe.

But to God's eternal purpose, and the reality of eternal values, we should add a third principle. It is implied in what has been said concerning values, but it needs to be singled out for special emphasis. This principle is: the necessary correlation between freedom and fellowship. This is something which belongs to the very essence of Christianity. "For freedom did Christ set us free," declares Paul; "be not entangled again in a yoke of bondage." Christianity is not another legalism, but a religion of the Spirit. At the same time those who have been set free by the Spirit of Christ are "one body in Christ, and severally members one of another." Freedom and fellowship—for Christianity these are two sides of the same shield, two aspects of the same profound experience. Martin Luther expressed this twofold experience in his treatise *The Freedom of the Christian Man* when he wrote: "A Christian man is a most free lord of all things and subject to no one; a Christian man is a most dutiful servant of all things and subject to every one."[7]

But while basic for Christianity, this principle has not been made fundamental in our modern social order; instead it has been given only a very restricted application, or else has been directly violated. Lutheran Christianity, indeed, has confined the Reformer's union of freedom and fellowship almost exclusively to the sphere of the inward spiritual life and personal morals, and has taken a mainly passive attitude in the realm of politics and economics. As Troeltsch, the German philosopher-theologian has written: "Lutheranism is inclined to endure existing conditions humbly even when they are bad." This is because "the yielding spirit of its wholly interior spirituality adapted itself to the dominant authority of the day." "Thus Lutheranism naturally does little toward building up a new social structure."[8]

Calvinistic Christianity, it is true, has had a much greater capacity to penetrate political and economic movements and for a long time cherished the ideal of "a Holy Community," in which every phase of life was to be brought under the direct rule of God. But this was a thoroughly legalistic ideal, which sacrificed the freedom belonging to Christianity in its essence.

But with the secularization of modern politics and business it has

[7] A. C. McGiffert, *Martin Luther*, p. 95.

[8] Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, Vol. II, pp. 573, 574, 576.

been the claims of community which have been sacrificed. That was the inevitable result of the *laissez-faire* school of political economy and the doctrine that that government is best which governs least. The watchwords of the capitalistic system—freedom of contract, free competition, the regulation of both production and wages by the law of supply and demand—have led toward an economic individualism in which the values of community have been well-nigh lost sight of so far as business and industry are concerned. A similar individualism has prevailed in political life and in our general culture. In consequence the fellowship for which Christianity stands has found little or no realization in great areas of our modern life.

But the point which most concerns us now is that for lack of fellowship freedom in turn is endangered. The totalitarian governments make the charge that in the capitalistic democracies freedom, for great sections of the population, means only freedom to starve. And there is an element of bitter truth in this charge. When in a land of abundant resources like our own from seven to sixteen million men remain unemployed for years at a time, freedom to work means nothing to them. And again, when, among the employed, millions can only maintain themselves and their families at a subsistence level, freedom remains for them but a hollow word. An economic and social system which tolerates such large-scale social evils cannot pride itself on the liberty which it assures to its citizens, even though the system is politically a democracy. It lacks those qualities in its collective life which can enable these many millions among its citizens to be real persons. It is not a real community. In other words, personality and community, freedom and fellowship, belong together; the one cannot be had without the other.

I remember an interview with Justice Brandeis some twenty years ago which was enjoyed by a group of ministers, teachers, and social workers, of which I was one. A prominent social worker in New York, Mr. Robert Bruere, had gathered us together to meet his friend, the Justice, who himself had been actively interested in social questions before his appointment to the United States Supreme Court. There was an especial motive for the interview, which was to ask the Justice whether he thought ministers and academic people had any right to express judgments about matters in the business world, concerning which only the man of practical affairs might be supposed to have sufficient knowledge. Justice Brandeis began with a concrete business situation of which he knew. It was a business which had given only seasonal employment to its men; and for some years the workers had been employed on an average for only 128 days in a year. Such a state of things, said the Justice, is sin. A man cannot be a good citizen, he said, who is employed only 128 days

in a year. Such a situation, he held, is emphatically one for ministers and socially minded laymen to concern themselves with. If the businessman protests with the question, "What can be done about it?" the rejoinder may be: "That is a question for the practical expert to answer." But the difficulty in answering it does not alter the ethical judgment which condemns the evil situation.

In other words, there is an ethical and religious aspect to all questions of economics and politics, and this aspect must not be lost sight of through becoming absorbed in the practical and technical aspects. No aspect of these questions which affect the life of every one can safely be ignored; but that with which ethics and religion are concerned is most basic, and the ignoring of it is most disastrous. In the instance given by Justice Brandeis the necessary interrelation between personality and community life had been overlooked or flouted, and in consequence the freedom for personality on which democracy prides itself had been violated.

But just as personality and community, freedom and fellowship, are organically related to each other, so are all the eternal values—justice, mercy, truth, beauty, love—parts of one organic whole, being bound together in unity by the eternal purpose of God, which is working in history toward the goal of summing up all things in Christ. God purposes that the children of men shall become his sons, knowing the truth and so becoming free; becoming free also through becoming members one of another; having the divisive, evil forces within them and between them overcome by the self-giving, reconciling love of Christ. In these eternal realities taken in their dynamic unity Christians must find the ultimate foundations for any true order among men.

Their significance for a new order may be seen in part from the judgment upon the present social order which they involve. Justice Brandeis used the word "sin" in condemning the economic process which did violence to the personalities of the workers. Theological thought on its part is putting the doctrine of sin in the forefront of its teaching, in order to set forth realistically the central cause of man's desperate plight in this our boasted modern world. In so doing theology is striving to overcome the complacency which characterized so much of both secular and religious thought before the outbreak of the First World War. But if theology is to avoid ascribing sinfulness to human nature as such, thus taking it out of the realm of man's responsibility, it must make clear the positive good from which sinfulness departs and which it tends to defeat. That positive good is the eternal purpose of God in which he summons men to share, and the meaning of which is made known through the incarnation of the eternal values of his nature in his prophets and his Beloved Son.

Our present social order, then, comes under condemnation because

it involves so much that is contrary to God's eternal purpose and resistant to its working. Our sins of omission are very great in that we have failed to share, individually and collectively, in God's creative working in human society. Instead we have bogged down in self-satisfaction or in cynicism. Our sins of commission have been no less great. We have jealously guarded our privileges instead of seeking justice. We have been governed by class or race feeling instead of the ideal of human brotherhood. We have sanctified the profit motive and glorified the will to power instead of making the promotion of human welfare our controlling purpose. Too few of us have really believed that the self-giving love of Christ could be the animating spirit of all our activities, whether in business or politics or in our daily work.

Thus the first effect of gaining a new hold on the eternal realities of our Christian faith will be a deep contrition for the sinfulness in the social order to which we belong and for our personal share in that sinfulness. We have been betraying the trust which God reposes in us in calling us to be his sons and in revealing to us in Jesus Christ the meaning of the life of sonship. But if we truly repent at having been traitors to God's trust and intend to bring forth fruits meet for repentance, we shall seek to make the eternal realities to which we have been giving our thought the foundations for building a better social order. Let us, then, go on to consider certain lines of reconstruction which are congruous with these foundations.

The first line of reconstruction which I would propose is closely connected with the last of our foundation principles. Our efforts at reconstruction should be directed toward such an organization of community life as will give effective freedom to all. Particularly should this be done in the sphere of economic activity. When our leaders in finance and industry talk about "our American way of life," they are most apt to emphasize "free enterprise" in the business world. But if we look back over the American scene between the First and Second World Wars, we may well ask, How much free enterprise was possible for the rank and file of American labor? Indeed, how much free enterprise was open to the graduates of our schools and colleges after the beginning of the great depression? And does not the monopolistic character of "big business" often override and throttle the free enterprise of "little business"?

In truth, we cannot save our democracy, with its ideal of freedom for the individual, unless we reconstruct it so as to give real freedom to all individuals. We need to keep in mind the special type to which the dictators of today who are the great enemies of democracy belong. The fascist and nazi dictators of the present, unlike many of the great dictators

of the past, have not come into power as military leaders with armies behind them. Rather, they are demagogues, who gained their power by playing upon the discontent and misery of the masses. And in America we have had recent specimens of demagogues who have proven enough of a threat to our democracy to give us warning. It is very dangerous, then, to try to save democracy in its old individualistic form. Instead, we must seek for such a synthesis of individualism and collectivism as will give us an organized community life providing freedom for all.

In corroboration of what I am saying let me cite a passage from a recent article of Professor John Bennett. He is urging the obligation of the church for preparing the mind of our nation to meet a revolutionary demand for economic justice. In this connection he says:

> The truth in the idea of "the wave of the future" is that the future does set for us a new and drastic choice, the choice between totalitarian and democratic planning of economic life for the benefit of all people. No people who have discovered that they can use the instruments of government to provide economic security for themselves are going to be the sport of unregulated markets or of privately owned monopolies. If democracy means that, then they will choose totalitarianism.[9]

Thomas Mann, writing in the *Atlantic Monthly* (February, 1942) on "How to Win the Peace," helps us to carry our thought a step further. He says:

> The fact that Russia and the Anglo-Saxon peoples are fighting today on the same side against the enemies of freedom and human dignity is only the external expression of an inner and deeper truth: namely, of the fact that socialism and democracy have long ago ceased to be alternatives. It is upon the meeting and the adjustment of the two that the hope of the world depends—the social reform and rejuvenation of Western democracy and the humanization of Eastern collectivism by the turn toward the democratic, toward the recognition of the values and rights of the individual (p. 179).

The author then goes on to show that the principles for this development are really contained in Christianity. He takes *freedom* as being the individual need and *equality* as being the social need, and continues:

> Christian humanity has combined the individual and the social principles in a way that is emotionally unassailable and wholly natural. The value and dignity it bestows on the individual, the human soul in its immediate relation to God, are not contradicted by the equality of all before God. On the contrary, that dignity and that equality are one and the same thing. . . . The Christian conception of the world accepts as a necessary truth that a human synthesis, a reasonable and just synthesis, must be possible between freedom and equality, the individual and society, the person and the collectivity. . . . And we feel today that in the relationship of freedom and equality the center of gravity has moved toward the side of equality and economic justice, away from the individual and toward the social. *Social democracy* is now the order of the day (p. 181).

[9] John Bennett, "Revolution or Counter-Revolution?" in the *Christian Century*, Feb. 18, 1942.

Thomas Mann belongs to that *hegira* to America from present-day German oppression which corresponds to the one that came to us after the failure of republicanism in Germany through the suppression of the revolution of 1848, and which brought many eminent citizens of the type of Carl Schurz; and he here speaks with the insight of one who has been persecuted for democracy's sake. The development of a social democracy is indeed the line we should follow in our efforts to reconstruct our American social order; and the ultimate grounding of that effort is, as we already have seen, in the necessary correlation between personality and community which belongs to the essence of Christianity.

There is a second line of reconstruction which it is important for us to adopt if we would bring our social order into accord with Christian foundations. We need to reorder our social practice so as to channel the fruits of science and technology directly and systematically into the service of human welfare.

It is notorious that nothing has changed the world in which we live so much as modern science and the inventions which science has made possible. The world as we know it today is infinitely vaster and infinitely more intricate than was the world as known before the advent of modern science. And our social life is far more complex, and in many ways richer, than that of our ancestors by reason of the systems of communication, transportation, manufacture, and agriculture which modern technology has made possible.

And yet many of the results of science today, instead of serving human welfare, are being employed for the building of armaments and used for the destruction of life; and thousands of laboratories are strenuously conducting work in the greatest secrecy in the hope of adding some new efficiency to the conduct of war. This is the heaviest charge to be laid at the door of modern man—that the science and technology of which he is so justly proud are being so used as to produce such unprecedented destruction of human life and to threaten the very fabric of civilization.

This problem of the appropriation of the results of science by militarism points ahead to the subject of the next chapter. But there is another aspect of the effects of science upon society which involves a more domestic problem. Many of the achievements of science that make possible great social benefits are exploited by private interests, which have financial profit as their main motive and entirely subordinate public benefit to such profit. Much, if not most, of our technology comes into the service of large private corporations—and necessarily so under our present economic system. For some kind of large organization of resources for production, whether by private capital, or by voluntary coöperative enterprise, or by the government, is indispensable for the practical execution of what tech-

nology makes possible. But under our present capitalistic system valuable discoveries are often suppressed. Others have to wait till a profit can be seen in their exploitation. Others, when developed, have egregiously large profits drawn from them by their promoters. And when the new developments, the fruits of technology, take place, no one becomes responsible for preventing injurious social by-products which appear in the form of unemployment.

This union, perhaps often unwilling, between science and technology and the profit motive is a misalliance. The scientist has devotion to pure science as his first ideal. He is a seeker after truth as such. He wants to know more about nature and about life. The technologist, too, is not primarily concerned with building up a fortune. He wants to develop new efficiencies through a more accurate knowledge of nature's facts and laws. Neither the scientist nor the technologist, as an individual, is controlled typically by the motive of personal profit. But in respect to the fruits of their work upon the social order the profit motives of individual enterprisers and of corporations are very largely dominant. It is true that some great corporations now have certain laboratories for research only, making no demand upon the scientists working in them for results of immediate value to the business. But even in these instances the divorce between research and profit can hardly be complete.

It may be objected that the line of reconstruction under consideration —the channeling of the fruits of science and technology directly into the service of human welfare—also introduces a motive of utility which is incompatible with pure science. I am far from wishing that pure science should be subordinate to utility, even social utility. Truth, as we already have said, is an eternal value, and the pursuit of truth needs no sanction from any utility, however lofty. That was a fine statement from Mr. Raymond Fosdick in connection with the anniversary of the Rockefeller Foundation: "Science is more than the techniques that cluster around it —more than its inventions and gadgets, more than the discovery and correlation of new facts. Science is a method, a confidence, a faith. It is a method of controlled and rechecked observations objectively recorded with absolute honesty. It is a confidence that truth is discoverable. It is a faith that truth is worth discovering." Yes, we may add, truth for its own sake.

But when the results of science do affect the general social order with a powerful impact, scientists as citizens, and citizens in general, do have a responsibility for directing these results for human welfare. This subject was made a matter of discussion at an annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Are the men of science, it was asked, not responsible for the social consequences of their discoveries?

Some of them resent being blamed for over-production and technological unemployment and the destructive uses of scientific discoveries. "Pure science," said one of them, "has nothing to do with ethics, she recognizes no moral obligations whatever." But others have accepted a new responsibility for the results of their laboratory labors. Said Professor J. C. Philip, president of the chemical section, "Impelled by patriotic motives, most scientists have put themselves freely at the disposal of the state in time of need. But many are hesitating to admit that patriotism must always override considerations of humanity. Whatever be our individual attitude in this matter, it is time for chemists and scientists in general to throw their weight into the scale against the tendencies which are dragging science and civilization down and debasing our heritage of intellectual and spiritual values."[10]

It would indeed be well if such an obligation were recognized by scientists. As we already have said, the eternal values, such as truth, beauty, justice, love, are organically related to each other in the purpose of God, and the pursuit of one should not render a person irresponsible in respect to the others. But if the obligation mentioned rests upon scientists, it rests no less upon all citizens. And it extends to the constructive uses of scientific discoveries as well as to the prevention of destructive uses. Dr. Walter B. Pitkin is authority for the statement that there are enough chemicals, valuable for agriculture, in the region of the Dead Sea to render all of Europe self-sufficient as to food supply, and at a higher standard than ever in the past, for many generations to come. I remember, a few years ago, seeing what a thriving business Imperial Chemicals, Ltd., was doing on the shores of the Dead Sea; but it could not be assumed that the enterprise was governed by any large social motive. By way of contrast we can bring to mind our own Tennessee Valley Authority, which is conducted in the public interest and is conferring marked social benefits upon all that region. TVA seems to have been accepted by the country at large, but only after the fashion of some actions that college faculties reluctantly take—"upon condition that it shall not be regarded as a precedent."

Such actions, however, often do become precedents; and TVA is an excellent specimen of the employment of technology directly in the service of human welfare which should be widely extended in our land. It is an instance of that social democracy which Thomas Mann tells us is the order of the day. The general adoption of its policy would call for that democratically planned economy to which John Bennett summons us. If this seems revolutionary, let us remember, as Bennett warns us, that it probably is our only alternative to counterrevolution.

There is a third line of reconstruction of which I would speak briefly in conclusion. It is a line to be followed primarily by the church

[10] H. J. Cadbury, "The Motives of Biblical Scholarship," in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LVI (1937), p. 14. Mr. Cadbury quotes from the British Association for the Advancement of Science, *Report of the Annual Meeting*, 1936, pp. 146 and 149.

and by Christian teachers, but it is none the less relevant to the bringing to pass of a new social order. The church and Christian leaders and teachers should seek to foster a creative Christianity which can be the central motivating force in a dynamic society.

Our modern society is an increasingly dynamic one. In tribal life fixed patterns of custom are well-nigh all-controlling. Agricultural societies have been largely static. China and India have been subjected to invasions at different periods in the past, but between these upheavals they have settled down to a static condition. Under the feudal system in Europe the lot of most people was determined by their status. The dynamic effect of the passage "from status to contract" which came with the break-up of feudalism was the subject of Sir Henry Maine's epoch-making study. The industrial revolution launched society into a continuous current of social change. But the economists of the previous generation used to teach that stable natural laws in economics could be depended upon as regulators of social justice. I well remember how my own professor of economics, John Bates Clark, used to emphasize that "in a static society" each factor in production—land, labor, and capital—would receive the equivalent of what it produced; and it was the tendency toward a static society which he relied upon to bring approximate justice to pass. But instead of this we find social change taking place at a constantly accelerating rate. "The unchanging East" exists no longer, and the changes in the West have become convulsive. A dislocation anywhere produces reverberations everywhere. Our society is an increasingly dynamic one. But this opens the doors of possibility both to great goods and great evils.

In such a society Christianity is called upon to be increasingly creative. We have emphasized the need of recovering a hold on the eternal meanings of Christianity. But we also have seen that these eternal meanings, instead of lulling us into passivity and acquiesence, summon us to creative effort. The eternal purpose of God, in which he would have us share, is a creative one. The eternal values of God's nature bring every society under criticism and judgment and afford the indispensable guides for advancing toward a better one. The embodiment of an eternal value in a concrete situation is always a creative task. And the necessary correlation between freedom and fellowship, which belongs to the essence of Christianity, is not a necessity which works automatically. It is indeed self-defeating to seek either without the other—either freedom for personality while neglecting to develop real community, or a collective society which overrides personal freedom. But the positive expression of this correlation in actual society calls for creative faith and creative love.

Christianity is indeed creative in its essential nature. It is true that its institutions and dogmas have been largely conservative in their influence

on society. And this conservative function is an indispensable one. To it we owe the traditions out of which our cherished democracy has sprung. But these traditions are at their heart traditions of the revelations of God through creative personalities—the great prophets in the Old Testament and Jesus Christ and his apostles in the New. The centre of Christianity is not the dogma of the Incarnation but the fact of the active self-expression of God in the supreme personality of Jesus Christ. The supreme organ of Christianity is not an official hierarchy but a living community, inspired and empowered by the indwelling Spirit of Christ. There is no inherent opposition between the conservative and the creative functions in Christianity. What is needed is such a rebirth of essential Christianity as shall make the church once more the nourishing soil and atmosphere for creative spirits and at the same time make it the persuasive power which shall unite such spirits in the building of a community of love. Then indeed we shall have that creative Christianity which can be the central motivating force for our dynamic society.

As our thought has developed we have been unable consistently to separate the problem of a new social order in the domestic sense from that of a new international order. This is only an indication of the fact that these two problems are really two foci of one problem. In the following chapter we shall start from the other focus and take up the theme of *Christianity and a New International Order.*

(*To be continued*)

THE CAPE COD PLAN

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Readers of the Crozer Quarterly who happened to be listening in on Dr. Ralph W. Sockman's radio hour on Sunday morning, March seventh, may recall his reference to, and endorsement of, the Cape Cod Plan which he explained as the use three times daily of the simple seven-word prayer: "Father, Thy will be done through me." He suggested the use of this prayer as a Lenten discipline, and told his hearers that various denominational leaders were coöperating in promoting its use during the Lenten season by urging upon their constituents not merely the personal use of the prayer, but also the securing by each user of seven other persons who should pledge themselves to its use. Thus possibly a very considerable number of people might be persuaded to unite their hearts in this prayer and so definitely influence the destinies of this stricken world. Once before in a Sunday morning broadcast Dr. Sockman had referred to the Cape Cod Plan, and at a still earlier date several religious journals had given it some publicity. The idea has been so sympathetically received by so large a number of people and over so widespread a territory that it seems to reveal what may not unfairly be termed a popular yearning for spiritual guidance.

The Plan originated with, and is being promoted by, a layman who is chairman of the board of trustees of the church of which the writer of this article is pastor. Walter W. Dwyer is a graduate of Columbia University whose business activities have given opportunity for interesting experience and extensive acquaintance, and who in recent years has been making his home on Cape Cod. He continues to be an enthusiastic student of men and nature, deeply interested in fields of religious thought and effort. One of his hobbies has been the study of the life and philosophy of Ralph Waldo Emerson.

Some time ago the writer preached to his Sunday morning congregation on the Lord's Prayer and suggested that if we really gave serious thought to what we were saying when we repeat "Thy will be done," we might not pray so glibly. We are ready to have God's will done "on earth," but should it chance to centre in our own personal life, a sincere and unreserved surrender to God might result in revolutionary upheavals and most embarrassing, not to say uncomfortable, experiences. Shortly afterward Mr. Dwyer came to his pastor saying that his studies in Emerson had been productive of a prayer which would meet the suggestion of that sermon. It was "Father, Thy will be done through me." Here, he

declared, is a prayer which is both intimately personal, and at the same time capable of becoming well-nigh universal. He went on to point out the fact that it has no sectarian limitations—it is equally applicable and acceptable to Catholic, Protestant, and Jew. (Moslem or Buddhist, for that matter!) Moreover, it might prove more potent than the preacher had expected.

This layman's enthusiasm was sufficient to organize a series of meetings on Cape Cod in which Catholic priest, Jewish rabbi, and Protestant minister all participated. These meetings, while not crowded, were well attended, and the groups who gathered included thoughtful men and women from all three religious bodies. There was no emotional appeal; simply a straightforward statement of the possibilities which seemed inherent in the idea, and the suggestion that the people present give the plan a trial by themselves repeating the prayer three times daily, and urging their friends and neighbors to do the same. The results seemed sufficiently encouraging to warrant a wider presentation, and to that end Mr. Dwyer began a correspondence with denominational leaders and representative Christian laymen. This correspondence led to personal interviews with these men, and from such interviews grew the Lenten program outlined in Dr. Sockman's broadcast.

It was more than a year from the original launching of the Plan on Cape Cod to the beginning of that Lenten season. The developing interest in the movement has seemed to justify the founder's enthusiasm. At the very outset it was interesting to discover that somewhat conservative public officials were impressed by it. School superintendents were among the laymen speaking publicly in its behalf. Within a month of its beginning on the Cape the Barnstable County Selectmen's Association was commending it to the selectmen and mayors of other Bay State communities. In reply to a letter from the Barnstable Selectmen's Association Governor Saltonstall wrote: "I heartily commend the officials and citizens of Barnstable County for this simple and forceful call to duty. It is an idea which, widely spread, can do great good." Governor Martin, of Pennsylvania, acknowledging a letter from Mr. Dwyer concluded by saying: "I strongly commend the movement. I feel we must summon our spiritual, as well as our material, resources in these dark days of our republic and of the world."

Local newspapers made the Plan the subject of news items and editorial comment. The Boston *Globe* published an article describing the Plan and commending it. The fact that it was growing in public favor was noted and commented upon by such religious journals as *Advance, Zion's Herald, Christian Century,* and Glenn Clark's *Clear Horizons.* The August (1942) issue of the *Christian Herald* carried an illustrated

article which brought written acknowledgement and commendation from scores of readers. *Weekly Unity* gave its stamp of approval, and the *Christian Advocate* followed with an illustrated article by Rev. Paul E. Johnson, of the seminary faculty of Boston University, who was then supplying a Methodist church on Cape Cod and so had opportunity personally to share in one of the union meetings. As it became better known, one religious leader after another welcomed the idea and endorsed the prayer, until at the beginning of Lent, 1943, Mr. Dwyer was able to report that the use of this simple seven-word prayer as a Lenten discipline had the endorsement of Baptist, Congregational-Christian, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Protestant Episcopal leaders.

In presenting the prayer as an item in the Lenten program, Mr. Dwyer called especial attention to the fact that it might well be used by that "extensive segment of our population at present shut out of the war effort—the elderly, the incapacitated, the sick." He further suggested that "it is a patriotic laymen's movement of great possibilities and magnitude, based on the power of the Spirit. Every community shares in the responsibility and privilege of aiding our nation in this manner. All are asked to aid of their own volition and because of their love of God and country." Letters of appreciation have come from all over the United States, from shut-ins, from veterans' hospitals; even from far-off New Caledonia an army chaplain writes that the Cape Cod Plan has reached the armed forces there.

Probably in closing this factual outline of the history of the Cape Cod Plan it is only fair to add that throughout the entire development of the idea Mr. Dwyer has steadily insisted that it is not an attempt to build some new organization. He simply suggests the prayer as a spiritual aid available to any and all existing organizations, and to every individual. Nor has there been any solicitation of funds in connection with the Plan. The expenses of promotion have been borne by Mr. Dwyer personally.

It was suggested at the beginning of this article that the cordial reception given the Cape Cod Plan seems to indicate a desire for spiritual guidance on the part of considerable numbers of people. Now let the writer confess that he is very glad to submit this story of the Plan to the readers of the Crozer Quarterly because he finds that many of his ministerial brethren share with him some question as to the value of the ultimate result. That the prayer has value as a spiritual inspiration in the individual life cannot be questioned, but that it will prove powerful as a mass movement does seem open to reasonable doubt. We ministers, who have seen so many plausible plans come to nothing, whose very

professional training tends to make us cautious—possibly overcautious—and especially we of the so-called "liberal" group who are doubtful about any plan which seems tinged with emotional evangelism, we are tempted to react to the enthusiasm of the laity and the eager hopes of denominational leaders with the modern, skeptical "Oh, yeah! So what?" Also we are suspicious of possible oversimplification. It may be that we should be reminded of the admonition of the familiar hymn:

"If our faith were but more simple,
We should take Him at His word!"

It is quite possible that we miss much of real value because of our failure to appreciate the beauty and power of simplicity.

In any event, it is precisely this idea of simplicity which has been stressed in the promotion of this seven-word prayer. "Just turn the switch," we are told, "and let the divine power flow through you. When individuals accept the principle of this prayer, they make of themselves instruments through which the divine power works." At this point the argument of the promoter of the Cape Cod Plan travels in excellent company, for this latter suggestion has much in common with the Quaker doctrine of "holy obedience." Note Thomas R. Kelly as in his little book, *A Testament of Devotion,* he urges the committal of the individual life "in unreserved obedience" to God:

> If you don't realize the revolutionary explosiveness of this proposal you don't understand what I mean. Only now and then comes a man or a woman who, like John Woolman or Francis of Assisi, is willing to be utterly obedient. . . . But when such commitment comes in a human life, God breaks through, miracles are wrought, world-renewing divine forces are released, history changes. There is nothing more important now than to have the human race endowed with just such committed lives.

Precisely so! And here is the Cape Cod Plan providing the essential formula: "Father, Thy will be done through me."

It is at this point that the writer finds himself questioning the technique of the Cape Cod Plan. When we talk about "unreserved obedience to God," we are getting close to spiritual reality. So also when we honestly pray "Father, Thy will be done through me," we are again getting close to spiritual reality. Sincere praying of that prayer involves unreserved obedience to God—but it must be sincere! If God's will is to be done through an individual, he must first be willing to permit it. He may not evade responsibility by pleading ignorance: conscience and reason afford adequate knowledge so far as the individual is concerned. Positive response to the demands of conscience and reason is elemental to sincerity in the use of this prayer. Sincerity is of the

very essence of all true prayer—never more than when the prayer is "Father, Thy will be done through me." We forget that fervor qualifies the effective prayer of the righteous man, and much of our praying tends to become a rather mechanical repetition of accustomed phrases. We fail to appreciate the vital truth underlying Dr. Buttrick's significant definition: "Prayer is friendship with God."

Consequently, when the writer is asked to repeat *three* times each day the *seven*-word prayer, and also to secure *seven* other people to follow the same routine, he is beset with the uncomfortable suspicion that he is in danger of exchanging what ought to be his high spiritual privilege for a mere mechanical exercise, and is further suggesting to possible converts that they make the same unprofitable exchange. Actual practice might easily result in debasing the petition from genuine prayer to mechanical formula so that the individual using it would be really a disciple of Coué and not of him who taught us when we pray to say: "Our Father."

Now when in the privacy of the writer's study the above line of argument is presented to the founder of the Cape Cod Plan, his rejoinder to his minister's critical comment is somewhat after this fashion: "Granted the truth of all you say about God and prayer, it still remains a fact that the great majority of the human race do not pray, nor do they often think of God at all. You ministers lose sight of that. You think of humanity in terms of the faithful few you see in the pews on Sunday. You ought to be thinking in terms of the great multitude who are for the most part without a shepherd, some of them at church on Christmas and Easter, but most of whom never see the inside of a church from one year's end to another. These are the people we are after. God is extremely incidental to their way of life—at least so far as any personal recognition of him is concerned.

"Now if such people commit themselves to a course of action by the signing of a pledge, they somehow feel a special obligation to fulfill the agreement; hence the use of a written pledge. And having once signed a pledge they are quite likely to give the matter serious thought so that after the program has been followed for a few days they begin to ask themselves questions about it. They cannot well fulfill the terms of their promise to repeat this prayer three times daily without turning their thought toward God. So almost in spite of themselves God is held in the field of their attention and interest.

"Simple? Of course it is simple. There lies its value. When you preach a sermon on the philosophy of prayer, you scare people away from actually using it, because you make them think that sincere prayer makes unreasonable demands upon them. Yet really there is no course

of action more sensible. Just put yourself in right relation to God, and let him work through you.

"As for asking seven other people to use the prayer, how would anybody know about the Plan unless it were publicized? And what more effective way of giving it publicity than by getting the men and women who are using it to tell their friends and neighbors about it? This gives your people something worth while to talk about when they are calling. It makes missionaries of them.

"What will come of it? I do not know. This prayer is not offered as a complete program but merely in the nature of turning on the switch of our individual radios. How we amplify it, and what God's will is for each and every one of us is a matter of personal search and application. But on the theory of first steps first, the use of this prayer is the first elementary test that we must face and accept if we wish to make the United States the national channel through which the divine plan may act."

At this point the writer interrupts to insist that he is not wholly convinced despite the layman's enthusiasm, though he is painfully convicted of his own neglect of duty by the layman's masterly marshaling of facts. It is true that the church fails to reach many people whom it ought to help, and it also may be true that the Cape Cod Plan affords an excellent subject of conversation for the missionary-minded in getting a hearing from the skeptic and the indifferent. In our own community, however, the writer finds that this prayer deals with the individual so personally that the more sensitively spiritual ones hesitate to make it a topic of conversation—even missionary conversation.

For in the final analysis the seven-word prayer is an intensely personal one. The petition is not for the making of the United States a channel through which the divine will may act, but for the making of the individual personality such a channel. It seems improbable that a sufficient number of individuals will agree on an interpretation of the divine will for their own selves to create a great mass movement which will directly affect national or international problems, but it does seem reasonable to believe that the sincere use of this prayer may result in transformed lives. Therefore, confirmed and unreconstructed liberal though he is, the writer looks upon this Cape Cod Plan, which he unwittingly helped to initiate, as something which may become the force for good which his layman insists it is bound to be. For after all, history justifies the Quaker mystic in his estimate of the power of a fully committed life.

Usually in the course of these argumentative conferences in the minister's study it is at this juncture that the layman points authorita-

tively to a bundle of letters which he has drawn from his pocket and says: "Read these, and see for yourself what these denominational leaders say about it. Here is a presiding bishop encouraging widespread coöperation in the use of the prayer by the members of the denomination over which he presides, and here is the presiding official of another great denomination which brooks no bishops in its administration also endorsing the prayer and urging his people to participate in its use three times daily. If only these two great denominations united in the prayer, it would constitute a mass movement of no mean proportions, and, as you know, at least six Protestant denominational bodies have through press and pulpit shown more than mere perfunctory interest. Here possibly for the first time in history we have a spiritual project to which the various Protestant denominations are giving hearty united support.

"Moreover, our union meetings on Cape Cod have effectively demonstrated the fact that this simple, seven-word prayer furnishes a common denominator upon which Catholic, Jew, and Protestant can be united. We are justified in calling the Cape Cod Plan a national offensive for a united spiritual front."

Well, perhaps. We shall see.

As a mass movement the writer feels toward the Cape Cod Plan as Gamaliel of old felt about the enterprise which Peter and his companions were urging upon postresurrection Jerusalem: "If this plan or work is of men, it will collapse, but if it is of God——"

We shall see.

But if it should not prove a mighty mass movement, the writer would still believe in its underlying principle. In fact, he might be even more sure of its ultimate value. He would recall the tale of that ancient prophet who, taking shelter from a mountain storm in the recesses of a secluded cave, heard there the voice of God. Standing at the mouth of the cave, the prophet watched the storm and listened, but the Eternal was not in the wind, the Eternal was not in the quaking earth, the Eternal was not in the lightning's flash. But after the storm had spent itself there came "a still, small voice."

It is quite possible that when the war is over, and peace is won—if that peace shall prove enduring and truly Christian—it will be discovered that the controlling influence at the peace table lay in a small group of men who during the stormy years had been sincerely praying: "Father, Thy will be done through me," and who in the hour of their supreme opportunity made of their own personalities, committed to utter obedience, the channel through which divine wisdom found its expression. For—again we return to our Quaker mystic—"when such commitment comes in a human life, God breaks through, miracles are wrought, world-renewing divine forces are released, history changes."

THE BAPTIST HERITAGE OF FREEDOM

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LIBERTY is a New Testament idea. Over against restraints and bondage Jesus proclaimed liberty to the captive, the opening of the prison to them that are bound. "If the son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." It was what Paul called "the glorious liberty of the children of God."

But what does this liberty really mean? Martin Luther did not know. He spoke eloquently of "the liberty of the Christian man," but when he saw the Peasants' Rebellion and the excesses of the Anabaptists he hastily qualified his claims. The Puritans did not know. They practiced democracy to a certain extent, but their blue laws denied liberty to the unbeliever. Nor did the established churches of England and Scotland know. They accepted the privileges conferred by the state but had few crumbs to give to dissenting bodies.

Baptists have made a braver and wider application of the idea of religious liberty. They recognized George Fox's "inner light" and the fact of personal inspiration but went on to assert "soul liberty," the inherent right of every man to determine his own faith, to be a believer or unbeliever, and did not shrink in their Rhode Island jurisdiction from applying this principle to Catholic and Jew, Quaker and Puritan. These Baptists took the Bible as their rule of faith and practice, and with it affirmed the right of private interpretation, thus making it impossible for one believer to call another heretic; they affirmed the competency of the soul to draw near to God, thus ruling out priests and priestcraft. On this platform of liberty Baptist churches came into existence. The Christian in his freedom recognized that he was related to other Christians in a fellowship of kindred minds. At once, therefore, the question of the meaning and extent of the individual's liberty had to be settled.

Certainly the idea of authority must be refused within the church as well as from without. Some denominations accept a written creed or the dictum of ecclesiastical bodies. Their churches are united in a disciplined body, using the same rituals, singing from the same hymnbooks, subscribing to the same creeds. This, Baptists cannot accept. Never have they been willing to yield their personal right of thought by signing on the dotted line. Even in the church there must be room for private judgment, the right to voice one's faith in the vernacular of his own life, in the tongue wherein he was born.

On the other hand, Baptist liberty has never meant license, as though it were immaterial what one believes. We Baptists believe, and believe

intensely, in our New Testament and in the regeneration of life which faith in Christ has brought—that common experience which has brought us together. Others have called our fellowship a rope of sand. But experience has shown the strength of the tie that binds our hearts in Christian love. Baptists have preached no uncertain gospel. In the joy and certainty of their common faith they have come together to form great missionary societies and to carry on mighty operations. Free yet under bonds to Christ, Baptists have found a surprising cohesiveness and felt the need of no organizational tie to hold them together.

At bottom Baptist unity has been brought about by a recognition of the fruits of the Spirit. The fruits of the Spirit are love, joy, peace, long-suffering, and other Christlike qualities. Such fruits bear witness to the working of the Holy Spirit and are sufficient to commend the believer to his brethren. Here, then, is a cross section to show the composition of a Baptist church. There need be no uniformity in Christ. There are diversities of gifts in the same Spirit. He hath made some to be apostles, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers. Even so in a Baptist fellowship he hath made some to be conservatives, some radicals, some to be evangelists, and some to be in social service—all in the working of the same Spirit. The working of the spirit of liberty, then, is unity, but not uniformity. Nowhere in New Testament or Christian experience is there justification for the demand that Christians shall walk in an intellectual goosestep at the command of human authority.

Such a view of liberty in the Spirit leaves room for change and growth in the church's doctrine. This is, of course, a necessity to vital living. Jesus Christ does not change. The New Testament does not change. But our understanding may and should enlarge. The faith once for all delivered to the saints can never be frozen; it has never been compassed by the mind of fallible man. The liberty which we have found is a freedom to go into the garden of truth and to pluck such flowers as we wish—and we will not always pluck the same flower!

We Baptists believe that a static doctrine is the weight of the dead hand. We have as much right to think over the mysteries of the gospel as had the Reformers. The New Testament is one thing, Puritan theology is quite another. The cross is a central, governing revelation, but a dozen theories of the atonement bear witness to the variations of our understanding. Thus we face the fact that a company of free men may not be expected to think alike even in the Spirit. We see how in the processes of growth the radicalism of one day becomes the conservatism of the next. The destiny of some of our radicalism today, we venture to prophesy, is to be possessed and swallowed up by conservatives of tomorrow. All this is

natural, wholesome, inevitable. The way of liberty is, and always has been, the way of change, growth, increasing knowledge, as the new passes over into the old.

We recognize with thankfulness how all the differences within the Christian fellowship have served to enrich and broaden its life. In the life of the universal church many minds have contributed their thought: the independence of Luther, the determinism of Calvin, the free will of Arminius. In its history is the discipline and solidarity of the episcopacy, and the democracy of the Puritans; the social feeling of Shaftsbury, Wilberforce, and Walter Rauschenbusch; the scientific reasonableness of Henry Drummond; and the hot evangelism of Wesley and Moody. So too, our Baptist fellowship has been made rich by differences. As we think of men who have done much in our company, men like Bitting, Burton, Barbour, Beaven, Mabie, Duncan, Rockefeller, and Ford of Boston, we are not thinking of men who were of one theological mold. What they were we may not always remember, but they were different. Each sounded his own note in the symphony of activities, and we were all richer because they were different.

This, then, is the heritage of Baptist liberty, the record of many minds, the accomplishments of many workers, the fellowship of all sorts and conditions in an organism that demanded no conformity but realized a unity in the glorious liberty of the children of God. Having such a heritage, we must look with great concern on the efforts of one party among us to obtain control. These conservatives calling themselves fundamentalists have drawn a circle which excludes their fellow Baptists who have a different understanding of the Bible. It is not a question as to whether the conservative is a sounder position than the liberal. The real question is whether any party or faction should seek to rule; whether our Baptist liberty and tolerance are to be exchanged for a principle of conformity.

It has been the proud record of Baptists that we have had no part in religious persecution and have demanded no trials for heresy. But now under this fundamentalist program the old ideas are coming back under other names. Instead of being heresy, the position is termed "unsound." Instead of being a heretic, the erring brother is a "modernist." A rose by any other name, or persecution disguised as conscience, has the same smell. When fundamentalists would defeat and reject a candidate for the ministry who has every qualification save agreement with their particular theological shibboleth; when men are boycotted from denominational preferment, a place on convention programs or on its boards for theological reasons only; when such unscriptural practices as whisperings and backbitings are employed to keep a modernist under suspicion—all this, we say, is a revival of the old spirit of persecution and a denial of the great liberty

with which Christ set us free. It is faction and the apotheosis of faction, the substitution of human standards for our liberty in Christ.

The end of all this, if such a spirit should win, would be, of course, fatal to our denominational life. Victory for a faction would be defeat for the cause. Victory for such a spirit would only open the way to further bickerings until at last some victorious faction would have totalitarian control and the long circle back to authoritarian control would be complete.

Facing such factional discord, we call upon our fellow Baptists of every persuasion to realize again the meaning of our liberty, to realize that our strength now, as it always has been, is in our inclusiveness, not in faction but in brotherly confidence and fellowship. We may well learn again what was meant by the word, God is no respecter of persons nor is he a judge of orthodoxy. Rather, in every nation and in every theological school the fruits of the Spirit have been manifest. What God hath cleansed no man may call common.

COPERNICUS: 1473-1543

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THE PRESENT year is the quadricentennial of two books which have vitally influenced civilization: the *De humani corporis fabrica* of the Flemish physician Vesalius, the foundation of modern anatomy, called by the eighteenth-century French physician Sénac "the discovery of a new world" and by his Swiss contemporary von Haller "an immortal work"; and the *De revolutionibus orbium cœlestium* of Nicolaus Copernicus, the foundation of modern astronomy with its demonstration of the heliocentric system. The appearance of the latter volume was one of the most important events in the intellectual story of man, since it overthrew mediæval ideas and prepared the way for Newton's concept of mechanism and the infinity of space and time. It was the lifework of one of the great pioneers of modern thought. It is fitting even in the midst of a devastating war which began with an invasion of Poland, the land of the author's birth, to pay tribute to the work of her greatest son.

Astronomy is not only the oldest, but the most progressive science. In each of the four divisions into which astronomers divide its history we find revolutionary changes. In the earliest or Babylonian epoch man, though lacking accuracy in his observations, had evolved with the naked eye a general knowledge of the heavenly bodies, and was especially interested in the seven planets which included the sun and moon, with which he associated the names of his gods as we do yet through their Roman equivalents, in their heliacal risings and settings, eclipses, conjunctions, and positions in the starry belt of the zodiac. And all this he had done for practical purposes of agriculture and the determination of the seasons for religious festivals and astrology and magic. The earth was believed to be a flat circular disc immovable in space, surrounded by the ocean stream with a hemispherical vault above, to which the stars were affixed and across which the planets traveled.

This cosmology was taken over by the early Greeks, as we see from the poems of Homer and Hesiod, but was slowly modified by the naturalistic philosophers of Ionia, beginning with Thales of Miletus, who has been called the first modern man, since he replaced myth with reason in explaining natural phenomena. These early Greek thinkers and their successors over a period of three centuries were precursors of the Alexandrian epoch of astronomy which centred at Alexandria, the city built by Alexander the Great in 332 B.C., the capital of his successors, the Greek Ptolemies of Egypt, and, after the eclipse of Athens, the cultural centre of

the Mediterranean world. Here during the three pre-Christian centuries and well into the second of our era, scholars gathered from all over the Greek world for study and the dissemination of their results. Astronomers now made special observations and measurements of the heavenly bodies, restricting their inquiries to those phenomena which could then be made intelligible, *i.e.*, the study of celestial motions, inquiries made possible by the science of geometry, a Greek invention. Thus astronomy became a mathematical science, a kinematic elaboration of applied geometry. It is nothing less than marvelous how, during this the last gleam of the Greek genius now turned to science, astronomy advanced so far that, with the aid of only the simplest instruments, men knew the obliquity of the ecliptic, set the times of the equinoxes, determined their precessions, and, as we shall see, announced the heliocentric system eighteen centuries before its demonstration by Copernicus.

This theory was finally demonstrated with mathematical accuracy by Copernicus who, in overthrowing the agelong Ptolemaic system, the culmination of the Alexandrian era, introduced the third epoch in astronomical history. His results were proved in the main by the supplementary labors of Kepler and Galileo, and still later by Newton. Newton may be said to stand at the threshold of the fourth and last epoch, for he showed that all the complicated phenomena of celestial motions, those of the planets in their elliptical orbits and of their satellites, were due to one universal law, that of the mutual attraction of gravitation which holds all together and is as valid for the solar system as for the more restricted motions on the surface of the earth. Of these divisions we are here concerned with the third, which laid the foundations of a right understanding of planetary motions, in the epoch-making book of Copernicus which is of interest not only to the professional astronomer but to every layman who wishes to understand the earth's place in the universe.

Niklas Koppernigk, known to us by his Latinized name Nicolaus Copernicus, was a native of Thorn on the Vistula, an important town in Prussian Poland already in the preceding century, and at the time of his birth in 1473 an important entrepôt of trade between Poland and Western Europe. Here his father, a merchant of Cracow, had settled. The latter's nationality—was he German, or was he Polish?—has aroused acrimonious controversy. Through the interest of a maternal uncle Copernicus was given a splendid schooling for his lifework: two years at the University of Cracow, where he studied mathematics and astronomy, and nearly a decade at the Italian universities of Bologna, where he studied under Domenico Maria Novara who was suspected of "Pythagorean" views, of Padua, where he studied medicine and read Plato in Greek, and of Ferrara,

where he became a doctor of canonical law in 1503. In the Jubilee year 1500, he himself taught in Rome.

Meanwhile in 1497 he had been appointed a canon of the cathedral at Frauenburg in Prussia—his acceptance based on temporal rather than religious grounds—and here he returned in 1505 when his Italian studies were over. But still for a number of years he acted as physician to his uncle, then bishop of the Prussian diocese of Ermland, at near-by Heilsberg, till the latter's death in 1512. In his capacity of physician there and later among the poor of Frauenburg he evinced none of the genius which he later displayed in astronomy, for, to judge from marginal notes and receipts in his surviving medical works, he followed established authorities and medicines. Finally at Frauenburg he spent the remainder of his life, his canonical duties being secondary to his interest in astronomy, for he was a scholar rather than a priest. Only once, in 1514, was he called away to join the Lateran Council in Rome in the proposed reform of the calendar, the first step towards its completion under Pope Gregory XIII in 1582.

Copernicus seems to have begun the studies which culminated in his famous book at the bishop's residence in Heilsberg. It was practically completed by 1530, although it was not given to the world till the year of his death, thirteen years later. But the purport of his system was already known to scholars perhaps as early as 1512 through the circulation of a popular analysis of his planetary system in manuscript form, the so-called *Commentariolus*. This served for material in 1533 for a lecture before the Vatican court by the papal secretary, where it received the approbation of Pope Clement VII, and three years later Cardinal Schoenberg, papal nuncio in Poland and Prussia, urged Copernicus to publish his results in full. In 1540 his one distinguished pupil, George Joachim von Laucher, known to us as Rheticus because of his Swiss provenience, already at twenty-five professor of mathematics at Wittenberg, was permitted to publish at Danzig the *Narratio prima*, or first detailed account of the new system. Three years later the main work was published at Nuremberg. Why Copernicus had been so long reluctant to give to the learned world the fruits of his studies is explained in part by a sentence in the dedicatory letter to the scholarly Pope Paul III, in which he asked that the church support his search for truth, a seemingly needless precaution since he wrote from within the church and remained unmolested throughout his lifetime. An advanced copy reached him on his deathbed, and he died happily unconscious that a liberty had been taken by an anonymous hand, inserted into the preface by the Lutheran theologian Andreas Osiander, designed to disarm ecclesiastical criticism by insisting that the work was purely hypothetical, that is, that it was not intended as a true representation of the universe but merely as a means toward further

enlightenment. Not till seventy years later was the book found to be heretical; then, in 1613, along with Galileo's *Letters on the Solar Spots* and Kepler's *Astronomia nova*, it was placed on the *Index*, where it remained till 1835.

Unfortunately the earliest account of Copernicus' life and work by Rheticus is lost, and we are dependent on the biography by the French philosopher Pierre Gassendi a century later (1654). Gassendi's work has been the basis of all subsequent biographies, and has been augmented in the last century by the labors of many scholars, more especially by Leopold Prowe in his *Nicolaus Coppernicus* which appeared in 1883-1884, and on which the author spent thirty-three years of research. In 1873, on the four-hundredth anniversary of Copernicus' birth, the Copernican Society of Thorn issued the final Latin text of the *De revolutionibus* along with the *Narratio prima* with additions from the original manuscript, which latter, after being neglected for three centuries, was rediscovered in a private library at Prague nearly a century ago.

The Copernican system, then, was a gradual development in the author's mind extending over his whole mature life. It was a complete reversal of ideas about the earth's position in the solar system and planetary motions from the geocentric system of Ptolemy with its teaching that the earth was the centre of the universe, which had dominated men's thinking for fourteen centuries. Copernicus could not accept Ptolemy's complicated motions of the planets—some in one direction, others in another—for he found it simpler to assign to the earth a place among the planets, and so laid down the basic principles that the diurnal motions of the heavenly bodies, especially the rising and setting of the sun, were apparent only, due to the earth's revolution on its axis, and that the revolution of the sun around the earth was similarly illusory, due to the earth's revolution around it. Thus the sun replaced the earth as the fixed centre of the solar system, which kept the planets in their orbits by invisible attraction. He demonstrated what motions could be attributed to the earth to explain its seasonal phenomena, as well as certain slow changes in the direction of the earth's axis of rotation, and elements in its orbit—a diurnal rotation about its polar axis, an annual revolution around the sun similarly from west to east in the plane of the ecliptic, and variations in the inclination of its axis from the imaginary line which joined it to the sun: the first motion explained the apparent rotation of the celestial sphere about the poles of the heavens, the second the apparent annual course of the sun, and the third the phenomena of the seasons. He found that the then known five planets (and the earth) wheeled around the sun in this order: Mercury, the nearest, in about 87 days; Venus in 224; Earth in 365; Mars in one year and 321 days; Jupiter in 11 years; Saturn

in 29 years—though he wrongly assumed their orbits were circular. Only three more major planets have been discovered in historical times: Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto.

Thus Copernicus introduced a new era in astronomy, for he began his investigations when the earth was regarded as the centre of the solar system and ended them by showing that the sun occupied that position. All this he did almost a century before Galileo's improvement of the telescope, and with instruments little better than those used by Ptolemy, *viz.*, the quadrant, astrolabe, and triquetrum, the latter an improvement on the Greek astronomer's *organon parallacticon.* No wonder that Kepler, the completer of the system, called him *vir maximo ingenio, et quod in hoc exercitio magni momenti est, animo liber.* Sebastian Steriokowski, Polish writer on architecture (1743-1824), erected a statue to his memory in the church of St. Anne in Cracow, appropriately inscribed *Sta, Sol, ne moveare,* while the Danish sculptor Thorwaldsen made one in bronze for Warsaw in 1830, and the Pole Godebski another in 1900 which now stands in front of the court of the library of the University of Cracow, which claims Copernicus as its most famous student.

For a long time the new theory of the heavens met opposition. We might mention Montaigne, the essayist (1533-1592); Christopher Clavius, head of the commission appointed by Gregory XIII to reform the calendar, who in 1585 affirmed that "the earth must stand still in the centre of the universe"; Shakespeare, who often speaks of the earth as the "centre," though he shows a glimpse of the new system in the speech of Ulysses in *Troilus and Cressida* (1, 1, 85-91); Marlowe, who outlines the Ptolemaic system in *Doctor Faustus* (lines 644-678); Sir Francis Bacon, because of his opposition to Aristotle; Pascal, who rejected Copernicus' results and called him and his followers in his *Praise of Knowledge* "new carmen who drive the world about"; Milton; Giovanni Riccioli, the first to discover a double star (*zeta Ursæ majoris*); and Otto von Guericke, the German natural philosopher. But by the beginning of the eighteenth century, a hundred and fifty years after its announcement, the Copernican system had gained almost universal acceptance in scientific circles.

It was championed in England by many writers from 1556 on, notably by William Gilbert, physician to Queen Elizabeth and pioneer in electrical magnetism, who composed his *De magnete magneticisque corporibus* in its defense in 1600, since he was convinced that the solar revolution of the earth—itself a great magnet—and its suspension in space were the result of magnetic planetary attraction. In Italy the reformer Giordano Bruno even outdistanced Copernicus in his teaching about the constitution of the universe, but because of this and other heresies met his death at the stake in Rome in 1600. Tycho Brahe—a Dane, but born of Swedish parents

in Scania, then a province of Denmark—could not accept a system which involved the motion of the earth because "it contradicts not only the principles of physics, but also the authority of the Holy Scripture which repeatedly confirms the stability of the earth." He therefore tried in his chief work, as its name implies, *Astronomiæ instauratæ progymnasmata* (1602-3), to harmonize the systems of Ptolemy and Copernicus. In the Tychonic cosmos the earth remains immovable in the centre of the universe while the planets revolve around the sun, which in turn with the sphere of the fixed stars revolves around the earth. His opposition to the Copernican system, however, was balanced by his real services to astronomy, *viz.*, improved instruments, planetary observations, and a new catalogue of 777 stars—later increased by Kepler to 1,005—which superseded those of Ptolemy and Copernicus. He carried on his observations for a score of years on the island of Hveen—which he renamed Uraniborg, "fortress of heaven"—which the Danish King Frederick II turned over to him. Under the latter's successors, however, he was deprived of the observatory and migrated to near Prague, where he spent his last year as astronomer of the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolph II. His *Rudolphine Tables* of planetary motions—published by Kepler in 1627—opened the way to discoveries which revolutionized later astronomy, since they transformed astronomy from a kinematic science, *i.e.*, one in which the motions of the heavenly bodies were considered in themselves without reference to causes, to a mechanized one. Lastly they demonstrated that defects in the Copernican system demanded a revision.

Such a revision was made by his German assistant at Prague, Johann Kepler, who in his book with the long title—*Astronomia nova seu Physica cœlestis tradita commentariis de motibus stellæ Martis* (1609)—destroyed the last vestiges of the Ptolemaic system retained by Copernicus, by formulating his first law that each planet revolves around the sun in an elliptical orbit with the sun as its focus, since this alone explained the phenomena. Thus he based his work on physical rather than hypothetical grounds In the same work he introduced his second law, that the radius vector, the imaginary line which joins the centre of the planet with that of the sun, sweeps over equal areas in equal periods of time, thus demonstrating that the planes not only of Mars but of all the planets pass through the centre of the sun and that the latter is the motor power of our system. In his later work *De harmonice mundi*, or *Science of Sounds*, published in 1619, he announced his third law, *viz.*, that "the squares of the periods of revolution around the sun of any planets are proportional to the cubes of their mean distance from the sun." It was these laws which enabled Newton to determine those of the attraction of gravitation. Most of Kepler's work was done before the telescope came into general use, by one whose whole life

was a struggle with ill-health, family troubles—his mother had been imprisoned as a witch—religious persecution, and poverty. He was even reduced to the role of an astrologer through being forced to make horoscopes of the emperor and nobles to eke out a living.

The Italian physicist Galileo also enthusiastically embraced the new theory, for he demonstrated the fallacy of the philosophical arguments against it by substituting for their Aristotelian basis the new science of dynamics or mechanics of motion, and thus placed the problem of planetary motion in a new light. With the use of the telescope which he magnified thirty times, he discovered many hitherto unknown celestial phenomena which favored the new system and helped to dispel the old distinction between earth and planet. In his *Sidereus nuncius (Siderial Messenger)*, 1610, he discovered the satellites of Jupiter, that Venus had phases like those of the moon, that the latter had mountains, and that the Milky Way—the *Galaxias* of the Greeks and the *Via lactea* of the Romans—was a galaxy of innumerable stars. In his *Letters on the Solar Spots* (1613)—the book which was later placed in the *Index*—he asserted that the sun, as proved by its changing spots, rotated on its axis. But in trying to convert the church to the Copernican system, especially by saying that the literal interpretation of Scripture in respect of physical phenomena led only to absurdity, he was summoned to Rome in 1616 and compelled to renounce propagating orally or in writing his heretical views that the sun was immovable and that the planets had a diurnal motion. Years later, on the appearance in 1632 of his *Dialogo dei due massimi sistemi del mondo,* he was summoned before the tribunal of the Inquisition and forced to take this oath: *Corde sincero et fide non ficta abjuro, maledico, et detestor supradictos errores et hæreses,* though the famous *sotto voce* words in Italian on rising from his knees, *Eppur si muove!* are clearly apocryphal. His *Dialogo* was prohibited, his system condemned as opposed to Scripture, and he was imprisoned in the dungeon of the Inquisition, but later was allowed to live in his villa near Florence under continual ecclesiastical surveillance. Here, blind, deaf, and infirm he died in the same year in which Newton was born. The decree against him in 1616 was not lifted till 1757 by Benedict XIV.

With the opening of the seventeenth century the Aristotelian theory of celestial motions representing spontaneous activity on the part of the planets began to yield to views now held about the solar systems as a mechanism whose parts react on one another according to fixed mechanical laws. Later in the century Sir Isaac Newton formulated the principles of mechanics and applied them to astronomy in his *Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica* (1681), in which he generalized terrestrial gravitation into a universal celestial property and thus established the heliocentric system as the only possible cosmology. Voltaire is sponsor for the pretty

story how Newton was led by the fall of an apple to reflect on gravity, which attracted all bodies to the earth's centre and extended it to the planetary system where it was as valid as on the earth. To be sure, it was later that Galileo while teaching in Pisa (1589-1591) gave ocular demonstration to students and professors from the Leaning Tower that bodies of different weight fall with the same velocities. Under Newton, then, the ancient kinematic astronomy became one of celestial mechanics. It took a generation for men to accept so revolutionary a theory of the intricacies of planetary motion, but it was verified by his successors. Thus it was Newton who did away with the mediæval conception of a universe governed by benevolent purpose—the doctrine of teleology or design in nature which still clings to the church—for he made it clear to the intellectual classes that men dwell in a world in which events occur as mechanically as the ticking of a clock. However, he did not renounce belief in God, but only took from him the power of causing the sun to stand still.

After following the story of the gradual acceptance of Copernicus' system down to our time, it remains to return to the Greeks, especially the astronomers of the Alexandrian epoch when the heliocentric system, its crowning achievement, was first announced, and thus determine how much Copernicus may have been indebted to his predecessors.

The early Greek philosophers, who rejected the simple Babylonian mythology of the heavens, tried to explain the nature of the celestial world by unverifiable physical images. Thales (*ca.* 636-547 B.C.) was the first Greek astronomer and much more—philosopher, mathematician, engineer, statesman, and even businessman, for he made the first market corner in history by buying the olive crop of his neighborhood because he sensed a bad harvest the following year—and he was regarded later as one of the Seven Sages of Greece. His astronomical ability is generally gauged by the fact that he was the first Greek to predict a solar eclipse, though this was not the consummate act of genius it is often said to be, for during his travels in Egypt he had learned of the Babylonian discovery of the period of 223 lunations, estimated at 6,588⅓ days or approximately 18 years, after which cycle eclipses recur. This made it possible for him, as Herodotus tells us, roughly to predict the year, but not the day, although astronomers have identified his eclipse with the one occurring May 28, 585 B.C. He, like the Babylonians, regarded the earth as a flat circular disc floating on universal water.

His younger contemporary Anaximander (*ca.* 610-547 B.C.) believed the earth was suspended in space without support, held in position by being equidistant from all other heavenly bodies, and having the form of a cylinder whose upper circular surface was our world, and surrounded

by the "infinite." His successor Anaximenes (*ca.* 544 B.C.) believed the earth was a flat disc riding on all-encircling air, the stars being attached to a celestial sphere—the latter the oldest astronomical concept. But it was Pythagoras of Croton in Italy, one of the great figures in the history of science since he was a mathematician, astronomer, inventor of the science of acoustics, theologian, and moral reformer, who was the first man to teach that the earth was a sphere, probably because he regarded that as the most perfect of figures, and that the sun, moon, and stars were also spherical, and that the entire spherical universe rotated around its axis which passed through the centre of the earth, the latter being fixed in space. He also first showed that the planets had independent rotary motions of their own. Parmenides of Elea in Italy, elder contemporary of Socrates in Athens, agreed with Pythagoras about the sphericity of the earth with its five zones, but while Pythagoras made the spherical universe rotate about an axis through the earth's centre, which meant that the universe was limited, being completely surrounded by void, Parmenides denied such infinite void and made his finite sphere motionless, its motion being illusory.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ in Ionia enjoyed the friendship of Pericles in Athens, and when the latter became unpopular at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War he himself was accused of impiety and was for a time imprisoned for saying that the sun was a red-hot stone and that the moon was made of earth. He was the first man to attribute the origin of the universe and its management to mind (*nous*). In astronomy he showed that the moon shone by reflected light and so gave the earliest true explanation of eclipses—the solar ones due to the interposition of the moon, the lunar ones to the moon falling within the shadow of the earth between sun and moon—as Plutarch tells us. But curiously he still regarded the moon, the earth, and probably all the planets as flat.

Later Greek astronomers restricted their inquiries to the study of celestial movements made possible by geometry, and converted astronomy into a mathematical science, the kinematic elaboration of applied geometry, thus inventing geometric schemes of representation, modified to consist with precise observations. The later Neo-Pythagoreans were the first to abandon the geocentric system by making the earth a planet, the resulting "Pythagorean" system being attributed by Theophrastus to Philolaus of Croton, and by Diogenes Laertius in his *Lives of the Philosophers* to Hicetas of Syracuse, while Aristotle more generally refers it to the "Pythagoreans." Such a theory, the earliest to displace the earth as the centre of the universe, anticipated that of Copernicus only in part, since it did not teach that the earth and planets revolved around the sun, but rather around a "central fire" or "hearth of the universe," the governing

principle, while the sun and moon did likewise. Thus the "hearth" added an eighth to the usual seven heavenly bodies, while the fixed stars, which also revolved around the "hearth," added a ninth; to complete the decade, a tenth was assumed, the "*counter*earth" nearest the "central fire," followed in turn by the earth, moon, sun, five planets, and fixed stars. We cannot see the *counter*earth since our hemisphere is turned away from it, but it was the *primum mobile* or force, the moving agent of all.

Plato, in the *Timæus,* has the earth stationary in the centre of the universe without support, while his great pupil Eudoxus of Cnidus (408-355 B.C.) is said to have been the first to teach planetary motions scientifically—that each planet was attached to the equator of the celestial sphere which rotated about two opposite poles with the earth in the centre. These poles were embedded in the surface of a second sphere still external to the first, but concentric with it, the second similarly in a third, and that in a fourth, twenty-six such shells being assumed for the whole solar system. In other words, such a system was a combination of several concentric spheres which produced planetary motions. This was the system adopted by Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), who also regarded the spherical immobile earth as the centre of the universe. Thus the idea started by Pythagoras that the earth was a sphere suspended in space and accepted by most of his successors as the centre became the usual Greek explanation of the solar system, organized later by Hipparchus (*ca.* 150 B.C.) and by Ptolemy three centuries later into the "geocentric" system imposed with modifications on the Middle Ages.

Still, before Hipparchus, there were Greek astronomers like Philolaus and Hicetas, to whom I have already referred, who had a different view, for they believed that the earth was neither at rest nor in a central position, and tried to explain planetary motions as due to mobile bodies rotating around a "central hearth" as well as on their axes. One of these later thinkers took the final step toward heliocentrism, for he had the planets rotate not around a "central fire," but around the sun itself. This was Aristarchus of Samos (*fl.* 280-264 B.C.), of whom we know little else, since of his many works all except one on astronomy, *On the Magnitude and Distance of the Sun and Moon,* have been lost. That he was a well-known scientist, however, is shown by the fact that Vitruvius included him with Philolaus, Eratosthenes, Archimedes, and others in his *De architectura,* a work composed at Rome in the Augustan age.

So out of harmony with the normal trend of Greek thought was his theory that Plutarch, in his essay *On the Face in the Moon's Orb,* according to Cleanthes, who succeeded Zeno as head of the Stoic school in Athens, was of the opinion that the Greeks should indict him for impiety for putting "the hearth" of the universe in motion, since that to him was

the effect of his attempt to show that the heavens remained at rest while the earth revolved "in an oblique circle, while it rotates at the same time about its own axis."

We learn nothing of Aristarchus' system from his one surviving book, probably because the latter was an earlier work; thus we are dependent for our knowledge of it from other writers, first from a chance notice in the *Sand Reckoner* of Archimedes of Syracuse, the most famous mathematician and physicist of antiquity who was slain in 212 B.C. during the siege of his city by the Roman Marcellus in the Hannibalic War, which siege, it may be remarked, was protracted by his invention of engines of war which were later magnified in the popular imagination. In this work Archimedes calculated the sphere of the stars, arguing that it was possible to note a larger number than that of the grains of sand sufficient to fill it —a number he estimated at sixty-four figures in our notation—thus showing that the power of notation is unlimited. He writes of Aristarchus:

> But Aristarchus brought out a book consisting of certain hypotheses . . . that the fixed stars and the Sun remain unmoved and that the earth revolves about the Sun in the circumference of a circle, the Sun lying in the middle of its orbit. . . .[1]

Here in brief but unequivocal language the heliocentric theory is stated.

Copernicus refers in two passages to views of the earth's motion in the works of Greek astronomers, and even to rival theories developed from their eccentrics and epicycles, some of which he found inconsistent with physics, since they made a monstrosity of the universe. In his dedicatory letter he tells us that he had read in Cicero that one Nicetas, (*i.e.*, Hicetas, an early Pythagorean), had attributed motion to the earth. The passage is from Cicero's *Academica* (2:39):

> The Syracusan Hicetas, as Theophrastus reports, holds the opinion that the heaven, the Sun, moon, stars, and in short all the heavenly bodies are stationary and that nothing in the heavens is in motion except the earth; which by revolving and twisting around its axis with extreme velocity produces all the same results which would be reproduced if the earth were stationary and the heaven in motion. . . .[2]

Copernicus also says that he had read in Plutarch that Philolaus, Ecphantus, and Heraclides of Pontus held the same opinion. We quote the passage from the *De placitis philosophorum* of Pseudo-Plutarch (3:13):

> It is commonly maintained that the Earth is at rest. But Philolaus, the Pythagorean, holds that it revolves around the "Fire" in an oblique circle in like manner to the Sun and Moon. Heraclides of Pontus and Ecphantus, the Pythagoreans, suppose the Earth to move not with a motion of translation, but after the manner of a wheel turning upon an axle about its centre from the West to the East.[3]

[1] Sir Thomas Heath, *The Copernicus of Antiquity*, London, 1920, pp. 40 f.
[2] Translated by H. Rackeman, Loeb Library, 1933.
[3] Angus Armitage, *Copernicus*, London, 1938, p. 87.

But in connection with this passage Copernicus says nothing of Aristarchus' theory, but merely mentions the rotation of the earth on its axis, especially the idea of Plato's pupil Heraclides, who seems to have made a near approach to the system of Copernicus by asserting that Venus and Mercury revolve around the sun as a centre like satellites, though we cannot be sure that he included the other planets. If he had done so, this, combined with the further assumption of Heraclides that the earth revolves around its axis, would have anticipated the system of Tycho Brahe. Curiously enough, while nothing is said in the passage quoted from Plutarch about the earth revolving around the sun, in a preceding passage of the same essay (2:24) Plutarch does mention both the theory and its author: "Aristarchus places the Sun among the fixed stars, and holds that the Earth moves round the Sun's circle." Copernicus must have seen this passage, but does not quote it nor refer to the theory there expressed, nor does he mention it elsewhere in his book when mentioning Aristarchus. However, in the original manuscript, we find these words (in a footnote in the 1873 edition of the text, p. 34):

> Although we admit the motion of the Sun and Moon might also be demonstrated in the assumption that the Earth is immovable, this agrees less with the other planets. It is probable that it was on these and similar grounds that Philolaus judged that the earth moves, and *some say that Aristarchus of Samos was of the same opinion.*[4]

The question naturally arises why Copernicus deleted these pertinent words from his text.

We know little of the fate of Aristarchus' theory. Plutarch tells us, in a reference to Plato, that a Chaldæan astronomer, Seleucus of Seleucia on the Tigris, who flourished *ca.* 150 B.C., adopted it. He asks:

> Did Plato put the earth in motion as he did the Sun, the Moon, and the five planets, and was it necessary to conceive that the earth . . . was not represented as being held together and at rest, but as turning and revolving, as Aristarchus and Seleucus afterward maintained that it did, the former of whom stated this only as a hypothesis, the latter as a definite opinion?[5]

After Seleucus no astronomer by name at least is known to have sponsored the theory; Copernicus, however, refers to it as given by Martianus Capella, a fifth-century Carthaginian encyclopædist, who in his allegory, *De nuptiis Philologiæ et Mercurii,* says:

> For although Venus and Mercury show daily risings and settings, yet their orbits by no means surround the Earth, but encircle the Sun with a wider circuit. In short, they make the Sun the centre of their orbits.[6]

[4] Translated by Armitage, *op. cit.*, p. 88.
[5] Sir Thomas Heath, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
[6] Bk. VIII (on astronomy), translated by Armitage, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

The cause of the eclipse of the Aristarchian theory in Greece was doubtless the great authority of Hipparchus of Nicæa in Bithynia, the greatest of Greek astronomers, who flourished around the middle of the second century B.C., who reverted to the geocentric theory and was followed by Claudius Ptolemy in the second century of our era, the completer of that system.

Hipparchus made many inventions and discoveries in astronomy, for he invented trigonometry, first spherical and then plane, constructed a table of chords similar to our sines, invented a planisphere, and discovered the precession of the equinoxes, *i.e.*, the motion of the equinoxes along the circle of the ecliptic or plane of the earth's orbit, due to the constant change in the direction of the earth's axis, caused, as Newton centuries later explained, by the attraction of the sun and moon on the equatorial bulge of the earth which is a spheroid. Hipparchus' estimate of the annual forward movement within a few seconds—he estimated it as not less than 36″ (the true value being 50.″2)—shows what a capital achievement this discovery was over 2,000 years ago. Unfortunately he renounced the theory of Aristarchus, probably because it did not account satisfactorily for variations in distance and irregularities of planetary motions which became ever more apparent as methods of observations improved, while the geocentric theory seemed to explain accurately enough the celestial phenomena and was reconcilable with the earth's immobility. As, however, his works are lost and known only from Ptolemy, we cannot say.

Ptolemy's planetary and lunar theories brought to an end Alexandrian astronomy, whose roots were far back in the ancient civilizations of the Tigris-Euphrates and Nile valleys. He carried on his observations at Canopus near Alexandria between A.D. 127 and 151, and so was in a position to appraise the work of his predecessors in his *Great Syntaxis,* known to us by its Arabic title *Almagest,* since it was translated at Bagdad in 827 at the order of the caliph Al-Mamun. According to his system the earth, a sphere, hangs stationary in the centre of the universe, around which the stars revolve uniformly together, as if fixed in a crystalline sphere within which the sun revolves in a circle eccentric to the earth, and the moon and planets in individually peculiar and complicated paths revolve in circular orbits about points—called *epicycles*—which in turn revolve in larger circles whose centres outside the earth are in similar motion. Thus were explained the annual traverse of the sun and the monthly one of the moon, and all the motions of the various circles being uniform explained the loops, progressions, and retrogressions of the planets. Such a system, intricate and complicated, consisted with appearances and so "saved the phenomena" as Plutarch called it, a geocentric system which made planetary motions at least understandable.

Ptolemy's system was, then, the culmination of Greek astronomy, for Ptolemy had no successors, only commentators and interpreters, such as the astronomer-geometer Theon of Alexandria, who wrote a commentary on his work in eleven books during the reign of Theodosius the Great, and Theon's daughter Hypatia. She was head of the Neoplatonic school there and, *ca.* A.D. 415, probably at the instigation of Bishop Cyril, was slain in the streets of Alexandria by a fanatical mob of monks, her body dragged into a church and torn in pieces—philosophy's most beloved martyr because of her youth, sex, and beauty.

To have wielded absolute authority in astronomy, as Aristotle did in natural science, and to have organized an astronomical system which, though wrong in principle, dominated Europe, Western Asia, and North Africa for centuries, is no mean title to fame. But an analysis of the *Almagest* shows that much of that fame is specious and that its chief merits are industry and learning rather than originality. While he made valuable discoveries, Ptolemy was to a large extent merely the editor of views of men greater than himself, notably of Hipparchus, since his work is frankly based on that of the latter, whom he frequently cites and in one place calls the "lover of truth and of labor." Thus the stellar motions of Bk. VII come from Hipparchus, as doubtless does the catalogue of over a thousand stars in Bk. VIII, arranged in Babylonian constellations, with their magnitudes, celestial longitudes and latitudes, the most interesting part of the work. Hipparchus had been prompted to the latter task, according to Pliny's *Natural History* (2:26) by the appearance of a new star in 134 B.C. Bk. V is connected with Hipparchus' astrolabe, and the account of the motion of the sun and length of the solar year in Bk. III are based on the latter's precession of the equinoxes. However, the discussion of the lunar months, estimated at 29 days, 12 hours, 44 minutes, and 3 seconds in Bk. V, where Hipparchus' theories are examined, and the presentation of the planetary theory, celestial latitudes, and orbital inclinations in Bks. IX-XIII are, in the main, Ptolemy's own work. Even the famous dictum, still as valid today as in antiquity, that "for the explanation of phenomena we should accept the simplest hypothesis possible, if it is not controverted by observation," came from Hipparchus. It is sometimes difficult to separate the views of Ptolemy from those of Hipparchus.

Thus finally the geocentric system, the logical outcome of Greek thinking, emerged triumphant and was accepted in the Middle Ages. The reasons why Ptolemy was satisfied with it were doubtless the same as those which had motivated Hipparchus—chiefly its harmony with appearances as noted by the naked eye, and so with common sense. Moreover, it also harmonized with religious conservatism in later Greece as it did in after ages with Christianity and Mohammedanism. And it harmonized

well enough with Aristotle's physical arguments. Due to the latter's materialization of Eudoxus' system which, as we have seen, represented the planets as carried round the earth in transparent concentric spheres, Ptolemy's system caused confusion in the mediæval mind, and the church accepted a modified version of it and reverted to the Babylonian concept of a flat earth. This was not attacked till the time of Copernicus; it was completely exploded by Kepler's discovery that the planetary orbits were elliptical, and still later by Newton's mechanical principles. A proof of its tenacity, however, is shown by the fact that the two systems, Ptolemaic and Copernican, were long presented side by side in our early American universities.

In the long centuries between Ptolemy and Copernicus developments in cosmology were almost nonexistent in Christendom, inhibited especially by the infamous decree of Justinian which closed the pagan schools of Athens in 529. But there was a revival outside the Christian world under the Arabs. On their conquering march eastward to India, begun in the seventh century, they came upon Greek ideas planted long before in the Middle East by Alexander the Great, and westward through Egypt, and eventually to Spain, with the remnants of Alexandrian science. Scientific activity flourished at the Arabian courts in Bagdad and Cairo and at the Moorish ones in Toledo and Cordova from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries. Arabian monarchs had Greek works in astronomy, geography, and medicine and Hindu scientific books translated, and—chief among all —Ptolemy's *Great Syntaxis*. Al-Mamun, called by Sismondi, "the Augustus of Bagdad," founded the first mediæval observatory in 829 where Arabian scholars catalogued stars and recorded celestial motions. They found, as in Christendom, difficulty in reconciling the ideas of Ptolemy and Aristotle, since the former's complicated planetary motions were somewhat inconsistent with the latter's physical principles. Averroes rejected Ptolemy and favored Aristotle who had said that any planetary hypothesis must conform with the physical laws of motion, while others favored Ptolemy. On the whole, the Arabs made few additions to Greek astronomy, since they largely lacked the mathematical genius of the Greeks. They slavishly followed Greek theories and made little attempt to understand the celestial motions, but rather fell into fantastic speculations, such as attributing intelligence to the celestial spheres. Still Islam kept astronomy and other Greek sciences alive when Europe was intellectually dead, and their recovered Greek observations were used in the West as early as A.D. 1000, while in the late twelfth century Arabian translations of Greek books were retranslated into Latin, beginning with that of Ptolemy's *Almagest* by Gherard of Cremona in 1175 (not published till 1515). This was followed by translations of Aristotle's physical works.

By the fifteenth century there was a revival of astronomy in the Italian and German universities, as part of the Renaissance stimulated by the recovery of the Greek classics before and after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, by the invention of printing, and by geographical exploration started by Prince Henry of Portugal, for exploration demanded astronomical instruments. That revival culminated in the work of Copernicus and his immediate successors.

After Ptolemy, then, and down to Copernicus, little was known of the heliocentric system. Still it was alluded to and even professed by two mediæval churchmen, the Irish philosopher-theologian Johannes Scotus Erigena in the ninth century and Nicolaus Cusanus in the fifteenth, both of whom must have been known to Copernicus, a good Catholic. Erigena, who elaborated the first synthesis of mediæval theory in his *De divisione naturæ* (865-870), a book burned twice in later centuries—in 1225 by Pope Honorius III and in 1585 by Pope Gregory XIII—expressed the belief that authority and reason cannot be contradictory, but that the latter must be the criterion, and speaks of Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury as bodies "which always describe their circles around the sun." Cusanus, six centuries later (1401-1464), a pioneer of modern philosophy, denounced the perverted scholasticism of his day in his *De docta ignorantia,* and taught that the earth revolved around the sun, and also the immensity of the universe which contained many worlds, and could not have a centre:

> Now it is clear to me that the Earth is really in motion, though this may not be apparent to us, since we do not perceive motion except by a certain comparison with something fixed (2:12).
>
> Since the Earth cannot be the centre, it cannot be devoid of motion.[7]

Finally we should mention Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), an elder contemporary of Copernicus, who among his multiform abilities had time to observe that the earth rotated on its axis and to deny that the sun revolved around it.

How much Copernicus was indebted to his precedessors we cannot say, although it seems clear that he knew their various surmises about the problem which he demonstrated. We cannot, therefore, call the *De revolutionibus* an altogether original work, since the theory had been announced in antiquity and was dimly known down through the century before his death. His contribution to astronomy is, then, that he developed and demonstrated by mathematical proof a theory that was already known, and created a new and logical planetary system, just as Hipparchus and Ptolemy centuries before had created an opposing one. He reorganized

[7] Armitage, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

astronomy on an inverted basis with deductions based on the relativity of motion. His book, while epoch-making, was an inperfect one due to his retention of certain ancient prejudices such as the circular orbits of the planets which made it impossible to place the sun in the exact centre of any. His work, far in advance of any that had preceded, made it possible for his successors, notably Kepler and Newton, to complete a system which has revolutionized our conception of the universe and our place in it. It was Copernicus' glory that he made the sun ruler of the universe and the earth its satellite, for the sun with its vast mass befitting the dignity of a celestial ruler, with a diameter over a hundred times that of the earth and consequently with a volume a million times as great, and with a mass equal to that of 332,000 earths all in one, seems a worthy celestial ruler, maintained in mysterious majesty at a mean distance of over ninety million miles. Today we know that this, the central body of our system, is actually one of the smallest and faintest of the myriads of suns which stud the sky, although because of its comparative nearness it apparently is the largest and brightest; that it, like the earth, has a northern and southern magnetic pole and slowly wheels on an axis which deviates 6° from a line perpendicular to the ecliptic; that the term of its rotation, as calculated from the sunspots, which move across its surface east to west, and from spectroscopic observations, is over twenty-five times that of the earth; and that, as was first made clear by Sir William Herschell in 1783, it moves at great velocity through the heavens in an unknown orbit.

All this has degraded man from his long-assumed exalted position at the centre of the solar system, which requires four hours for light to reach Neptune and an incalculable time to reach the stars, the nearest of which, *alpha Centauri,* is 4.3 light-years away. It has humbled him to a mere speck of matter on a tiny fragment of an endless cosmic machine whose immutable motions go on forever. Copernicus' studies, completed four centuries ago, first raised the question whether man is the goal of creation as he long supposed himself to be, and whether the countless other suns have similar planetary systems on which similar beings dwell; or whether our system is, as Sir James Jeans, who recently disproved the nebular hypothesis of Laplace held since 1796 as the origin of our system, surmises, unique, an abnormal freak, the result of an initial disruption æons ago caused by the accidental collision with another star, an occurrence which not one star in many millions might undergo. These questions will remain forever unanswered, but we may in our surroundings of mystery ask with Emerson, "Why so hot, my little man?"

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

In an earlier editorial attention has been called to the popular practice of quoting a fragment of a sentence from the Bible without its context. Quite independent of the sincerity and piety of the man who does it, the result is almost certain to be misleading. And the opening words of Genesis provided an excellent example of that all too common procedure. But the Old Testament has no monopoly on such verses; the New Testament, too, is full of utterances which lend themselves easily to the same practice. One of the most unfortunate is John 7:17. As it stands, it is clear and incisive; as popularly misquoted without the concluding clause, it easily becomes the support for a most unwarranted confidence. The words, as misquoted, are: "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching," or, as some of the earlier versions translated, "of the *doctrine.*" Of course, the words continue: "whether it is of God, or whether I speak from myself." The context is clear: the Jews have been amazed at Jesus' words. "How knoweth this man letters, never having learned?" Jesus' answer is: My teaching is not mine, but his that sent me. If any man willeth to do his [*i.e.,* God's] will, he will know that this is the case, namely, that my "teaching" comes from God, not from me.

But as popularly misquoted, the words are made to support and justify the invincible ignorance of which so many Christians are proud, and which has alienated so many from the church. A former colleague frequently referred to the problem this verse had caused him during his years in the parish ministry. Time after time laymen would be certain that they had all the answers; that the minister's training had been superfluous, if not actually baneful; that all one needed was a seeming piety, and lo, all the crooked places would become straight. Thus, again and again, those who had fallen prey to this or that curious notion or vagary which nest so securely amid the multifarious twigs of the Protestant tree, would quote this fragment and continue: "*I* will to do God's will; therefore God has made clear to me all the doctrines." Few pastors of long experience but will be able to recall chapter and verse.

Thus through the years a premium has been placed on ignorance; the emptier a man's head is, the more of divine truth the Almighty can pour into it. This may seem like good physics; it results in some pretty terrible theology. It has resulted, furthermore, in a resolute and deep-seated repugnance to the thought of an educated ministry. Even in this day, when, in theory, standards have been raised, it persists. In law, in medicine, in most of the so-called "learned professions," the average

layman hesitates to express his opinion—at any rate, to a degree he respects the dictum, *crede experto*. Not so in theology: there are no closed doors which will not open, if not to the gentle knock, at least to the bumptious knee. Is this exaggerated? Let those who as candidates for vacant pulpits have had the experience of "talking with the pulpit committee" answer. Children in the third grade do not regularly sit in the committee to determine whether or not the new teacher is competent to teach them, or to quiz her as to her views about the multiplication tables. But in our churches we are more democratic. Is not every man a priest? And thus pulpit committees disregard as trivia the reputation of him whom they are purposing to call—does he pay his bills? does he love all the sisters in the Lord as warmly as he does his own wife? does he know how to preach more than two sermons? did he really receive, and from a reputable school, the degree he prints on his letterheads? Instead, they quiz him as to his views on plenary inspiration, on the second coming, on the physical resurrection, and (*pace* Freud) on the virgin birth. Years ago I went into Italy for the first time. I knew no Italian. I bought one of those clever little conversation books, and painfully looked up the desired queries. But I soon gave it up in disgust. What was the use of asking questions when I couldn't understand the answers? Perhaps some day this elemental truth may dawn in our churches.

"Willing to do God's will" is certainly commendable. Perhaps it might be "God's will" for certain individuals to ponder the fact that they have received two ears, two eyes, and only one mouth. And then, again, is it always so easy to know *what* God's will is? We are being urged to pray, "Father, Thy will be done through me." Such a simple prayer we are told; surely every one can pray that! And then comes the disquieting doubt: "Just what is 'God's will' for me? What does he will me to do?" But this must be left for another time. Of one thing we can be sure: Where ignorance is bliss, it still remains folly.

From Off the Campus and On

It is a distinct pleasure to welcome back to our pages Professor Wright, since 1916 a member of the department of philosophy at Dartmouth College. Of his paper he modestly writes: "There is nothing particularly original in it. Several years ago I discovered that some of my colleagues in other departments were considerably confused upon the subject, and I thought it would help them a little in their thinking if the simple and more fundamental considerations and distinctions were put before them in an elementary way. So when I was invited recently to read a paper to a small Sunday evening faculty group, I read this paper. It seemed to go over well, and was followed by a good discussion in which various points of view were defended but all were able to agree on common definitions of terms in accordance with the paper." We are sure this paper will "go over" equally well among our readers.

Mr. Bixler's paper carries enough autobiographical touches to introduce him to the few who do not already know him. He has just completed his first year as president of Colby College. Before going to Colby he had been Bussey Professor of Divinity at Harvard University, and on several occasions acting dean of the Harvard Divinity School. His contributions to the Crozer Quarterly have been many and welcome.

Eugene William Lyman is one of America's great philosophical theologians. After graduation from Amherst and Yale and after graduate work in Germany he held professorships at Carleton College, Congregational College of Canada, Bangor Theological Seminary, and Oberlin. In 1918 he became professor of the philosophy of religion at Union Theological Seminary, becoming professor *emeritus* in 1940. His many books and articles extended his influence throughout the scholarly world. In 1942 a *Festschrift* in his honor, *Liberal Religion,* was published by his former colleagues and students. The second part of his article, entitled "Christianity and a New International Order," will appear in the January issue.

Articles and reviews from Dr. Newell have already introduced him to our readers. Earlier articles, "Speaking of Challenges" (January, 1941) and "Because We Are Christians" (January, 1942), will be remembered with appreciation. In his essay in the current issue this gifted preacher discusses with characteristic sobriety and restraint a topic which bids fair to be widely discussed and debated in the coming days.

The article by Dr. Baldwin should and will receive attention. He says some things which he is not alone in believing needed to be said. A graduate of Rochester Theological Seminary, he has been since 1919 pastor of the Chestnut Street Baptist Church, Philadelphia. For twenty-five years he was a member of the Foreign Board of the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society.

For many years Walter Woodburn Hyde was professor of ancient history at the University of Pennsylvania. Our readers will remember his article, "The Popular Religion of Greece and Its Survivals" (April, 1941). In the present essay this able historian clearly reveals that for the true scholar there is no such thing as "retirement."

Once again the CROZER QUARTERLY is able to print a good grist of reviews. In addition to the members of the Crozer faculty fourteen scholars "from off the campus" contribute important discussions of significant books. Dr. Bertocci is an assistant professor of philosophy at Bates. Professor Brightman has been for many years a member of the department of philosophy at Boston University. Dr. Bronk was long a member of the editorial staff of the American Baptist Publication Society. Dr. Burkhardt, a newcomer to our pages, is assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin. Professor Ferré is a member of the department of theology at Andover Newton. An article by him will appear in our pages in the near future. Professor Hudson has recently become a member of the department of church history at Colgate-Rochester. Professor Irwin has held the chair of Old Testament at the University of Chicago since 1930. His article, "Images of Yahweh" (October, 1942), aroused wide attention. Professor Matthews needs only to be welcomed. An important article by him will appear in the January issue. Professor Montgomery, dean of American Semitists, was for many years head of that department at the University of Pennsylvania. Professor Reid, of Wake Forest College, and a Crozer trustee, will be remembered for his challenging article, "The Layman Observes the Minister" (July, 1942). Professor Steere is a member of the Haverford College faculty and the successor of Rufus M. Jones. Professor Sweet is a professor of church history at the University of Chicago. Dean Van Dusen, of Union Theological Seminary, requires no introduction in any theological circle at home or abroad. Professor Widgery, of the department of philosophy at Duke University, is a frequent and welcome contributor to our pages.

BOOK REVIEWS

How Do We Know God? by Richard Kroner, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. x, 134, $1.75.

Richard Kroner is a genuine scholar. This is evidenced by his great work, *Von Kant bis Hegel,* by his long and successful conduct of the philosophical quarterly, *Logos,* and by his productive literary activity. He is also a genuine man, simple in character, strong in faith, piercingly honest. Yet *How Do We Know God?* is a confusing book—confusing, it seems to the reviewer, not because of the depth of its ideas, but because of their contradictoriness.

This is not to say that the book is wholly confusing and contradictory or that it lacks all merit. For its opposition to naturalistic philosophy, for its refusal to surrender to the "cult" of science, and for its profound appreciation of prophetic religion it is worthy of high commendation. Whole pages could be filled with sound and judicious observations by the author, of which a few samples follow. "Even great theologians," Kroner truly says, "have fallen victims to the pretensions of the intellect and have overrationalized faith and its content." "We must venture to think as believers." "Faith is the trust in reality or in destiny controlled by the living God. Faith is a kind of personal confidence." "Science determines the realm of conditions and means, not the realm of persons and purposes." "Despite the infinite distance separating God and man, man can experience God in his personal life." "Historical knowledge is not religious knowledge." "Though the physicist is himself a person, he is nevertheless unable to comprehend personality as long as he is nothing but a physicist." "It is the prejudice of our time to overrate the value of scientific knowledge, as if no other knowledge could attain to any truth whatever." "Man is man because of his being related to ultimate reality." "There is *truth* in our experiences, no matter how vague, how confused, how narrow they may be." Spiritual knowledge is "at once personal and interpersonal, individual and universal." "The knowledge of God is intrinsically mystical, because it is an *empirical* knowledge of a *transcendent* being." It is "a personal fellowship with the Creator and Ruler of the universe, who remains a mystery even when he reveals himself." "The knowledge of God as rooted in faith depends on this historical process." "The history of man thus becomes at the same time *a history of God.*" "Historism [*sic*] intimidates religion, fundamentalism terrorizes history, and indeed, science as well." "The purpose of God," is, so the author says at the close of the book, "superior to the laws of nature and to the secular events of human history."

To the liberal theistic thinker, all, or almost all, of the foregoing statements are profound truths, veritable gems of insight. Surely, he might suppose, an author who writes thus is essentially on the right track! This supposition is unfortunately a hasty inference. Professor Kroner's thought is confused by at least three cross-currents which conflict partly with the soundly rational empiricism of the passages quoted above, and partly with each other. These three currents may be called authoritarianism, romanticism, and antiscientism. All three conflict with the general tenor of the citations above; and the first two conflict with each other. Let us consider the evidence.

Is Kroner's thought authoritarian? If by authoritarianism is meant reliance on the biblical revelation as ultimate authority over against all extrabiblical forms of reason and experience, Kroner is clearly authoritarian in numerous utterances. In the preface, he contrasts "belief in the sciences" with "belief in the Bible." He asks whether it

does not verge on blasphemy "to speak of the heavenly father of Jesus in terms of philosophic considerations based on a logical procedure" (p. 65). This seems to disallow even the language of reason, and to require purely biblical formulæ. It is a "characteristic mark of revealed religion," he says, that God calls and "man is the target of God's actions." "Man," on this view, "does not deliberately act: he is acted upon." For this reason, revealed religion excludes experiment in the scientific sense. The picture of man as target, as passive object of divine action, is thoroughly authoritarian. Man's knowledge of God comes not by seeking or any human act whatever; it comes only "by obeying Him, by devotion and adoration."

In contrast to this authoritarian spirit of passive submission, there is the current of romanticism, that is, of rich emotional productivity. This is hinted at when Kroner says that "the prophet is more akin to the creative artist than he is to the scientist." True enough, we reply! But the creative artist is no mere target, no submissively obedient soul. He is a man of action. But Kroner's romanticism goes further than this. He insists on the alogical character of religion. "No logical process can grasp or dissect it." In fact, the nonlogical and the unknown are essential to religion. "If God revealed Himself unrestrictedly, He would no longer be a mystery. . . . If He ceases to be a mystery, religion could no longer fulfill its function." Religion, then, depends on our ignorance. In still another sense, Kroner's view is romantic, namely, in his emphasis on the concept of "life." "Spiritual truth," he says, "can be found by life alone. This sounds far more like romantic pragmatism than like authoritarianism. The "vitality" of the biblical images is "a guarantee of their inner truth." Religious experience is "embedded in the flux of life and movement." An entire section deals with "the superiority of life over history."

Even more difficult to reconcile with the tenor of the passages quoted at the start is what we have called the antiscientism of Kroner. Few philosophers or theologians clearly conscious of the problem of value would care to assert that science furnishes us with a criterion of religious value. But Kroner goes far beyond this when he says, in a passage that may be called the heart of the book:

> It is obvious that we have to abandon the standard and the criterion of science, that is, of rational or logical knowledge, whether it be empirical or speculative, experimental or deductive, if we are to understand the particular mode of religious knowledge, its kind of truth, its kind of certainty.

One might well wonder what we have left to understand with if we abandon all the available means of understanding.

Dr. Kroner has written a stimulating and provocative book. It is not consistent; its definitions are not precise; yet it is a book which grows out of rich and sincere experience, out of struggle and suffering. Few will agree with it throughout. Open-minded readers will learn much from it.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

Palestinian Figurines in Relation to Certain Goddesses Known through Literature, by James B. Pritchard, New Haven, American Oriental Society, [American Oriental Series, Vol. 24], 1943, pp. 99, pp. 2 of plates, $1.75.

This volume by Professor Pritchard is fully worthy of the distinction given to it in its appearance in the monograph series of the Oriental Society. It is notable also as a product of collaboration with several leading orientalistic scholars, whom he names with his acknowledgments, most of them his preceptors at the University of Pennsylvania, Professors Della Vida, Harris, Ranke, Speiser, along with a fellow student, Dr. Dorothy Stehle, and also Professors W. F. Albright and G. E. Wright.

The work appears to be a result of what might be called seminar process, the Oriental Department of the University of Pennsylvania having pursued for several years a remarkable system of coöperative seminars, in which its members, faculty, and students participate, along with scholars from neighboring schools. The present writer has long been of the opinion that there should be more such coöperation in scholarly work, and particularly in orientalistics, with its amazing extension in geography and history. Such a method would avoid much subsequent criticism and correction.

The first part of the book is of archæological value in its full description of 294 figurines and plaques, representing goddesses, ranging from 2000-600 B.C. These are carefully docketed and described (pp. 5-31), followed with a study of their grouping as types (pp. 31-58). There follows a study of the female deities of Palestine, whom these figures must represent, and whose names are well known from the Old Testament, Asherah, Ashtart-Ashtoreth, Anat (pp. 59-88), this study involving their appearance in the other Oriental lands from Mesopotamia to Arabia and Egypt. An appendix (pp. 89-96) treats at length of the appearance of these lusty goddesses in the recently discovered Ras Shamra texts, which have been the most striking orientalistic discovery for many years, as also a study of Ashtart in the Phœnician inscriptions. At the end of the volume three pages are devoted to bibliographical abbreviations, which, however, do not by any means cover the whole range of literature cited throughout.

For the Bible student the thesis is of great value for the full citation of all the biblical references to those deities and their cults, and for the light now thrown upon the extensive subject by the archæology of the widespread ancient civilization. For him it will be a most useful introduction to an interesting field of research, the paganism with which the monotheism and ethics of Israel had to cope. And for the professional scholar the work sums up meticulously and judiciously the disparate items of knowledge—archæological, philological, religious—and is a volume for which all interested will be grateful for its usefulness.

JAMES A. MONTGOMERY

The Survival of Western Culture, by Ralph Tyler Flewelling, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xv, 304, $3.00.

Professor Flewelling sees western culture dominated by two great and opposed themes: universalism and individualism. These appear throughout the history of the West in various guises—authoritarianism versus democracy, Plato versus Aristotle, geometry versus arithmetic, cyclical space-time versus linear space-time, and so forth. Universalism is Bad. Individualism is Pretty Good. It is not entirely good because it has its nasty, selfish, antisocial aspects. But it is the basis of the survival of western culture (if it does survive), providing it is transmuted into personalism. Personalism is true individualism. A human being is a person when "he finds himself and his highest good only in the well-being of all."

In his foreword Professor Flewelling says that his account of western culture is going to be accused of being oversimplified. Since this is one of the few of his prophesies which is not vague and utterly impossible of verification, I regret that I cannot make the accusation. His outline of history appears to me arbitrary and imaginative rather than oversimple, and even if there were more evidence for his dual themes than Professor Flewelling presents, this sort of history strikes me as being about as enlightening as the old principles of Yang and Yin.

But what of the present? What does Professor Flewelling, contemplating the contemporary crisis, say is to be done? The destiny of our civilization, he tells us,

depends upon the recognition of the dignity and worth of the human person. But he never tells us what he means by this except in highly general and eulogistic terms. This is the most serious shortcoming of the book, because while Professor Flewelling makes it clear that he is a foe of authoritarianism and absolutism, most of his passages on "persons" and "personalism" could be transplanted to the works of those very active authoritarians, the Neo-Thomists. They, too, make much of the concept "person" and its importance as distinguished from individualism. Presumably Professor Flewelling would not be seen dead in the company of such absolutists. Yet there is no way to tell them apart on this, the most important doctrine in the book. And mind you, the survival of the West is declared to depend upon the acceptance of this doctrine.

Perhaps Professor Flewelling might have taken on the job of making his solution more concrete and specific if he were less of an optimist. For all his harsh words about automatic progress he believes things are going to come out all right in the end because he perceives a benevolent Creative Mind in nature. He arrives at this belief by a touching faith in Max Planck as a philosopher, and the simple device of reading nature teleologically. Evolution, for instance, looks like this to him: . . . "It is a story of fine coöperation, such as that wherein the bee toils for the flower to further its propagation and the flower in turn yields its dying sweets for the benefit of the bee." According to Charles Darwin, a single clear instance of a bee toiling *for* a flower to further its propagation would wreck his whole theory of evolution. That was said more than seventy-five years ago, and Darwinian evolution is still going strong. Professor Flewelling universalizes this "coöperation" of the bee. "By such coöperation in millions of instances," he says, "the whole process of nature goes on."

This cheerful view of the universe pervades the book, and for all his personalism Professor Flewelling does not have to depend on "persons" to see us through. I doubt very much, for example, if any man who saw the future as really dependent upon human creativeness and initiative could have written a sentence such as this: "If we had further need for emphasis on the fact that nature is an organism, part related to living part, surely the responses of nature to our attempts to use her in airplane, radio and television should be sufficient." With such an attitude it is quite logical, I suppose, to write a book on the "Survival of Western Culture" whose chief messages might be summed up in the exhortation: Be good personalists!

FREDERICK BURKHARDT

The New Order in the Church, by William Adams Brown, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, pp. 189, $1.50.

The central thesis of this book is that the church can fill its place worthily in the postwar world only if it undergoes a radical change in its own order. If the church wants a new world—and it does—then it must make the desired ways of conduct in that world implicit in its own organization and life. The church's spiritual ministry must be by example as well as by precept. Consequently, extensive reforms are required within the church. If these take place, the church's sincerity will be proved to the world through deeds and the disclosure made that the church proposes to apply the principles in its administrative and economic life which it would like to see utilized by the statesmen and nations of the earth.

Dr. Brown finds the Ecumenical Movement to be a first step toward a new order in the church. Although the seventy-eight churches in different parts of the world, including Eastern Orthodox, Old Catholic, and Protestant, which have joined the

World Council of Churches, have not yet met for the formal organization of that body because of the war, they have nonetheless accepted the constitution which is to govern the organization. Such a movement towards world-wide Christianity represents a pattern of international coöperation which the church may well call upon the nations to emulate. As there is now a vast company of men and women who, beneath all the differences of race and class and nation, are resolved to maintain their sense of vital unity even despite the barriers of war, so there can come to men of good will in all nations the firm resolve to establish a unity of peoples which will transcend all national and racial barriers. In ecumenical Christianity Dr. Brown finds a body which can "represent the Church as a whole, have authority to act for it in the region of common agreement, and make provision for systematic study in the region of difference." Such might well be a pattern to statesmen for moulding the world of the future.

Yet if the present church is to be fully healed of its diseases of division, considerable work must be done in the local churches and the present factions of Christianity. No overhead movement, which some would interpret the World Council of Churches to be, can fulfill its function unless the great commonalty of Christians is solidly behind it. It is just at this point that the greatest hindrance to a unified Christianity is to be found. It still remains true that despite all the lip service which has been paid to the desirability of Christian unity, most Christians still make their denomination their primary loyalty rather than the Church Universal. Until this psychological barrier is destroyed, there can be no genuine new order in the church. It is the judgment of the author that the church needs, above everything else today, men and women who will make the Ecumenical Movement not one cause among other causes, but the one which will have a primary claim upon their devotion. Without a growing host of such folk the church will not set a pattern of coöperation, service, witness, and love for those who must organize the world anew politically, economically, racially, and socially once the war is over.

This volume may be best described as a guiding philosophy for the church of the future with many definite suggestions included for its specific service in the fields of worship, witness, service, and education. In the postwar world there will be need of renewed fellowship, of a unifying faith, of economic sharing, and of world-wide understanding. Only a unified church can meet those needs. If the church completes the movements of understanding and increasing unity progressively fostered by the church conferences at Jerusalem, Lausanne, Stockholm, Oxford, Edinburgh, and Madras, then it will become a symbol in unity, understanding, coöperation, and love which can well be the inspiring frame of reference for the world to be. As Dr. Brown says in the concluding pages of his book: "We cannot make it [the Church] truly Christian without at the same time affecting the whole order of which it is a part. The more nearly Christian the Church becomes, the closer we come to solving the administrative and educational problems to the discussion of which this book has been devoted, the nearer we shall come to an answer to the world-old puzzle—Can civilization be made Christian?" (p. 176).

All those who are interested in the church's rôle in the days now with us and soon to come in the postwar world should make a careful study of this philosophy of the church.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Science, Philosophy and Religion: Third Symposium, published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, New York, 1943, pp. xix, 438, $3.00.

This third symposium is worthy of its predecessors. The main theme is the relation of science, philosophy, and theology to the democratic way of life. There are twenty-five papers, with appended discussions by various members of the conference; all are thoughtful, and many are thought-provoking. The main theme, the democratic way of life, is approached from various angles: objective values, origins, meaning of human dignity, problems of education, the place and significance of art, music, and letters in eastern civilization.

Challenging as most of the papers are, space permits mention of but a few. That of Philipp Frank, of Harvard University, on the relativity of truth and the objectivity of values, is well balanced and timely. Relativism is the only method that is compatible with the progress of human knowledge; yet while his method lacks some of the values of absolutism, it has contributed much to present-day life as is seen in liberal Judaism and in liberal Christianity, and it is essential to progress of thought. Nor does relativism deny objectivity, for the growing richness of experience provides the student with an ever-closer approximation to the "absolute." However, truth can be stated only in complicated, qualified, relativized language.

Maximilian Beck, of Yale University, in a lengthy dissent seems to be wide of the mark. When he states that "people do not regard something to be moral because it has been ordered by an authority, but, on the contrary, believe that an authority is an authority because what it orders is good," one greatly wonders. The context is clear; the real moral consciousness is the problem, and Kant's categorical imperative is the arbiter. But in the world of history, by and large, mankind is guided by authority, whether it be good or evil. Orthodox Jews may eat grasshoppers and locusts (Lev. 11:22), but may not eat oysters or pork (Lev. 11:6, 7). This has been the law of the land for thousands of years, based not on health or taste, but on authority.

James B. Pratt, of Williams College, presents a clear, compelling paper on the nature of value which he finds in subjectivism; and John S. Brubacher, of Yale University, who writes on education toward a democratic world order, is well aware of the need, the difficulties, and the desirable methods. How can we have democratic education, when dictatorship, at home and abroad, is so prevalent and infiltrates so easily? Reasonable methods are suggested.

A basic article is that of Gregory Bateson, the English anthropologist, on human dignity and the varieties of civilization. Briefly and clearly he shows how the concept of human dignity or self-respect or acceptance of self arises, so that in different civilizations the idea in one may be widely divergent, even contradictory, from that in others. Thus in international relations it is essential that the formative cultural pattern of each should be thoroughly understood by the others. The need of this is glaringly apparent in the rejoinder of Professor Beck, of Yale, to whom Bateson replies that the difficulty of communication between one discipline and another is seen in the fact that "Dr. Beck has apparently misunderstood what I was trying to say."

The paper of Lyman Bryson, Teachers College, Columbia University, "What Is Good Society?" cannot be passed over. It is trenchant and realistic. Good society is usually equated with the "one best known and most pleasantly familiar." It is "ours." Furthermore, as our desires are not in our genes but are the product of our culture, in our Western Christian democracy "cultural parochialism" is dominant. A fact to be recognized is that not all human beings want freedom; many wish

freedom to choose a vastly different way of life. Hence, in the remaking of the new world, to peddle abroad the "absolutes" of the theologian cannot avail, since they are divisive. In any reform the cultural patterns of the people concerned must be recognized, and to these political patterns should be adjusted.

A worthy article is that by Nels F. S. Ferré, of the Andover Newton Theological School, on the meaning of human dignity from a theological perspective. A wide range of information in philosophy, theology, biology, and sociology is drawn upon with fine facility of expression, and considerable evangelical fervor. Evidence of personal interest in research work is coupled with at least a dash of dialectic. He narrows the theme of the paper from "theological perspective" to that of the "Jewish-Christian." One wonders if the original topic is not the more appropriate for such a conference, if not quite so adequate for this address. It is a well-balanced contribution, but words of appreciation—and there could be many—must here give place to queries that have been long in the mind of the reviewer, and will not down.

It is true, that the "wise philosopher does not limit truth to our feeble systematization of our fugitive glimpses of our little world." But, with due humility, should we not recognize that "our feeble systematization of our fugitive glimpses" has been hard won, by good and wise men, and is a hundred- if not a thousandfold more adequate and more certain than was the guesswork of our remote ancestors who originated the hypotheses which are basic to our Jewish-Christian theologies? No doubt we have polished and dressed them up, often in semiscientific garb, but no amount of rhetoric can conceal the fact that at bottom, sometimes stripped of the more primitive by Jewish leaders, these theories are those of Arabia of five thousand years ago. Their origin and development lie back in the millenia of prehistory, and are as definitely known as is the story of Eohippus. They were valuable in the early dawn of human experience, but neither their origin nor their antiquity makes them more sacrosanct than are the tools of the Old Stone Age. Do these ancient explanations of human problems—many of them the result of wishful thinking; all of them based on the most meagre knowledge—stand the tests of these, later, light-flooded days? Professor Ferré's contributions in this volume indicate that he is wrestling with this question.

It is true, as he says, that "the true philosopher beholds the ideal order stretching far beyond his own grasp of its worth and reality," but how far does that warrant a "faith judgment," based primarily on theological speculation, that neglects almost, if not entirely, the historic process? That is, the "norm" of conduct is "grounded in God" or in "the will of God." The same idea is expressed in a later paragraph: responsibility to and for society "is in the end based on responsibility to God; and again: "man's sense of right is rooted in a reality beyond self and society." These are all quieting, Christian phrases, all born in the Arabian Desert, but where is the evidence? Naturally, tradition responds as tradition has been taught: my Hebrew Bible; the essential spirit, the high points of the Jewish Scriptures; the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible; the King James Version; the New Testament, literally—no, spiritually; my church, the Archbishop of Canterbury; not so, the papacy; the "inner light"; my metaphysical forebrain, stirred by the flame of idealism. So a "faith judgment" based on "the will of God" is for each group the discipline of the group. This is too indefinite to satisfy any one outside of the particular group.

But basic to this problem is the implication—frequently the assertion—that by reason of personal experience the theologian has access to information which is hidden from the uninitiated. Thus, he is in possession of an "absolute" of which even the most intelligent layman can know nothing. But we note that all

such information is emotionally conditioned and traditionally limited; that among different groups of initiated the will of God varies even to exclusive opposites, to say nothing of the arrogance of the assumption that is vocal even among the most humble. Personally, when I find myself saying—as here I do in agreement with Mr. Ferré—"it is easier for many reasons . . . to believe in a God of the universe . . ." I am a little fearful that my "inherited, spiritual capital" may be weighting the scales. My tradition (may she ever be right; but my tradition, right or wrong), which is the guiding star of not a few leaders in every branch of the Christian church, is fatal to all progress. No "norm" is final; no "will of God" is absolute.

It is true that inheritance is likely to be lost if not exercised, but what has that to do with the old dictum, "a few generations can, of course, live on inherited spiritual capital, but in the end the ethos without the faith loses its compelling power"? This is too vague to be meaningful, and when made specific is specious. What does he mean by "spiritual capital"? Hard-shell Baptist doctrine? a brand of Lutheranism? the fervor of Methodism? a peculiar doctrine held in common by the Latin, the Greek, the Coptic, the Protestant branches of Christianity, but not found in Mohammedanism or Confucianism? Is it *agapē*, a self-abandoning brotherly love? But none of these, not even the last, is the peculiar possession of Christianity. Moreover, a fine ethos has existed among the followers of Confucius for over two thousand years, without any so-called "faith judgment." Only when we compare the best in the thinking and the living in our own group with the worst in that found outside of Christianity—an all too frequent practice—do we find a peculiar comfort. When we reverse the process, we are often put to shame.

On a good many counts Christian theology seems to be sadly parochial. Is this basic in the Christian religion, or is it due to the accumulated incrustations of the passing centuries? In these days there is compulsion to be interdenominational, interracial, and international. Can Christianity surmount the unwarranted barriers of traditionalism and ecclesiasticism? Can she reinterpret the ideal of the Old Testament and of Jesus in terms of human relations and ideals? Can she reëxpress her vision so that it may bear the scrutiny and gain the assent of all wise men, East and West? Can she find the abiding strength and stimulus for the abundant life in the great realities as they are being revealed in the personal, the social, and in the unfolding universe? The crises of these years, the war and the world upheaval, the astounding discoveries of the physical sciences in an expanding universe, the amazing new knowledge in anthropology, biology, and sociology, these, each and all, contribute to a new order of thought. Some of our theology may have to go; but the religion of Jesus will endure. The green light has signaled an open highway to Professor Ferré and his contemporaries. They are competent.

I. G. MATTHEWS

God and Evil, by C. E. M. Joad, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. 349, $3.00.

At best book reviewing is a perilous task. This case is exceptionally so. Frankly, this latest book by Joad is a puzzle, and the reviewer can only state his reaction and consequent criticism.

Professor Joad has been a clever lecturer and a facile writer. He has combined, at his best, "punch" with profundity, importance with clarity, historic knowledge with systematic power. On the other side, his sweeping generalizations are often exaggerated for effect and misleading in detail. He evidently enjoys shocking people and being discussed.

While this volume is hailed as the conversion to theism of one of England's leading agnostic and indeed antireligious philosophers, the reviewer wishes to enter a strong caution. The conversion seems neither complete nor altogether serious. The professor still dramatizes himself and speaks rather prematurely on topics beyond his depth. "Trench religion" may be too strong a term even for an academic trench situation. No doubt Joad is fairly serious (and who can judge a man's inner relation to God?), but there are a flimsiness and flippancy about the whole book which hardly bespeak the depths of religion as "comforted despair." Even if part, though not all, of this flippancy may be the embarrassment of head and heart in conflict, there should nevertheless be a profounder note in a book on this topic by a man of Joad's training and capacity.

Professor Joad has given up his antireligious stand and become a "benevolent agnostic." He even wants to try the theistic hypothesis for himself. It cannot at least be disproved, even though an omnipotent, benevolent God is more refuted than proved by reason. Yet since values are objectively real, since mystics claim contact with God, since such knowledge is inaccessible except to those who have had such experience, since we need a God who constitutes moral authority and provides social and individual motivation in desirable directions, and since evil confronts us as never before as discouragingly and destructively real, we must believe in God if we are to be saved. Thus (runs the thread of the arguments) evil threatens us; we cannot save ourselves; therefore God must be real. We may also believe since modern science and philosophy have destroyed old obstacles and since there is universally this organic need, answered in some, to believe in God beyond our feeble sight. Christianity, of course, is too crude and Ptolemaic in theory, history, and practice to convince modern man of its truth.

Because of this rational justification, especially on account of man's universal longing to believe, Professor Joad feels he has gone beyond mere pragmatism. Where does he actually stand or come out?

He has done much thinking about the problem of evil, about religion, yet far less about Christianity. He is either woefully ignorant of the best theological developments and positions or else chooses to ignore them. His whole treatment is rather amateurish, and he fails to see the deeper reasons for a religious interpretation of our existence because of his failure to know method, perspectives, and the deeper levels of the problems. Particularly the following points vitiate his gropings: 1. His perspective is throughout philosophic-speculative rather than religious-existential. 2. He talks of the consciousness of sin but fails signally to see things in the light of the cross. His whole approach to the problem of evil is hedonistic, superciliously *bourgeois*. Grace and faith are not part of the book. A fellowship redeemed by suffering is never even mentioned. At the best he confronts the individual with value, especially the æsthetic experience. Much of the argument definitely reads as though the shallow, self-satisfied philosophic comfort of the middle-class speculator is threatened by the Nazis, but never destroyed by God in the very essence of its idolatry. This is no thoroughgoing religious revolution, but more of a calling on the universe for help to preserve the best in the *status quo*. 3. With all his talk of his former faith in evolution, he nevertheless never confronts the real problems of God in history, retrospectively, presently, or prospectively. This whole central realm is peculiarly neglected in spite of his rejection of Aristotle's kind of God. 4. The most discouraging bit of evidence that the conversion is far from complete is that evil is still not subsumed under theological categories or solved ultimately at all. All Joad wants is a sense of meaningfulness in life and that its evils will not

overwhelm us overly much. There is no solution at all in terms of metaphysical ultimates. The God of Joad is no God in the light of which the whole process of created nature and history is seen. Without any doctrine of history, immortality, and last things the theistic hypothesis is both lame and utterly forced. Joad wants a practical stimulant for a failure of nerve; no real God big enough to make all evil ultimately meaningful or big enough to give us faith in a full solution even though we see but in part and dimly. 5. His discussion of Christianity is not in the depths of basic motifs and involvements but on the superficial phenomenological level. He never even sees the profound distinctions and issues. Christian love to him is pretty much the same as other idealistic assertions; not the eternal judgment of man's dominant self-seeking and basic idolatries. Doctrines like the Incarnation are discussed as by an outsider who never has even touched the fringe of the metaphysical, moral, social, and spiritual issues involved.

Joad's discussion of pain in the animal world is well done. Theologians have seldom been vital on this point. This aspect of the problem of evil demands larger perspectives as to the fullness of God's purpose. His very critical picture of Jesus is also mostly to the good. We have been rather complacent about the interpretations we have given certain features of his life and teachings. At least we ought to face the problems more carefully. His discussion of emergent evolution is also of great value to those who have not themselves struggled long and deeply with the problems involved.

We welcome all comers; no, we beg all and sundry to ponder the deeper problems of our common existence. Yet it must be no game. No earnest Christian can rejoice to have a philosopher say he begins to believe in God only to show his superficial grasp of the issues involved. The existential ultimates must be wrestled with in deadly earnest, without cleverness, without philosophic pride, and solved after years of honest struggle as best we may with the blood of both mind and heart. All this "return to religion" is to be watched and appraised with care. Much of it is just a failure of nerve. But that can become the opportunity for men to find a theological perspective and existential decision which by their coöperation can find the only adequate foundation for both individual and social living.

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

George Keith, by Ethyn Williams Kirby, New York, Appleton-Century, 1943, pp. vi, 177, $3.00.

In a carefully documented and well-written monograph of a hundred and fifty pages, Ethyn Williams Kirby has issued the first serious biography of the colorful seventeenth-century religious leader, George Keith. In the life span of a single figure who served both in England and Colonial America and who was first Calvinist, then Quaker, then "Christian Quaker," and finally Anglican missionary and clergyman, he has had a rich occasion to portray the religious development of the period of 1660-1710, especially in Quaker and Anglican circles.

Born in Aberdeenshire, Scotland, in 1638, Keith was thoroughly educated in the conventional classical university atmosphere at Aberdeen, but grew weary of classics and of both the moldy potted Aristotle and the stern and rigid doctrines of the Aristotle of Geneva, whose "Institutes" were so much prized by the Scotch teachers of his day. "And I came to value one dram of living knowledge: (from God Himself) so to speak, to all the Talents, that other which I had labored so much for, and had cost me so much travel and money . . . and it lay upon me from the Lord to depart from these Teachings."

This first departure from Calvinism to Quakerism was aided by the study of Descartes with his emphasis upon the inner principle of clear and distinct knowledge which must replace all dead tests, and the writings of Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist, together with the influence of the little Quaker group both at Edinburgh and Aberdeen which he frequented. The company of Robert Barclay and the elder Barclay, both men of great gifts, made this Aberdeen connection fruitful for him, and soon his Scotch talent for theology and for arguing were at work on his new-found experience of religious immediacy.

His *Immediate Revelation . . . Not Ceased* was issued in 1668 and was one of the ablest theological defenses of Quakerism to appear before Barclay's masterpiece, *The Apology*, which owed no small debt to Keith's earlier pamphlet. The passion to instruct, teach, systematize, and present in logically coercive form the Quaker position marked Keith from the beginning, and his long vigils in both Scotch and English prisons, where he was sent for his adherence to Quaker practice, only gave him added leisure for this work.

It was this same passion for systematization and verbally statable orthodoxy that both won and lost him his following as a Quaker leader. So long as it was directed at the persecutors of Quakerism, this passion for theologizing was appreciated by most Friends. But when it began to turn itself upon the Friends themselves and to set up Christian standards of orthodoxy and to impose them censoriously upon the meetings, especially in America where he had gone in 1685 as surveyor-general of New Jersey, resentment mounted swiftly, and through a series of bitter controversies a schism resulted. In 1692 George Keith's followers formed an independent group in New Jersey and Pennsylvania called the "Christian Quakers."

This ugly controversy grew out of weaknesses in the Society of Friends which the author of this monograph would have done well to have elaborated beyond the brief references which he makes to them, weaknesses which Keith in a pompous and ostentatious, but none the less accurate, way drew attention to. The relation of later generations of Quakerism to the Christian tradition in which the adult first generation of Quakerism, including George Fox, had been scrupulously schooled before the inner illuminations that marked their Quaker experience had come—to the Bible, to the historical Christ—was and is today an issue of grave importance to the Society of Friends, one which still calls for attention. So is the question of whether a deeply concerned Friend can hold a political administrative office where he may have to exert force to preserve order in the community, as the New Jersey and Pennsylvania Quaker magistrates of Keith's day were willing to acquiesce in. And the issue of holding slaves became of no smaller importance less than a century later. All of these issues Keith divined and confronted Friends with. He did it, however, not in the manner of a John Woolman, ready with infinite humility and patience, with reason and persuasiveness, with great personal sacrifice and affection and love for those he would seek to change, but rather in the harsh, sharp fashion of Pascal's *Provincial Letters*, and he wore out both his high standing and his welcome in the Society and was finally disowned first in America and then in England.

For the next five years, until 1700, his principal occupation was pamphleteering against the Quakers in England and preaching as a free-lance minister, holding weekly meetings in London in a hired hall. In 1700 he joined the Church of England. The next period of Keith's life reveals most tellingly the new missionary vigor of the Church of England, marked by the founding of the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge (1699) and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (1701). The latter group sent Keith to America again in 1702 to

do missionary work among the Quakers and to strengthen the Anglican communions all through the colonies.

The tale of this journey is not a happy one. After fathering a separation within the American Quakers in 1692 and then spending ten years in London in the most bitter attacks upon them and their English brothers, followed by his submission to the Anglican communion, he was not a missionary to win the Quaker heart to the more ancient communion, but only an unpleasant ghost returned to haunt and cudgel them. Some hint of their feeling toward him is indicated by the name of a pamphlet written against him on this journey which is entitled *Proteus Ecclesiasticus.*

His faithfulness to his charge on this journey, however, cannot be questioned. Upon his return to England as a man worn out with words and in poor health, as rector of the little Sussex parish of Edburton, he could not resist the temptation to continue his Quaker-baiting and he kept up his challenges to debates until he could get about no longer. The author of this book lists 105 books and pamphlets as the output of this intense life of religious controversy. Over half of them were written in the fifteen years 1692-1707 and were attacks on Quakerism. There is no record of that mellow and fragrant calm that marked Newman's closing years when he could answer a vehement Protestant challenge to public debate on the vileness of Catholicism by accepting on condition that his opponent would let him reply on his violin.

George Keith died in 1716 after a long and painful illness. He had incarnated the course of much of the English soul's pilgrimage from the Calvinism of the Commonwealth through the Quaker firsthand discovery of religious immediacy and the sacredness of each man as a vehicle of God, back to a growing yearning for more touch with Christian history, with the Bible and the sacraments, to the only half-reformed Catholicism of his ancient forebears that is the heritage of the Church of England. Here in the tragedy of this proud contentious and word-heavy man is a pilgrimage that is worth study by Quakers, Baptists, Calvinists, and Anglicans alike to see what each supplies that the other lacks. Here is no revolutionary prophet, no single-minded saint, no man who opens the way to the new levels of hidden inwardness in the soul. Yet here is a grim reminder that in any religion there are intellectual, historical, social, and institutional aspects as well as the crowning centre of immediacy that are neglected only at peril of an ultimate anemia of soul. Here is also the most convincing example of how the means determine the end in religious controversy as well as in war. For George Keith's career reveals how impossible it is to advance the deepest religious interests by rancorous polemical violence whether it be through the spoken or written word.

DOUGLAS V. STEERE

The Legacy of Egypt, edited by S. R. K. Glanville, New York, Oxford University Press, 1943, pp. xx, 424, $4.00.

The "Legacy" series is well-known. No higher praise can be accorded the present volume than that it is worthy of its antecedents. A mere listing of its seventeen contributors might enhance this repute, for they are all scholars of recognized authority. And the book itself is of the attractiveness for which the Oxford Press is famous. It is a happy augury that such a work came out of England in the third year of the war.

From an introductory essay by the editor sketching the nature of the heritage from ancient Egypt and the awakening of modern interest in Egyptology, the book moves on through discussions of chronology, history, literature, art, science (in various branches), law, and then a series of chapters comprising almost half the total

bulk that survey cultural and political relationships. A lengthy chapter is given to the Greek papyri; then the relations of ancient Egypt to Israel, to Rome, to Christianity, to Byzantium, to Islam, and to modern Egypt.

The essays are in general of such quality that to single out any for special mention can mean little more than an expression of personal interest. General Sewell's discussion of calendars and chronology brings new clarity into this basic issue. But was it necessary to resurrect, even with hesitation, the fabled Atlantis in order to explain the scientific knowledge of earliest Egypt? Does not such an attitude argue an uncritical discounting of preliterary cultures? That the Egyptians were capable of rapid progress in the practical aspects of science is evident from their sudden mastery of the complicated arts of massive building.

The excellent sketch of oriental history contains (p. 48) the arresting claim that "it was with the aim of securing, once for all, the southwestern boundaries of the Assyrian empire against Egyptian interference, rather than with any desire to incorporate Egypt within these boundaries, that Esarhaddon at length undertook the conquest of the country." Now just what is the evidence for this view? It implies a very intimate familiarity with the thinking of "the great king." When will historians abandon the outworn habit of embellishing their attested facts with pure imagination and setting both forward as of equal authority? On the preceding page the origin of the Samaritans is traced to the "mixed population" introduced by the Assyrian conquerors, completely ignoring the certain fact that the bulk and basis of the people remained Israelite.

Jean Capart's essay on Egyptian art is all that we might expect from him. Its treatment of the theme under twenty subtitles, along with generous introductory and concluding statements, suggests the richness of the material presented. Doubtless the reader will, however, become a little suspicious of the repeated use by Capart of the word "perfect." Such is a very high claim for any art. And waiving the question of the validity of the method of "descriptive geometry," which the Egyptian artist chose as against our use of perspective, was it "aiming at showing things as they are" when he characteristically depicted the human body with a twist so that one sees the front at the shoulders but at the same time the side at the hips?

What does Oesterley mean by stating (p. 221) that "mention of the Hittites (in the Megiddo inscription of Thutmose III) is the earliest mention we have of them"? At its obvious and apparently intended meaning, the statement simply is false. The Merneptah stela, we are told (p. 224), shows "the untenability of the contention that the exodus took place under Merneptah." It does only if we are to hold uncritically the traditional view that all Israel was enslaved in Egypt and went out as a united host in a single movement. It is odd, too, to have Jeroboam harbored in Egypt in the reign of *Rehoboam* (p. 226). And the claim that the forms of Hebrew poetry were influenced by those of the Egyptian calls for much better evidence and more balanced discussion than Oesterley provides on pp. 241-243.

The chapter on Christianity and Egypt is of high interest; also that on Islam. It is notable that Egypt had similar influence on both. It was the home of Christian monasticism, and stimulated the same tendency in Islam; and it fostered mysticism in both religions. Also one is impelled to mention the chapter on the papyri, and those on Egyptian science and medicine, and——but where shall we check comment within the limits of a brief review?

WILLIAM A. IRWIN

What Is a Mature Morality? by Harold H. Titus, New York, Macmillan, 1943, pp. 229, $2.00.

This is the type of book very much needed by the great number of persons without philosophical education who are not satisfied with traditional moral conventions as such and seek a method of settling their moral problems. As I understand it, "rules are made for slaves," children, and those incompetent to make sound judgments of their own. A description of a mature morality should indicate how such judgments should be made. That is essentially what Dr. Titus does. A mature morality should be one concerned primarily not with conformity with moral rules but with a realization of moral values. That, I am inclined to think, is Dr. Titus' position. At any rate, it is fundamental to it. Yet it is unfortunate that his discursive literary style has prevented him from bringing this distinction of moral rules and moral values sufficiently clearly into the foreground. The lack of a really clear analysis of this distinction is especially evident in the discussion of illustrations in the important chapter on "Compromise and Experimentation." Thus, in the example of the moral conflict of the prohibitionist (p. 117) there is no discussion of whether (according to moral values) prohibition is ethically right or wrong. It is not even suggested that such a question might be or should be raised.

In chapter IV Dr. Titus gives accounts of eight marks of a mature morality. As these marks cannot be listed here, I wish to call the attention of preachers and others to them. They are an excellent statement of principles and attitudes, a statement that could be well and widely used for moral education. The final chapter, more optimistic in tone, appears to me to be more in accordance with the facts of contemporary life than the first, entitled "Moral Confusion." The volume is of a very high standard of thoughtful exposition and of inspiration, and this writer hopes that many of those concerned with the guidance of the adolescent and the mature (in age) will study it.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

Roots of Bergson's Philosophy, by Ben-Ami Scharfstein, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. ix, 156, $1.75.

This estimate of the roots of the philosophy of Henri Bergson is, in a sense, a stricture against those ardent Bergsonolaters who contend that the ideas of Bergson are such that their like were never before conceived by the mind of man. The author cites Bergson himself as contending in his *L'Intuition philosophique* (pp. 809 f.), that in the solutions which any philosopher reaches, "we expect to find, arranged or disarranged, but scarcely modified, the elements of preceding or contemporary philosophies." Certainly this is remarkably true in the case of Bergson himself despite those who hold that his originality consists in an entirely new system of thought and ideas. For instance, in Bergson's evolutionary theory, there is not a single important phase which cannot be isolated and then "be duplicated among the biologists and philosophers of France who were active before him or during his time" (p. 98).

The preceding paragraph has suggested the general plan of the book. Reviewing the various phases and concepts of Bergson's philosophy as these are expressive of time, intuition, psychology, biology, morality, and religion, Scharfstein seeks to find the roots of each in those movements of science, religion, and philosophy which preceded Bergson or were contemporaneous with him. Thus in his theory of time Bergson is indebted to Spencer, Renouvier, Boutroux, Ravaisson, Balmès, Cournot, Delboeuf, Lotze, Fouillée, and Guyau; in his vitalistic biology to Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Ravaisson, Cournot, Delboeuf, Lalande, and also to a large group of

scientists; in psychology to Hartmann, Charcot, Ribot, Maine de Brian, Guyau, and others; in religion particularly to Plotinus, the Christian mystics, and to Henri Delacroix and Evelyn Underhill as interpreters of mysticism. This vast indebtedness of Bergson to the past and contemporary worlds was held within the bounds of consistency through his unswerving loyalty to French spiritualism. He ever considered life lived on a purely scientific level as incomplete and thwarted. The endeavor of his life, through his devotion to a spiritualistic interpretation, was to wed once again science and metaphysics, the divorce of which he considered the greatest evil from which contemporary philosophy suffers.

Having shown the great dependence of Bergson upon his past and present, our author devotes a final chapter to the question, "Is Bergson Original?" Obviously, if originality consists in being entirely novel in one's ideas, Bergson cannot qualify. But philosophic originality consists not in producing something *de novo* so much as it consists in giving form, clarity, and consistency to a multiplicity of points of view which have already seen the light of consciousness. Since man is an imitative creator, much of his originality consists just in this procedure. Herein we find the importance of Bergson for "his 'originality' is a gift for synthesizing the theories of other persons" (p. 138).

This small volume is an interesting disclosure of the roots of the thinking of one of our most vivid contemporary philosophers. It discloses the dependence of even the great thinker upon the world about him and the thoughts of his past and present. Surely it reveals the requirement that every philosopher seek to understand the cultural milieu of his world before he sets down his conclusions about life and human destiny.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Christian Philosophy of History, by Shirley Jackson Case, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1943, pp. viii, 222, $2.00.

Here is a vigorous and a stirring reaffirmation of the fact of progress, a clear-cut expression of a robust faith and confidence in the ways of God, and a challenging call for more strenuous and devoted endeavor on the part of mankind. Obsessed as we are with contemporary evil, the long view herein presented comes to us as the sound of drums and bugles to our drooping spirits. In a pessimistic age it gives us solid ground upon which to base an optimistic faith.

This is the book that all former students of Dean Case have long hoped that he would write, and it is a book that has been sorely needed to fill a glaring gap in theological literature. The crucial point in every theology is its interpretation of history, for upon this is dependent both its doctrine of God and its doctrine of man. Without a clear conception of the possibility, or lack of possibility, inherent in the historical process, the theologian can do no better than to erect an idealogical structure completely divorced from reality, and until a minister has grounded his preaching on a solid and substantial concept of history, his sermons will be little more than empty words piously pronounced.

The problem of constructing a valid philosophy of history has always come to the forefront during critical times, and the present hour of perplexity has been no exception. Theologians representing many points of view—Nicolas Berdyaev, Otto Piper, Christopher Dawson, John Macmurray, Paul Tillich, Gerald Heard, and many others—have sought to interpret for us the meaning of the past for the present and the future. Strangely enough, among all these men, the methodology of the historian has not been utilized in the effort to trace the course of history. No attempt has been

made to base interpretation upon a candid examination of the long story of mankind. To the contrary, the course of history has been trimmed to fit the requirements of a pattern arrived at, for the most part, by metaphysical speculation. It is for this reason that the present volume, free from bondage to any of the speculative hypotheses, will be welcomed by all ministers who take seriously the task of interpreting to the members of their congregations the significance of life as it is actually lived upon this planet. Without question, *The Christian Philosophy of History* should be read by every person who makes any pretense of thinking in theological terms.

The volume is marked by Dean Case's usual vivid rhetoric and sparkling similes, and passages abound that by virtue of their pertinence, pungency, and insight clamor for quotation.

WINTHROP S. HUDSON

A Prophet and A Pilgrim: Being the Incredible History of Thomas Lake Harris and Laurence Oliphant; Their Sexual Mysticisms and Utopian Communities Amply Documented to Confound the Skeptic, by Herbert W. Schneider and George Lawton, New York, Columbia University Press, 1942, pp. xviii, 589, $5.00.

"Incredible history," a phrase of the subtitle of this work, is an accurate choice of words. Yet while the material itself is incredible and ephemeral, the research of the authors is convincing and solid. The book has appeared as number 11 of the *Columbia Studies in American Culture,* a series of documents devoted to those aspects of American culture usually neglected in political histories and in histories of American literature and education. The authors have carefully documented their story; they have been sympathetic in their telling of a fantastic tale and yet quite ready to admit that they scarcely know how much of the story to believe. This picture of the "lunatic fringe" of the American scene is a very necessary part of the perspective of American life of the last half of the nineteenth century.

The prophet, Thomas Lake Harris, was a mystic who constructed an elaborate and baffling mythology based upon the psychology of sex. The deity was masculine-feminine; every man had a celestial feminine counterpart. With all his dreaming about the world of spirit Harris was shrewd in his business affairs. The community of the Brotherhood of the New Life, while beset with many difficulties, did continue for a number of years—longer, I believe, than many other similar attempts at utopia. Both the colonies of Eden-on-Erie (New York) and Fountain Grove (California) were devoted chiefly to the manufacture and sale of wine. Harris was successful in building up a fortune in this trade. Wine, which was turned into a profit for the spiritual community, Harris considered a "vehicle of the quickening influence" upon mankind. He wrote: "Now you must understand the wine holds in solution living animates, a million times smaller than bacteria as to the nature point which is their ultimate structure and they endeavor to puncture the myriads of larvous and parasitical growths that swarm in the ultimate degree of all human flesh" (p. 474). Perhaps it does! At any rate, Harris was able to relate his lucrative wine business to his world of divine Father-Mother.

Oliphant was a more gifted writer and emerges from the critical labors of the historians in a more favorable light. He seems to have been a sincere but often misled seeker after truth. Schneider and Lawton consider him "a gifted man of erratic and undisciplined intellect who tried to lead a Christlike life and achieve a variety of saintliness all his own" (p. 413). At only one point one might question his motive; he did attempt to increase his funds for a Zionist community in Palestine by appealing to the belief of some Christians in the fulfillment of prophecy. On the whole, the Oliphant thread of the story is the more interesting.

Stripped of the elaborate theological and mythological system, the Brotherhood of the New Life is similar in some of its practical emphases to the recent Oxford Group (Buchmanite) Movement. Oliphant summed up the tenets by saying that they "simply condense and crystallize into the uses of our daily life and teachings of Christ, under direct divine guidance, and we enjoy evidence both of an external and internal character which the world would call supernatural encouraging us when we are obeying His will, checking us when we go astray, and uniting us daily more nearly to Him and to each other" (p. 109).

It is significant that below the fantastic and absurd, the insincere and ostentatious, is something which is elemental, something which those who were attracted to Harris and Oliphant did not find in the organized religion of the churches. Although abortive and unfruitful, the Brotherhood of the New Life was a protest against the mediocrity of organized religion.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

The Negro in Colonial New England, 1620-1776, by Lorenzo Johnston Greene, New York, Columbia University Press, 1942, pp. 404, $4.50.

This book will not make the super-patriotic New Englanders happy, for the author has proved beyond any possible doubt that Colonial New England was more involved in the slave trade than any other section of the colonies, and that the New England attitude toward the Negro was little different from that of South Carolina or any of the other southern colonies. Rum making was the principal New England manufacturing interest, made so because it was indispensable for the slave trade. These facts have, in general, been known to the historian through such works as Weeden's extensive studies on the economic and social conditions in New England, Elizabeth Donnan's *Documents Illustrative of the Slave Trade* (3 vols.) and Moor's *Slavery in Massachusetts,* as well as numerous others. Mr. Greene's study, however, is the first that brings together all the facts bearing upon the Negro in Colonial New England.

Some of the chapter headings will indicate the nature of the treatment. The first chapter deals with the slave trade, a subject that has already found definitive treatment. Chapter three discusses the extent of Negro population and reveals that in 1774 the Negro composed 3.2 per cent of the total New England population. Connecticut in 1774 had 6,464 Negroes, which was more than any other New England colony, though Massachusetts had only a few less. Among the New England slave traders were found some of the most prominent families, many of them belonging to the gentility. Among them were William Pepperill, Jonathan Boucher, Peleg Clarke of Newport, Rhode Island, a descendant of John Clarke, the first minister of the Newport Baptist Church, and the Brown brothers, whose great fortune was based on the slave trade, and who later gave their name to Rhode Island College.

In no other region were slaves employed in a greater variety of trades than in New England. Besides the usual types of slave employment, Negroes were not infrequently used in shipbuilding, in cooperage plants, at iron works, in distilleries, as seamen, blacksmiths, in the whaling industry; and there are a few instances where a slave succeeded his former master as a physician. As a whole, the author thinks that slaves were better treated in New England than elsewhere in colonial America, due to the peculiar economic and political conditions prevailing there, and to the Puritan patriarchal conception of slavery based on the Old Testament (p. 327).

Chapter ten discusses slavery and conversion, a subject that has already been fully treated by Professor M. W. Jernegan. As a whole, the author thinks, there was less opposition to conversion of slaves to Christianity in New England than in the other

colonies. A fact that the author fails to note is that general opposition to slavery did not arise in New England until New England Calvinism began to change as a result of the Hopkinsinian emphasis upon the Edwardian doctrine of disinterested benevolence. Hopkinsianism insisted on a general atonement—that Christ died for all conditions of men, for Negroes and Indians, equally with New England Calvinists.

Among the slips which the reviewer has noted is one on p. 276 where the author has John Wesley, together with Whitefield and Jonathan Edwards, preaching "fiery" sermons in the New England Awakening.

WILLIAM W. SWEET

Heritage and Destiny, by John A. Mackay, New York, Macmillan, 1943, pp. x, 109, $1.50.

"The revolutions of modern history . . . have all been movements that had their origin in the power of ideas, 'the emotion of the ideal'. . . . The ideal is now being evolved from the real, and not the real from the ideal, as was the case a generation ago. . . . The 'emotion of the *real*' [has displaced] the 'emotion of the ideal'. . . . Strong adventurous spirits move forward by looking backward. . . . We must cultivate once again the habit of retrospection."

This is the *leit motif* of President Mackay's analysis of the present position in culture and religion. An earlier work (*A Preface to Theology*) had made vivid the familiar antithesis between the "spectator" and the "participant" attitudes by a contrast between the perspective of "the *balcony*" and that of "the *roadway*." The present book develops its underlying theme through a not dissimilar contrast between the perspective of "the *chauffeur*, . . . the slave of the forward view," and that of "the *boatman* . . . who moves intelligently forward by looking backward." Seeking "a new pathway to tomorrow" by "a rediscovery of yesterday," it searches "the heritage of Israel" for needed directives, and then brings their wisdom to bear upon the problems of "God and the Individual," "God and Culture," and "God and the Nation."

Everything upon which Dr. Mackay turns his rare powers of reflection and discernment lights up with fresh brilliance of meaning. Everything to which he devotes his no less notable gifts of exposition and interpretation is illumined in new shadings and colorings of delicacy and beauty. Here he lays bare the contradictions and frustrations of the contemporary scene and finds their resolution through profounder apprehension of the classic Christian views of God, of man, and of community. The distinction of his work lies less in the originality of its contentions, which he would emphatically disclaim, than in its capacity to drive home into the fabric of conviction and then on into the deeper and more decisive realm of volition ideas which are the current coin of present-day discussion. This power moves on every page of this great little book of hardly more than a hundred pages. It works with special challenge in the introductory and concluding sections. The former develops the viewpoint summarized in the quotations above; if accepted, it must revolutionize the outlook of the typical son of the modern world. In the latter (pp. 89-106), the author plumbs the riches of heritage of the nation of which he has himself so recently become a citizen. This confession of faith in the true destiny of America as a "*covenant* nation" might well be reprinted as required reading not only for the enlightenment and inspiration of any who may look hopefully toward the United States as a new homeland, but even more for the chastening and reconsecration of those who have inherited so casually a tradition of which they are prevailingly ignorant and to whose meaning for today they are so largely indifferent. This closing discussion, moving on a plane of lofty and restrained eloquence, is itself convincing vindication of the major thesis of the book.

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

Personalism in Theology, edited by Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Boston, Boston University Press, 1943, pp. x, 257, $2.50.

One should read books which do not conform to one's own habitual ideas, which require thought, and which throw one out of mental grooves and theological ruts. There is need for less yielding to complacency and more grappling with problems worthy of the intellectual and spiritual dignity of a man. For example, what and where is God? What is the essential nature of man? What is the relation of man to God? What are valid criteria of knowledge, and how can they be had? The struggle today is in the high places.

This volume of essays, written by thirteen eminent scholars in honor of Albert Cornelius Knudson, of Boston University, commands attention, furnishes jolts, arouses perplexity, and provokes gratitude. The book opens with a gracious eulogy of Professor Knudson, and a review—exhibiting more pomp than logic—of F. P. Bowne's philosophy. Thereafter appear valuable discussions of the universe, God, the relation of God to the universe, man's relation to God, ethical obligations, and educational problems.

These discussions of personalism are an intelligent effort to show the immanence of God without denying his transcendence. While they remind one of the pantheism of Xenophanes, Zeno, and Spinoza, exhibit the flavor of subjective idealism and the technique of mental projection, the reader is grateful for the emphasis placed upon the claim that reality is vital, accessible, and universal. For the personalist, God is neither nebulous spirit nor mechanistic law. These writers, moreover, do not bow to science, cater to pragmatism, nor fawn upon utilitarian education. Like Dante, they are disposed to consign to a lower circle those who, by education or otherwise, encourage the acceptance of a poor conception of God and discredit the spiritual nature of man.

A. C. REID

A New Philosophy and the Philosophical Sciences, by Apostolos Makrakis, New York, Putnam, 1940, 2 vols., pp. xlviii, 843, and xxviii, 716, $7.50.

In dealing with two volumes of such proportions as these by Apostolos Makrakis (1831-1905), founder of the philosophical School of the Logos in Athens, Greece, it is obviously impossible to give any detailed statement of content. Our endeavor will rather be to characterize the philosophy presented and to illuminate certain points of view and procedure which will enable the reader to evaluate the character of the work.

The endeavor of the author is to state the general background of the philosophic sciences, which he holds to be four in number: psychology, logic, ethics, and theology. The first three pertain to the inner man and prepare the way for the comprehension of the sublime object of the fourth, namely, God. So it turns out that the whole endeavor of man, in all his searching and observation, should be to discern the truth concerning God. As one goes through the various sciences, one discovers in a scientific way the Logos of the Mind called God. From these discoveries the philosopher is able to ascend to the contemplation of the Logos himself, thereby knowing him by whom all things were made that were made. The end of the quest, as the beginning, is God. Not a few will find in this general pattern the persistence of Neoplatonism's influence upon Christian thinkers of the third and fourth centuries. The pattern of the past is definitely revived in what the editors call, in distinction to all other systems of thought, "an entire system of philosophy and . . . the only complete philosophical work ever written" (Vol. I, p. xv).

Not a few modern thinkers will take umbrage at the reiterated claim that in this work one has the only complete and final system of philosophic and religious thought. If this be so, then there is nothing more to be discovered and certainly little further need of using ink to set down the formulations of our minds. Makrakis himself, in the preface to his work, writes: "I may observe that all previous philosophical systems have collapsed at their birth, as though built upon sand. As for mine, however, I am confident that it is too well grounded ever to fall, for it has been built solidly upon the solid rock of truth. Those who are incredulous are invited to test its solidity by attacking it; behold, I submit it to the judgment and trial of the entire scientific and philosophical world" (Vol. I, p. xxxv). Later, in the main body of the work, it is held that this is "a new system of philosophy, which will also be the last, since it is founded on the truth and amply satisfies the soul's philosophical wants" (Vol. I, p. 10). Audacious as this claim seems when one first beholds it in print, the repetition of it strikes one as being especially bad intellectual taste. Why not let the philosophy speak for itself rather than try to force into the minds of readers the contention that this is the last word and that there is nothing more to be said?

The truth of the matter is that what we have in this philosophical-theological system is what has been inherent in the religious speculations of the fathers of the Greek Church from the days of Clement of Alexandria and Origen. The principle of the Logos is exalted and made the key for opening the doors which lead us into the ultimate meanings of the universe and hence into the mind of God. Makrakis writes: "But what have *we* found to be the peculiar object of philosophy? The God-equal Logos, who was in the beginning with God, and who is the principle of awareness and of understanding, through whom all things were made and all things are explained, and who became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth, named Jesus Christ, the Lord of all. On this account philosophy is defined to be *love and knowledge of the God-equal Logos leading to deification* (Vol. I, p. 601). In all this we find nothing new. God is what the Logos is and salvation lies in our becoming what he is through love and knowledge. God is interpreted in terms of what is found in Christ, the historic expression of the Logos, and the Logos in turn is interpreted in terms of what has been found in God. Thus, in his theology, Makrakis finds the essential attributes of God's essence to be his life, his perfect awareness, his perfect volition, and his perfect power (Vol. I, pp. 449-460). When he comes to the theology of the Logos, he discovers the attributes of the Son to be the same as the Father: awareness, life, volition, and power (Vol. I, pp. 663-681). The Son is a copy of the Father. Since this has been orthodox Christian doctrine for ages, Makrakis introduces us to nothing new in what he considers the essential flow of his philosophy and theology.

The general procedure Makrakis follows in establishing the points of his philosophy includes 1. finding grounds for belief in God in nature, that is, in what the sciences tell us; and 2. discovering supporting and veridical statements for these truths in the Scriptures. In other words, natural truth and revealed truth corroborate each other. This means, in effect, that there is but one truth, not two truths, a finding with which modern thought would be in entire agreement. The only danger of making Scripture support every scientific discovery is that the day may come when Scripture may be found to contradict some fruitage of the scientific method. Should this happen, Makrakis' followers would find themselves with a conflict on their hands between science and religion, in which their leader's philosophy might possibly be brought into disrepute.

One of the keys to any theological system lies in the use of the Scriptures. Like most nineteenth-century Christians, Makrakis had a flat Bible. Every part of it is of equal value and is to be used with equal force in proving what is true. Naturally, this point of view has led to many disastrous bouts between the theologians and the scientists. It has also led to the survival of primitive views in religion and to the lurid use of imagination in determining the meaning and implications of particular passages of Scripture. Makrakis has not escaped these dangers. Consider, as typical, this paragraph:

> Let us conceive Satan in the carnate form of a large serpent called a dragon. His breast conceals the diabolical will of Satan; his belly hides the wicked desire that no man be created according to the image and likeness of God; his head conceals vicious thoughts by which he plans and hunts the food for his own belly; while his poison-spitting tongue conceals the falsehood which he pours out into the ear of man for the purpose of destroying and devouring him. The belly and the desire of Satan, his breast and his will, his head and his thoughts, as well as the falsehood of his tongue—all these constitute the essence and nature of the Devil. And so just as the belly and the breast and the head constitute one crawling body of the serpent, likewise the desire and the will and the intellect of the Devil constitute one Devil cursed above all others and utterly vicious (Vol. II, p. 126).

Those two volumes will be of interest to the student of theology not because they present an entirely new philosophy of religion, but because they reveal a type of thinking which has long prevailed in the Greek Orthodox Church. They are an excellent statement of the theology of that church, centring as it does in the Logos as an expression of the eternal reason of God and of man's salvation through such an identification with that Logos that it leads to deification.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Primacy of Faith, by Richard Kroner, New York, Macmillan, 1943, pp. xi, 226, $2.50.

This book is a fascinating and learned attempt to reinterpret the functions of reason and faith in relation to the theological problem and the Christian faith. But I am not sure that it is illuminating, especially if one is not willing to grant priority at the outset to certain demands of the religious consciousness.

These claims, which reason must satisfy if she would deserve primacy, are that reality is ultimately a mysterious unity of truth and goodness in a personal creator and redeemer. These claims cannot, in fact, be satisfied by logical and inductive reason based on sense and on moral experience. Such reason can suggest similar hypotheses, but, owing to its dependence upon concepts, inevitably ends in insoluble antinomies, such as finitude and infinitude, being and becoming, good and evil. Thus Dr. Kroner says: "Metaphysical thought may ultimately postulate the idea of a being whose essence is at the same time his existence . . . who unites in himself will and deed . . . who is as unchangeable as he is the cause and the end of all changes. . . . But we cannot deceive ourselves with the conviction that this idea is more than . . . the hypothesis of our own speculation." Though such an idea of God is "logically necessary," it is "not satisfying religiously" because "it lacks the reality of God which the heart longs for," and in any case never quite effects the reconciliation of opposites. Consequently: "Thought must die before it can grasp the Ultimate."

Fortunately, at this critical moment, faith comes into its own, and, by religious imagination, satisfies the heart's desire and "solves the problem of speculation . . . though not by speculation." The truth is that in every man there is a mystical intuition of the "all-pervading unity of particular things and processes," an intuition "silent" because it cannot define the indefinite and vague object of which it is

aware. This "original unity," which abstract thought separates and falsifies, is for religious imagination to express, "not in the methodical and argumentative course of philosophical reasoning, but rather in the unmethodical and naïve language of stories, tales, and legends." For example: Imagination seeks to express in such stories as "the fall" the mysterious reconciliation of the rational contradiction of the existence of moral evil in paradise.

As already hinted, it seems that Dr. Kroner has all the essential answers to start with. He explains why the God he knows about is rationally unattainable or deniable and why we need another cognitive power to make up the defects of reason. In this book, at any rate, he gives us no criterion for checking conflicting data of religious imagination, though he emphasizes that the check cannot be rational.

This kind of argument is indeed suggestive and encourages one to reëxamine his philosophical procedure, but can it legitimately remove the underlying *if*? *If* God is not what the religious imagination reveals, then he may be accessible to reason! Furthermore, have we not reached a curious state in philosophizing when we judge what were supposed to be our instruments for knowing reality, reason, and faith, by our prior knowledge of reality? Again, to say that life or reality is an indissoluble unity which conceptualizing reason falsifies may seem to be an illuminating answer to an antinomy until one realizes that it is an answer in the absence of understanding, and invoked by the *fiat* of a "faith" which is not, alas, an instrument of knowledge but a specific revelation of reality.

PETER A. BERTOCCI

BOOK NOTICES

Christianity and Civilisation, by H. G. Wood, New York, Macmillan, 1943, pp. 128, $1.25.

One of the *Current Problems* series. The author is professor of theology in the University of Birmingham. Though written in a British atmosphere, the little book will amply reward a careful reading here in America: to see what an outstanding English Christian leader is thinking and feeling. It is concisely written, but interesting, readable. It overflows with up-to-date scholarship; and a surprising familiarity with all that is going on—and being written—social, political, church, world conditions. There is a chapter on "Christianity and the Marxist Philosophy" that speaks out concerning communism and matters Russian. ("The Russian people will only preserve whatever the new regime has secured for them, as they can work the poison of Marxism out of their system.") The discussion of "Christianity and Scientific Humanism" is as fine a piece of what used to be called apologetics as one would ask for. ("Neither science without Christianity nor Christianity without science can do the job. The sooner the Christian faith and the true scientific outlook form an alliance the better.") One does not get any too much encouragement from the gospel, as the author applies Jesus' teachings to our world's outlook. ("His teaching gives no direct answers or simple solutions to our manifold social problems. He did not come to save civilisation: he came to save men and women.") Be it said that Professor Wood distinguishes between the rationalist and the mystical views of Jesus. Yet the book is not what you would call pessimistic. ("The Christian church has faced triumphant and insolent barbarism before.")

MITCHELL BRONK

Christian Bases of World Order, by Henry A. Wallace and others, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, pp. 255, $2.00.

This volume consists of twelve papers, by as many different authors, presented at Ohio Wesleyan University. They comprise the Merrick Lectures, and were part of a conference held at the university, March 8-12, which was attended by some three hundred church leaders. The general theme, the Christian Bases of World Order, is timely, and the papers, on the whole, are stimulating. Four of the lectures are on fundamental Christian principles, seven are on factors in world order, while the place of honor is given to Vice President Wallace, who opened the conference with an address "Practical Religion in the World of Tomorrow." Needless to say, this was courageously optimistic, with a fine correlation of the ideal and the real. Like a majority of the papers, it closely approximated a sermon. Bishop McConnell, President King of Gammon College, Professor Brightman of Boston University, and President Lee of Southern Methodist University follow on fundamentals. These four may be in agreement in essentials in religion, but in theology there would be considerable divergence. Brightman closes a fine argument for personalism with the terse sentence: "Let it [the postwar world] experiment with God." Bishop McConnell's God probably would consent to the venture, but we suspect the Deity of certain other contributors would resent such familiarity. A number of significant, though not sermonic, papers deal with economic, social, and political problems. Challenging is the one by Reinhold Schairer, in which the need for an international educational organization is strongly advocated. Such a world organi-

zation is considered essential to world peace, and a ten-point basic charter thereto is suggested. This charter is wholesomely liberal, even if objections might be raised to a suggestion such as "textbooks and teaching methods should be continually investigated"; this sounds just a little bit like Deut. 13:2-17, or like Gestapo educational methods. But the author might retort: The intellectual processes of children and most humans being what they are, what are you going to do about it?

I. G. MATTHEWS

The World of the Four Freedoms, by Sumner Welles, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. x, 121, $1.75.

This little book of addresses, delivered by Undersecretary of State, the Honorable Sumner Welles, between 1939 and 1943, is important, for one thing, because it contains the pronouncements of the chief spokesman of our State Department during the critical years of our becoming involved in a crucial world war. These brief, dynamic, statesmanlike speeches give an intelligent explanation not only of the fundamental causes of the world chaos of today, but also of the things that are being done by our government and the things that must be done by the United Nations to win the war and to establish order and permanent peace in the postwar world. Included, too, in Mr. Welles' addresses is the story of the achievement of inter-American solidarity under the leadership of our State Department and of what the coöperation of the American republics and Canada means to us in these critical times. Explanations of our political and economic mistakes after 1919 reveal the blunders and tragedies of the period. But Mr. Welles gives hope and courage to us to believe that, granted the will, we can create a postwar world in which the "four freedoms" will become a reality.

A. C. REID

That They May Have Life, by Stephen B. L. Penrose, Jr., Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1942, pp. xviii, 347, $3.75.

Wendell Willkie, in his account of his world tour which is reported in *One World,* tells of his discovery of a great fund of good will in the Orient which is directed toward the United States. In his list of the sources from which this good will has arisen he names first of all the Christian missionary colleges and hospitals which have been planted by Americans all over the Orient. The American University of Beirut in Syria is one of these colleges. Its story is told in this volume. Its founder and first president, Dr. Daniel Bliss, defined the purpose of the college in memorable words:

> This College is for all conditions and classes of men without regard to color, nationality, race, or religion. A man, white, black, or yellow: Christian, Jew, Mohammedan, or heathen, may enter and enjoy all the advantages of this institution for three, four, or eight years; and go out believing in one God, in many gods, or in no God. But it will be impossible for anyone to continue with us long without knowing what we believe to be the truth and our reasons for that belief.

From this school have come the leaders in education, government, medicine, religion in the Near East. In its classrooms and dormitories Turks, Armenians, Syrians, Arabs, and members of the ancient Christian churches have mingled together and made friendships that have helped to allay the bitterness which has characterized relations between these groups in the past. It has not been easy to carry on such an institution. Deep prejudices were set against its founding, and the vicissitudes of political history in that region have frequently disturbed the life of the school,

at times threatening its close. But because of the place it had won in the life of Syria it was able to carry on even during the first world war when America and Turkey were on opposite sides. It is a fine thing that the history of this great school has now been recorded for the public eye.

GORDON POTEAT

Benjamin Tallmadge, Revolutionary Soldier and American Business Man, by Charles Swain Hall, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. x, 375, $3.50.

The subject of this biography was not an outstanding personage in American history, and at first thought one attributes this rather elaborate account of his life to the family pride of his descendants. However, the point is well taken by the author—in the preface—that it is rewarding to go over the careers of some of the "long-neglected men who made possible the achievements of the more distinguished leaders." Benjamin Tallmadge was a Connecticut Yankee who served honorably under Washington, especially in patrolling and secret service. He was much in the Philadelphia area during the Valley Forge winter. Having been a classmate and intimate friend of Nathan Hale's at Yale College, he was strangely fated to have charge of Major André during this other patriotic martyr's last days. After the war he engaged extensively in business, in his home town, Litchfield. He speculated in land (five and six cents an acre!); had much to do with the "Ohio Company" and the better known Western Reserve. He was one of Connecticut's Representatives of Congress for several terms, a strong Federalist. Religion played a big part in Tallmadge's life. He had an old-fashioned conversion and was always harking back to it; was never at ease unless a revival was under way. Lyman Beecher was his pastor in Litchfield. His only regret about Washington's life was that that worthy had never "been explicit in his profession of faith in, and dependence on the finished Atonement of our glorious Redeemer." He was one of the promoters of a missionary training school at Litchfield, and had much to do in the early organizations of the Congregational denomination. Benjamin Tallmadge's lifetime, 1754—1835, constitutes a big slice of American history, and this volume is indeed rewarding as a study of that interesting and crucial period. The author is a librarian of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park.

MITCHELL BRONK

Baptists in the U. S. S. R., by J. H. Rushbrooke, Nashville, Broadman, 1943, pp. 16, $0.10.

The announcement from a Russian Baptist source that there are four million Baptists in the Soviet Union is probably wishful and fanciful. But, as is well known, Baptists constituted the largest and most oppressed group of dissenters in Russia under the czars, and today they seem to offer the most fertile subsoil for evangelical seed sowing, despite all Soviet opposition. Therefore, it is exceedingly important that we have a succinct, yet comprehensive, statement regarding their origin less than eighty years ago, their growth, persecution, cultural backwardness, internal dissensions, and their indestructible spirit. Such a statement, chiefly historical, is furnished us by Dr. Rushbrooke, president of the Baptist World Alliance. Recent developments and prospective changes require an intelligent understanding of the Baptists in Russia, who, if their own estimate of membership is reliable, now constitute one-fourth of the numerical strength of Baptists in the entire world.

JAMES H. FRANKLIN

BOOKS RECEIVED

**Religious and Secular Leadership,* by Solomon Zeitlin, Philadelphia, Dropsie College, 1943, pp. xvi, 117, $1.50.

**The Historic Mission of Jesus,* by C. J. Cadoux, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xxiv, 376, $3.00.

**Twentieth Century Philosophy,* edited by Dagobert D. Runes, New York, Philosophical Library, 1943, pp. 571, $5.00.

Musical Interludes in Boston, 1790–1830, by H. Earle Johnson, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. xviii, 366, $4.00.

An excellent addition to the Columbia University *Studies in Musicology.* It presents a charming picture of culture in the "Athens of America" of a century ago.

**Science, Religion, and the Future,* by C. E. Raven, New York, Macmillan, 1943, pp. x, 125, $2.00.

**Æsthetic Experiences and the Humanities,* by Francis Shoemaker, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. xviii, 339, $3.50.

**Religion of Tomorrow,* by John Elof Boodin, New York, Philosophical Library, 1943, pp. 189, $2.50.

**The Anti-Anthropomorphisms of the Greek Pentateuch,* by Charles T. Fritsch, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1943, pp. 81, $2.00.

**Race and Crime,* by Willem Adrian Bonger, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. xi, 130, $1.50.

The Goodspeed Parallel New Testament, edited by Edgar J. Goodspeed, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1943, pp. viii, 600, $2.00.

The most recent appearance of the indefatigable Dr. Goodspeed's excellent translation. This time it hobnobs with the King James Version in parallel columns. It should prove useful as well as revealing.

**Inter-American Affairs,* 1942, edited by Arthur P. Whitaker, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. x, 252, $3.00.

Working with God in His World, by Margaret S. Ward, Philadelphia, Judson Press, 1943, pp. 207, $1.50.

A course for use in the primary department of the vacation church school.

**A Survey of Religious Literature,* by Charles S. Macfarland, New York, Revell, 1943, pp. 157, $1.50.

The Quest for Preaching Power, by John Nicholls Booth, New York, Macmillan, 1943, pp. xviii, 240, $2.00.

This is another book on homiletics. The field has been so thoroughly worked over that it is difficult for anyone to make an original contribution in it. A new label can be put on the bottle, but the contents will have the same ingredients. That is about the case here.

* To be reviewed.

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